Karnataka High Court
Between vs Suresh V/S State Of Karnataka on 3 September, 2024
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 24.07.2024
Pronounced on : 03.09.2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 03RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.5821 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
1 . V.S.SURESH
S/O V.S.MURTHY
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.1178/5,
22ND 'A' CROSS, 23RD MAIN,
NEAR BDA COMPLEX,
BANASHANKARI 2ND STAGE,
BENGALURU - 560 070.
2 . S.P.HOMBANNA
S/O S.J.PADMARAJ
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO. 507/5
9TH CROSS
UPPER PALACE ORCHARDS
NEAR SANKEY TANK
SADASHIVANAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 080.
3 . S. SUDHINDRA
S/O S.K.SRINIVAS,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.23, 1ST 'C' CROSS,
2
3RD PHASE, REVENUE LAYOUT,
5TH BLOCK, BENGALURU SOUTH,
BENGALURU - 560 085.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI C.V.NAGESH, SR.ADVOCATE FOR
SRI NAGABHUSHANA REDDY K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY
MAHALAKSHMIPURAM POLICE STATION
BENGALURU
REPRESENTED BY SPP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
AT BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. SMT. R. SHASHIREKHA
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
W/O LATE JAGADEESH R.,
RESIDING AT NO.310, 6TH MAIN ROAD,
MAHALAKSHMI LAYOUT,
BENGALURU - 560 086.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI HARISH GANAPATHI, HCGP FOR R-1;
SRI.D.R.RAVISHANKAR SR.ADVOCARTE A/W
SRI NAVEEN GUDIKOTE, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR AGAINST THE ABOVE
PETITIONERS IN CR.NO.172/2024 OF MAHALAKSHMIPURAM P.S.
BENGALURU FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 306, 420, 506 R/W 34 OF
IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE 32ND ADDL.C.M.M COURT
NRUPATUNGA ROAD, BENGALURU CITY.
3
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 24.07.2024, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA)
The petitioners-accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 are knocking at the
doors of this Court calling in question registration of a crime in
Crime No.172 of 2024 for offences punishable under Sections 306,
420, 506 r/w Section 34 of the IPC.The 2nd respondent is the
complainant.
2. Facts in brief germane are as follows:
The petitioners and the husband of the complainant were
partners of one M/s. Soundarya Constructions. The husband of the
complainant commits suicide on 14-04-2024. The case was closed
recoding an unnatural death report - UDR. After about 40 days of
death of the husband, the complainant registers a complaint before
the jurisdictional police on 22-05-2024 alleging that while she was
cleaning the wardrobe of her husband she found a note which is
4
termed as a death note written by her husband in his own
handwriting and the contents of the death note shocked and
doubted that the husband of the complainant had been coaxed or
goaded to death, as he had incurred loss of Rs.60 crores and the
loss was on account of the petitioners herein who are the partners
of M/s. Soundarya constructions, and they are directly responsible
for her husband's death. It is alleged by the complainant that the
petitioners have made her husband to invest money in the said
construction Company. Even though the Company was in profit,
they had projected that the Company was in loss and on securing
loan in the name of the husband of the complainant, the same has
been utilized by these petitioners for their personal commitments.
This complaint becomes a crime in Crime No.172 of 2024 for
offences punishable as afore-quoted. Registration of the crime
and commencement of investigation has driven these petitioners to
this Court in the subject petition.
3. Heard Sri C V Nagesh, learned senior counsel appearing for
petitioners, Sri Harish Ganapathi, learned High Court Government
Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri D R Ravishankar,
5
learned senior counsel appearing along with Sri Naveen Gudikote,
learned counsel for respondent No.2.
4. The learned senior counsel Sri C V Nagesh appearing for
the petitioners would submit that the death happened on 14-04-
2024. The husband of the complainant commits suicide. At that
point in time, nothing was revealed nor the immediate investigation
revealed anything. After about 40 days, claiming that the husband
in his own handwriting had written the so called death note, these
petitioners are drawn into the web of crime. Learned senior counsel
would further submit that if the contents of the complaint are
noticed, they are absolutely vague, as all the contents relate to
things that have happened during the lifetime of the husband of the
complainant, which the husband himself had not complained of. He
would submit that none of the ingredients of the offence punishable
under Sections 306, 420 or 506 of the IPC are even met in the case
at hand. He would seek quashment of the entire proceedings.
