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9. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on various decisions of various High Courts, of which, some of them, which are relevant are referred to hereunder.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision reported in (P. Sarathy vs. State Bank of India) AIR 2000 SC 2023 wherein the Honourable Supreme Court categorically held that for exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the time spent in prosecution of another proceedings can be taken note of. In that particular case, the Honourable Supreme Court held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not speak about a Civil Court, but speaks only of a Court. It is not necessary that the Court spoken to in Section 14 should be a Civil Court. Any authority or Tribunal having the trappings of a Court would be a Court within the meaning of this Section. It was further held that the petition pending before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeal) cannot be a Civil Court within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, but it is definitely a Court within the meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Therefore it was held that the entire period of time from the date of institution of the departmental appeal as also the period from the date of institution of the appeal under Section 41 (2) before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (appeals) till it was dismissed, will have to be excluded for computing the period of limitation for filing the suit for a declaration that the removal of the appellant was illegal, ultra vires and valid. As per this decision of the Honourable Supreme Court, in the present case, even though the complaint was presented before a Court having no jurisdiction, the period during which the complaint was pending before the wrong forum has to be excluded and therefore, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the delay has to be calculated from the date of presentation of the complaint before the wrong forum till it was represented before the Court having jurisdiction has to be rejected. In fact, this decision relied on by the counsel for the petitioner only supports the case of the respondent.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the decision of this Court reported in (S.N. Jayarama Aiyar and others vs. S. Rajagopalan) AIR 1965 Madras 459 (Vol.52, C.167) for the proposition that when a case was filed in a wrong forum, then the case cannot be filed beyond the period of limitation by applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Even if this is accepted, then it remains that the period during which the case was pending in the wrong Court cannot be condoned. In such event, the entire length of delay commencing from 02.04.2009 till the date on which the complaint was re-presented i.e., 21.04.2010 before the correct forum i.e., IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai has to be calculated for condonation of delay. If the delay is calculated from 02.04.2009 till 21.04.2010, the period of delay will be 366 days. As stated supra, after insertion of Section 142 (3), the trial court is empowered to condone the delay if the Court is satisfied with the reasons assigned by the complainant. In this case, the complainant/respondent would state that the delay had occurred because the complaint was presented in a wrong forum. Therefore, the Court below, invoking the powers under Section 142 (3) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, condoned the delay on being satisfied with the reasons assigned by the complainant/respondent. Thus, the reason assigned by the complainant/respondent is an acceptable reason and the court below is justified in condoning the delay in accordance with the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (P. Sarathy vs. State Bank of India) AIR 2000 SC 2023 relied on by the counsel for the petitioner.

16. In the present case, no doubt, the respondent has filed an application for condonation of 67 days delay in filing the complaint by calculating the period during which the complaint was prosecuted in the wrong forum namely VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai. Originally, the complaint was filed on 02.04.2009 before the learned VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai and he ought to have filed the complaint on or before 28.03.2009, thus, there was 6 days delay in filing the complaint even before the learned VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, who admittedly has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. But after the petition for condonation of delay was returned by the learned VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, the petitioner re-presented the complaint before the learned IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, who alone has jurisdiction to try the complaint, with a delay of 67 days in filing the complaint, by calculating the period during which the complaint was pending before the wrong forum namely learned VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai.

18. In the present case, the court below namely learned IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, while condoning the delay, has taken two things into consideration. The complaint was originally filed by the respondent before the learned VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai by contending that the lawyer notice emanated from the office of the lawyer which is situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai. However, as per the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court, in (Harman Electronics (P) Ltd., vs. National Panasonic India (P) Ltd.,) (2009) (1) SCC 720 it was held that place where the cheque was presented before the holders bank and the place of issuance of statutory notice will not confer jurisdiction on a court and therefore, the learned VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai returned the complaint and that the petitioner had bonafide pursued the complaint before the wrong forum. The second thing that weighed the learned IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai is that the petitioner in the affidavit has stated that he suffered from viral fever which prevented him to present the complaint in time and therefore the delay of 6 days in filing the complaint is bonafide. Such reason assigned by the respondent for condonation of the delay was found to be acceptable and satisfactory by the learned IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai and therefore the delay was condoned. In fact, after amendment to the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, with effect from 06.02.2005, Section 14 (2) of the Act empowers the Magistrate to condone the delay in filing the complaint, if the reasons assigned thereof are satisfactory and acceptable. Therefore, the learned IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai on being satisfied that the delay in filing the complaint is reasonable, especially the delay had occurred during the period when the complaint was pending before a wrong forum, has condoned the delay. In any event, such a satisfaction arrived at by the learned IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai to hold that there is a sufficient cause for not filing the complaint in time, cannot be interfered with by this Court.