5. Per-contra, the learned senior counsel Sri D R Ravishankar
representing the 2nd respondent-complainant would submit that
6
certain transactions have happened between the husband of the
complainant and the petitioners. The police have seized the DVR
which was installed in the residence and have also seized the
mobiles, all of which would indicate that the last call before the
deceased committed suicide was from the 1st petitioner who had
constantly sent messages asking the deceased to call him urgently,
he would therefore submit this is abetment to suicide. The learned
senior counsel would also seek to place reliance upon certain bank
transactions and certain agreements between the petitioners and
the husband of the complainant at the time when the husband of
the complainant was alive. In all, he would seek to contend that
investigation, in the least, should be permitted to be completed. He
would place reliance upon a document at Annexure R2 to the
statement of objections, which according to him, is the reason for
transfer of funds from the account of the complainant's husband to
the 1st petitioner. He would submit that this is the trigger point of
abetment which led to commission of suicide.
7
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned senior counsel and other learned
counsel and have also perused the material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The petitioners
and the husband of the complainant being partners of M/s.
Soundarya Constructions is a matter of record. The husband of the
complainant dies by committing suicide on 14-04-2024.
Immediately thereafter, the police enquire into the matter and
register a UDR in UDR No.15 of 2024 after drawing the inquest
proceedings as obtaining under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. During
the course of the enquiry, prior to registration of the UDR, the
complainant and their relatives were all present and were enquired
into. After about 40 days of the death, a complaint comes to be
registered alleging that the petitioners have abetted the death of
the husband of the complainant, which is on the basis of a letter the
complainant allegedly found in the wardrobe when she was cleaning
her husband's wardrobe for the purpose of performance of the
ceremony of her husband. This becomes a crime in Crime No.172
of 2024. Since the entire issue has now sprung from the complaint,
8
I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. The complainant is
dated 22-05-2024. It reads as follows:-
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The complaint is completely vague. It narrates that the petitioners
have threatened that they would kill the husband and they have
forged the signatures of the complainant's husband and have
transferred several amounts. This led to the loan being taken in
10
the name of her husband, which further led to depression of her
husband. Broadly based upon this comes the complaint and the
crime in Crime No.172 of 2024. What is alleged against these
petitioners is the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC
inter alia. Section 306 of the IPC reads as follows:
"306. Abetment of suicide.--If any person commits
suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
For an offence to become punishable under Section 306 of the
IPC, the ingredients as obtaining under Section 107 of the IPC
are necessarily to be present. Section 107 of the IPC reads as
follows:
"107. Abetment of a thing.--A person abets the doing
of a thing, who--
First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person or
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or
illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and
in order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.--Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.--A person who, by wilful
misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact
11
which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or
attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to
instigate the doing of that thing."
Illustration
A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a
Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also
that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby
intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by
instigation the apprehension of C.
Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time of
the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the
commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission
thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
The interpretation of Section 306 of the IPC and its ingredients as
obtaining under Section 107 of IPC need not detain this Court for
long or delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court in plethora of
judgments has considered the said issue. I deem it appropriate to
notice every one of them, which are rendered for the last 3
decades.
8. The Apex Court has, right from MAHENDRA SINGH AND
ANOTHER v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH1 held as follows:
"1. Criminal Appeal No. 743 of 1989 is filed by Mahendra
Singh, the husband and his mother Radhabai the mother-in-law
of the deceased Khema Bai. The appellant in Criminal Appeal
1
(1995) Supp (3) SCC 731
12
No. 402 of 1989 is Gayatri Bai the sister-in-law of the husband
of the deceased Khemabai. These three appellants stand
convicted under Section 306 I.P.C. where under they have been
sentenced to three years R.I. each. In so far as the appellants in
Criminal Appeal No. 743 of 1989 are concerned, they have
undergone the sentence imposed on them. Sentence of the
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 402 of 1989 stands suspended
under orders of this Court after the appellant has undergone
sentence barely of about ten days. The charge under Section
306 I.P.C. is basically based on the dying declaration of the
deceased which when translated reads as follows:
"My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law
(husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They beat
me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to
marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my
sister-in-law. Because of these reasons and being
harassed I want to die by burning."
2. Learned Counsel for the appellant rightly
submitted that but for the statement of the deceased
there is no other pointed evidence from which it could be
inferred that there was any abetment so as to bring the
acts of the appellants within Section 306 I.P.C. under
which the appellants have been punished. The dying
declaration, per se, could not involve the appellants in
offence punishable under Section 306 I.P.C., because it
provides for abetment of suicide. Whoever abets the
commission of suicide, and if any person commits suicide
due to that reason, he shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.
Abetment has been defined in Section 107 I.P.C. to mean
that a person abets the doing of a thing who firstly
instigates any person to do a thing, or secondly, engages
with one or more other person or persons in any
conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal
omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and
in order to the doing of that thing, or thirdly, intentionally
aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that
thing. Neither of the ingredients of abetment are
attracted on the statement of the deceased. The
conviction of the appellants under Section 306 I.P.C.
13
merely on the allegation of harassment to the deceased is
not sustainable. The appellants deserve to be acquitted of
the charge."
(Emphasis supplied)
In RAMESH KUMAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH2 the Apex
Court has held as follows:
"9. So far as the offence under Section 306 of IPC
is concerned, in our opinion, the Trial Court and the
High Court have committed gross error of law in holding
the accused-appellant guilty and therefore conviction
under Section 306 IPC deserves to be quashed and set
aside.
10. Section 306 IPC provides that if any person
commits suicide whoever abets the commission of such
suicide, shall be liable to be punished. The ingredients
of abetment are set out in Section 107 of IPC which
reads as under:
"107. Abetment of thing.-A person abets the doing of
a thing, who- First.- Instigate any person to do that
thing; or Secondly.- Engages with one or more other
person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of
that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in
pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the
doing of that thing; or Thirdly.- Intentionally aids, by
any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing."
.... .... ....
13. The present case is not one which may fall under
clauses, secondly and thirdly of Section 107 of Indian Penal
Code. The case has to be decided by reference to the first
clause, i.e., whether the accused-appellant abetted the suicide
by instigating her to do so.
2
(2001) 9 SCC 618
14
14. It is beyond doubt that Seema did commit a suicide.
Undisputedly, such suicide has been committed within a year
of the date of marriage. What happened on the date of
occurrence is very material for the purpose of recording a
finding on a question of abetment. Enough material is
available on record by way oral and documentary evidence
with which we shall now deal with.
.... .... ....
20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke,
incite or encourage to do `an act'. To satisfy the
requirement of instigation though it is not necessary
that actual words must be used to that effect or what
constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically
be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable
certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of
being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the
accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued
course of conduct created such circumstances that the
deceased was left with no other option except to
commit suicide in which case an instigation may have
been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or
emotion without intending the consequences to actually
follow cannot be said to be instigation."
(Emphasis supplied)
In S.S.CHHEENA v. VIJAY KUMAR MAHAJAN3 the Apex Court
has held as follows:
"25. Abetment involves a mental process of
instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in
doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the
accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide,
conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the
legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this
Court is clear that in order to convict a person under
Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to
3
(2010) 12 SCC 190
15
commit the offence. It also requires an active act or
direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide
seeing no option and that act must have been intended to
push the deceased into such a position that he committed
suicide.
26. In the instant case, the deceased was undoubtedly
hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences
which happen in our day-to-day life. Human sensitivity of each
individual differs from the other. Different people behave
differently in the same situation.
27. When we carefully scrutinize and critically examine
the facts of this case in the light of the settled legal position the
conclusion becomes obvious that no conviction can be legally
sustained without any credible evidence or material on record
against the appellant. The order of framing a charge under
Section 306 IPC against the appellant is palpably erroneous and
unsustainable. It would be travesty of justice to compel the
appellant to face a criminal trial without any credible material
whatsoever. Consequently, the order of framing charge under
Section 306 IPC against the appellant is quashed and all
proceedings pending against him are also set aside."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case of M. ARJUNAN v. STATE4 it is held by the Apex Court
as follows:
"7. The essential ingredients of the offence Under Section
306 Indian Penal Code are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention
of the Accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to
commit suicide. The act of the Accused, however, insulting the
deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself,
constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence
capable of suggesting that the Accused intended by such act to
instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients
4
(2019) 3 SCC 315
16
of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, Accused
cannot be convicted Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code.
8. In our considered view, in the case at hand, M.O. 1-
letter and the oral evidence of PW-1 to PW-5, would not be
sufficient to establish that the suicide by the deceased was
directly linked to the instigation or abetment by the Appellant-
deceased. Having advanced the money to the deceased,
the Appellant-Accused might have uttered some abusive
words; but that by itself is not sufficient to constitute the
offence Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code From the
evidence brought on record and in the facts and
circumstances of the case, in our view the ingredients of
Section 306 Indian Penal Code are not established and
the conviction of the Appellant-Accused Under Section
306 Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained."
(Emphasis supplied)
In GURCHARAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB5 the Apex Court
holds as follows:
"15. As in all crimes, mens rea has to be
established. To prove the offence of abetment, as
specified Under Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, the
state of mind to commit a particular crime must be
visible, to determine the culpability. In order to prove
mens rea, there has to be something on record to
establish or show that the Appellant herein had a guilty
mind and in furtherance of that state of mind, abetted the
suicide of the deceased. The ingredient of mens rea
cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be
visible and conspicuous. However, what transpires in the
present matter is that both the Trial Court as well as the
High Court never examined whether Appellant had the
mens rea for the crime, he is held to have committed. The
conviction of Appellant by the Trial Court as well as the
High Court on the theory that the woman with two young
5
(2020) 10 SCC 200
17
kids might have committed suicide, possibly because of
the harassment faced by her in the matrimonial house, is
not at all borne out by the evidence in the case.
Testimonies of the PWs do not show that the wife was
unhappy because of the Appellant and she was forced to
take such a step on his account.
.... .... ....
20. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation in
declaring that the Trial Court and the High Court erred in
concluding that the deceased was driven to commit suicide, by
the circumstances or atmosphere in the matrimonial home. This
is nothing more than an inference, without any material
support. Therefore, the same cannot be the basis for sustaining
conviction of the Appellant, Under Section 306 of the Indian
Penal Code."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgments, has clearly held that
abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or
intentionally aiding a person in doing a thing. It should be a
positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid
commission of suicide, failing which, such cases of conviction
cannot be sustained, as there should be clear mens rea on the part
of the accused to drive the deceased for commission of such act.
9. The Apex Court in the case of MAHENDRA SINGH supra
was considering a case where the wife of the accused had
18
committed suicide. The allegation was that the husband was having
illicit relationship with the sister-in-law and, therefore, the wife had
committed suicide by burning. The Apex Court acquits the accused.
In the case of RAMESH KUMAR supra, the Apex Court observes
that investigation was to goad, urge forward, provoke incite or
encourage to do an act. If these ingredients are not present such
actions would lead to acquittal.
10. The Apex Court, later in certain cases, while interpreting
Section 306 of the IPC holds that there should be a positive act,
proximate to the time or date of occurrence of the incident and that
positive act should be either direct or indirect. The Apex Court in
the case of AMALENDU PAL v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL6 has
held as follows:
"12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that
before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section
306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and
circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced
before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and
harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no
other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be
borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide
there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of
incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the
6
(2010) 1 SCC 707
19
allegation of harassment without there being any positive
action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of
the accused which led or compelled the person to commit
suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not
sustainable.
13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section
306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission
of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the
commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act
of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission
of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged
with the said offence must be proved and established by the
prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.
14. The expression "abetment" has been defined
under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted
above. A person is said to abet the commission of suicide
when a person instigates any person to do that thing as
stated in clause Firstly or to do anything as stated in
clauses Secondly or Thirdly of Section 107 IPC. Section
109 IPC provides that if the act abetted is committed
pursuant to and in consequence of abetment then the
offender is to be punished with the punishment provided
for the original offence. Learned counsel for the
respondent State, however, clearly stated before us that
it would be a case where clause Thirdly of Section 107
IPC only would be attracted. According to him, a case of
abetment of suicide is made out as provided for under
Section 107 IPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court in the case of KANCHAN SHARMA v. STATE OF
UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER7 has held as follows:
"9. "Abetment" involves mental process of
instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in
doing of a thing. Without positive act on the part of the
7
2021 SCC OnLine SC 737
20
accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, no one
can be convicted for offence under Section 306IPC. To
proceed against any person for the offence under Section
306IPC it requires an active act or direct act which led
the deceased to commit suicide, seeing no option and
that act must have been intended to push the deceased
into such a position that he committed suicide."
(Emphasis supplied)
Again, the Apex Court in the case of MARIANO ANTO BRUNO
AND ANOTHER v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE8 has held as follows:
"42. To convict a person under Section 306 IPC,
there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence. It also
requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased
to commit suicide finding no other option and the act
must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push
deceased into such a position that he commits suicide.
The prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the deceased committed suicide and Appellant
No. 1 abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased.
In the present case, both the elements are absent.
.... .... ....
48. It is well settled that the Courts ought to be
extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of
each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose
of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in
fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. Reference
may be made to the judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh9, wherein this
Court set-aside the conviction of the accused for the offence
under Section 306 IPC as ingredients of Section 306 IPC were
not satisfactorily proved. It was observed as under:--
8
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387
21
"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward,
provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To
satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is
not necessary that actual words must be used to
that effect or what constitutes instigation must
necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the
consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite
the consequence must be capable of being spelt
out. The present one is not a case where the
accused had by his acts or omission or by a
continued course of conduct created such
circumstances that the deceased was left with no
other option except to commit suicide in which case
an instigation may have been inferred. A word
uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without
intending the consequences to actually follow
cannot be said to be instigation.
21. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal10,
this Court has cautioned that the Court should be
extremely careful in assessing the facts and
circumstances of each case and the evidence
adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding
whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in
fact induced her to end the life by committing
suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim
committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary
petulance, discord and differences in domestic life
quite common to the society to which the victim
belonged and such petulance, discord and
differences were not expected to induce a similarly
circumstanced individual in a given society to
commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should
not be satisfied for basing a finding that the
accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide
should be found guilty."
(Emphasis supplied)
22
The Apex Court in the case of PRABHAT KUMAR MISHRA V.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH9, holds as follows:
"18. The parameters required to bring an act or
omission by the person charged within the purview of the
offence under Section 306IPC have been elaborated by this
Court time and again and a few of these judgments are quoted
below for ready reference.
19. In Netai Dutta v. State of W.B. [Netai Dutta v. State
of W.B., (2005) 2 SCC 659 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 543] in almost
similar circumstances, this Court quashed the proceedings
sought to be taken against the petitioner under Section
306IPC. The relevant observations from the said judgment are
reproduced as under : (SCC pp. 660-61, paras 4-7)
"4. One Pranab Kumar Nag was an employee of M/s
M.L. Dalmiya & Co. Ltd. During the course of his employment,
he had been posted at various worksites of the Company and
on 11-9-1999 he was transferred to the worksite of the
Company's stores located at 160, B.L. Saha Road, Kolkata. It
seems that pursuant to the transfer order, Pranab Kumar Nag
did not join duty and after a period of about two years he sent
in a letter of resignation written in his own hand wherein he
expressed his grievance of stagnancy of salary and also
alleged that he was a victim of unfortunate circumstances. The
Company accepted his resignation with immediate effect. On
16-2-2001, a dead body was found at the railway tracks near
Ballygunge Railway Station and it was revealed that it was the
body of Pranab Kumar Nag. His brother went to the office
where Pranab Kumar Nag had worked and made enquiries.
The dead body of Pranab Kumar Nag was released to his
brother after the post-mortem examination on 19-2-2001.
After a period of two months, a complaint was lodged before
the police post on the basis of a suicide note allegedly
recovered from the dead body of Pranab Kumar Nag. Based on
the complaint, a case was registered against the appellant and
some others. A translated copy of the suicide note is produced
before us by the appellant. We have carefully read the alleged
suicide note. The substance of this suicide note is that
deceased Pranab Kumar Nag alleged that appellant Netai Dutta
9
(2024)3 SCC 665
23
and one Paramesh Chatterjee engaged him in several
wrongdoings (he has shown as a type of torture) and at the
end of the letter, a reference is also made to Paramesh
Chatterjee and Netai Dutta alleging that he reported certain
incidents to them. A reading of the letter would show that
deceased Pranab Kumar Nag was not very much satisfied with
the working conditions in the office. In the letter he has stated
that he had to be at the workplace sometimes throughout the
day and night and he had to remain in the company of some
drivers who had been sometimes in drunken condition at about
one o'clock or two o'clock in the night. It is also alleged that
the drivers who had been present at the workplace had been
having non-vegetarian food. He also complained that he had
to work even on Sundays. He further stated that one day he
could leave the workplace at 8 o'clock in the evening and all
the restaurants were closed and that he reported the matter to
the present appellant.
5. There is absolutely no averment in the alleged suicide
note that the present appellant had caused any harm to him or
was in any way responsible for delay in paying salary to
deceased Pranab Kumar Nag. It seems that the deceased was
very much dissatisfied with the working conditions at the
workplace. But, it may also be noticed that the deceased after
his transfer in 1999 had never joined the office at 160, B.L.
Saha Road, Kolkata and had absented himself for a period of
two years and that the suicide took place on 16-2-2001. It
cannot be said that the present appellant had in any way
instigated the deceased to commit suicide or he was
responsible for the suicide of Pranab Kumar Nag. An offence
under Section 306IPC would stand only if there is an abetment
for the commission of the crime. The parameters of
"abetment" have been stated in Section 107 of the Penal
Code, 1860. Section 107 says that a person abets the doing of
a thing, who instigates any person to do that thing; or
engages with one or more other person or persons in any
conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal
omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, or the
person should have intentionally aided any act or illegal
omission. The Explanation to Section 107 says that any wilful
misrepresentation or wilful concealment of a material fact
which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the
contours of "abetment".
24
6. In the suicide note, except referring to the name of
the appellant at two places, there is no reference of any act or
incidence whereby the appellant herein is alleged to have
committed any wilful act or omission or intentionally aided or
instigated the deceased Pranab Kumar Nag in committing the
act of suicide. There is no case that the appellant has played
any part or any role in any conspiracy, which ultimately
instigated or resulted in the commission of suicide by
deceased Pranab Kumar Nag.
7. Apart from the suicide note, there is no allegation
made by the complainant that the appellant herein in any way
was harassing his brother, Pranab Kumar Nag. The case
registered against the appellant is without any factual
foundation. The contents of the alleged suicide note do not in
any way make out the offence against the appellant. The
prosecution initiated against the appellant would only result in
sheer harassment to the appellant without any fruitful result.
In our opinion, the learned Single Judge seriously erred in
holding that the first information report against the appellant
disclosed the elements of a cognizable offence. There was
absolutely no ground to proceed against the appellant herein.
We find that this is a fit case where the extraordinary power
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be
invoked. We quash the criminal proceedings initiated against
the appellant and accordingly allow the appeal."
20. In M. Mohan v. State [M. Mohan v. State, (2011) 3
SCC 626 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] , this Court held as below :
(SCC pp. 636-39 & 642-45, paras 36-49, 62, 65 & 68)
"36. We would like to deal with the concept of
"abetment". Section 306 of the Code deals with "abetment of
suicide" which reads as under:
'306. Abetment of suicide.--If any person commits
suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine.'
37. The word "suicide" in itself is nowhere defined in the
Penal Code, however, its meaning and import is well known
and requires no explanation. "Sui" means "self" and "cide"
means "killing", thus implying an act of self-killing. In short, a
person committing suicide must commit it by himself,
25
irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his
object of killing himself.
38. In our country, while suicide itself is not an offence
considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach of
law, attempt to suicide is an offence under Section 309IPC.
39. "Abetment of a thing" has been defined under
Section 107 of the Code. We deem it appropriate to reproduce
Section 107, which reads as under:
'107. Abetment of a thing.--A person abets the doing
of a thing, who--
First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person or
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act
or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy,
and in order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.--Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing.'
Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with
Section 107 reads as under:
'Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time
of the commission of an act, does anything in order to
facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates
the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.'
40. The learned counsel also placed reliance on yet
another judgment of this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of
Chhattisgarh [Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001)
9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] , in which a three-Judge
Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with the case of a
similar nature. In a dispute between the husband and wife, the
appellant husband uttered "you are free to do whatever you
wish and go wherever you like". Thereafter, the wife of the
appellant Ramesh Kumar committed suicide.
41. This Court in para 20 of Ramesh Kumar [Ramesh
Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 1088] has examined different shades of the meaning of
"instigation". Para 20 reads as under : (SCC p. 629)
'20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite
or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of
instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must
be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must
26
necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence.
Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be
capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case
where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a
continued course of conduct created such circumstances that
the deceased was left with no other option except to commit
suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A
word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending
the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be
instigation.'
In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that
there is no evidence and material available on record
wherefrom an inference of the appellant-accused having
abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant's wife
therein) may necessarily be drawn.
42. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [State of
W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107]
, this Court has cautioned that (SCC p. 90, para 17) the Court
should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and
circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the
trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out
to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by
committing suicide. If it appears to the Court that a victim
committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance,
discord and difference in domestic life, quite common to the
society, to which the victim belonged and such petulance,
discord and difference were not expected to induce a similarly
circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide,
the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a
finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of
suicide should be found guilty.
43. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT
of Delhi) [Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] had an occasion
to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the
dictionary meaning of the word "instigation" and "goading".
The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke,
incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each
person's suicidality pattern is different from the others. Each
person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect.
Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula
27
in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the
basis of its own facts and circumstances.
44. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing.
Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate
or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.
45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the
cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a
person under Section 306IPC there has to be a clear mens rea
to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct
act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option
and this act must have been intended to push the deceased
into such a position that he/she committed suicide.
46. In V.P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Ltd. [V.P.
Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 361 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1290] this Court has held that when prima
facie no case is made out against the accused, then the High
Court ought to have exercised the jurisdiction under Section
482CrPC and quashed the complaint.
47. In a recent judgment of this Court in Madan Mohan
Singh v. State of Gujarat [Madan Mohan Singh v. State of
Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1048 : (2010)
2 SCC (L&S) 682] , this Court quashed the conviction under
Section 306IPC on the ground that the allegations were
irrelevant and baseless and observed that the High Court was
in error in not quashing the proceedings.
48. In the instant case, what to talk of instances of
instigation, there are even no allegations against the
appellants. There is also no proximate link between the
incident of 14-1-2005 when the deceased was denied
permission to use the Qualis car with the factum of suicide
which had taken place on 18-1-2005. Undoubtedly, the
deceased had died because of hanging. The deceased was
undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and
differences which happen in our day-to-day life. In a joint
family, instances of this kind are not very uncommon. Human
sensitivity of each individual differs from person to person.
Each individual has his own idea of self-esteem and self-
respect. Different people behave differently in the same
situation. It is unfortunate that such an episode of suicide had
taken place in the family. But the question that remains to be
28
answered is whether the appellants can be connected with that
unfortunate incident in any manner?
49. On a careful perusal of the entire material on record
and the law, which has been declared by this Court, we can
safely arrive at the conclusion that the appellants are not even
remotely connected with the offence under Section 306IPC. It
may be relevant to mention that criminal proceedings against
the husband of the deceased Anandraj (A-1) and Easwari (A-
3) are pending adjudication.
***
62. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC
(Cri) 426] this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of
various relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by
this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India or the inherent powers under Section 482CrPC, gave
the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein
such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Thus, this Court made it clear that it may not be possible to
lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to
give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
'102. ... (1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make
out a case against the accused.
29
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.'
***
65. This Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works
Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [Zandu Pharmaceutical Works
Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC
(Cri) 283] observed thus : (SCC p. 128, para 8)
'8. ... It would be an abuse of process of the court to
allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent
promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of
court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve
the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When
a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look
into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged
and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations
are accepted in toto.'
***
68. In the light of the settled legal position, in our
considered opinion, the High Court was not justified in
rejecting the petition filed by the appellants under Section
30
482CrPC for quashing the charges under Section 306IPC
against them. The High Court ought to have quashed the
proceedings so that the appellants who were not remotely
connected with the offence under Section 306IPC should not
have been compelled to face the rigmaroles of a criminal trial.
As a result, the charges under Section 306IPC against the
appellants are quashed."
21. It is not in dispute that the prosecution case is
entirely based on the suicide note left behind by the
deceased before committing suicide. On a minute
perusal of the suicide note, we do not find that the
contents thereof indicate any act or omission on the
part of the appellant-accused which could make him
responsible for abetment as defined under Section
107IPC.
22. We have minutely perused the suicide note
(reproduced supra) which clearly shows that the
deceased was frustrated on account of work pressure
and was apprehensive of various random factors
unconnected to his official duties. He was also feeling
the pressure of working in two different districts.
However, such apprehensions expressed in the suicide
note, by no stretch of imagination, can be considered
sufficient to attribute to the appellant, an act or
omission constituting the elements of abetment to
commit suicide. The facts of the case at hand are almost
identical to Netai Dutta [Netai Dutta v. State of W.B.,
(2005) 2 SCC 659 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 543] . Thus, we have
no hesitation in holding that the necessary ingredients
of the offence of abetment to commit suicide are not
made out from the charge-sheet, and hence allowing
prosecution of the appellant is grossly illegal for the
offences punishable under Section 306IPC and Section
3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act tantamounts to gross abuse of
process of law.
23. It may be noted that in the first instance, the
investigating agency itself proposed a closure report in
the matter after conducting thorough investigation. In
this background, we are of the opinion that there does
31
not exist any justifiable ground so as to permit the
prosecution of the appellant for the offences under
Section 306IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
24. Thus, the impugned order [Prabhat Kumar
Mishra v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine All 1496]
passed by the High Court and all proceedings sought to
be taken against the appellant in the criminal
case pending for the offences punishable under Section
306 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are
hereby quashed and set aside. The appeal is allowed
accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court, again, in the case of AMUDHA V. STATE10, has
held as follows:
"10. A Bench of three Hon'ble Judges in the case
of Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh,1 after
considering the provisions of Sections 107 and 306 of
the IPC, in paragraph 43, held thus:
"43. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, we
are required to address whether there has been abetment in
committing suicide. Be it clearly stated that mere allegation
of harassment without any positive action in proximity to the
time of occurrence on the part of the accused that led a
person to commit suicide, a conviction in terms of
Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. A casual remark that is
likely to cause harassment in ordinary course of things will
not come within the purview of instigation. A mere reprimand
or a word in a fit of anger will not earn the status of
abetment. There has to be positive action that creates a
situation for the victim to put an end to life."
(emphasis added)
In the case of Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State
of West Bengal2, in paragraph 12, this Court held thus:
10
2024 SCC OnLine SC 373
32
"12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view
that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under
Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the
facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the
evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the
cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the
victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life.
It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged
abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect
acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the
allegation of harassment without there being any positive
action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the
accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide,
conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable."
(emphasis added)
11. Taking the charge sheet as correct, we find
that there were no acts of incitement on the part of the
appellant proximate to the date on which the deceased
committed suicide. No act is attributed to the appellant
proximate to the time of the suicide which was of such a
nature that the deceased was left with no alternative
but to take the drastic step of committing suicide.
Therefore, no offence is made out against the
appellant."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. All aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court were acquitting
the accused who were convicted of offences punishable under
Section 306 of the IPC. In some cases the Apex Court directs High
Courts to entertain such petitions in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and following the said judgments,
this Court in plethora of cases has quashed proceedings in exercise
of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
33
12. On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex
Court as afore-quoted right from 1995 to 2024, what would
unmistakably emerge is that, there must be mens rea and actus
reus for an offence under Section 306 of IPC, as there must be a
positive act to instigate in aiding suicide. Proximate to the death
must be a dynamic act, be it direct or indirect. It should be
proximate to the occurrence of death and it should be instigation of
the kind that it drives a person to commit suicide. Thus, if these
ingredients are present in a given case, exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., would not be available. Likewise,
if they do not find place in a given case, this Court would step in
and obliterate the proceedings. If on the afore-quoted law that is
laid down, the facts obtaining in the case at hand are re-assessed,
what would unmistakably emerge is, that the death of the husband
of the complainant has no proximity to any of the alleged
instigations of the petitioners.
13. The sheet anchor of the submission of the learned senior
counsel for the respondent is, a letter, which according to him, is
34
the reason for commission of suicide. It is appended as Annexure
R2 to the objections. It reads as follows:
"Tel: 23348423
23317896
23319134
SOUNDARYA CONSTRUCTIONS
Promoters, Builders, Developers, Engineers & Contractors
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN"
SUBJECT: ISSUE NO OBJECTION CERTIFICATE
We SOUNDARYA CONSTRUCTIONS is the owner of the
property located at No-95, 2nd Main, Link Road,
Sheshadripuram, Bangalore-560020, do hereby we
declare and confirm that due to mutual understanding we
have given full authorization to Mr. V.S Suresh.
We (S.P HOMBANNA & R. JAGADHISH) have no objection
and convey my consent to Mr. V.S Suresh for further any
works he will be the responsible for the all the future
usages and liabilities and V.S Suresh will be the
authorization to sign all the documents related to office.
On Corresponding to the details provided, the period date
start from 01-06-2019.
Signature of Landlord
For SOUNDARYA CONSTRUCTIONS
Sd/-
Partner
(S.P HOMBANNA)
For SOUNDARYA CONSTRUCTIONS
Sd/-
Partner
For SOUNDARYA CONSTRUCTIONS
Sd/-
35
Partner
(R. JAGADHISH)"
(Emphasis added)
The learned senior counsel would emphasize upon the fact that the
signature of the husband of the complainant is forged, due to which
all the funds are transferred to the account of the 1st petitioner.
The said submission is, to say the least, preposterous. The said no
objection certificate issued by the complainant's husband and one
S.P.Hombanna is dated 01-06-2019, suicide is on 14-04-2024 -
a gap of 5 years. If this no objection certificate was forged and
based upon this, transaction has happened, for 5 years it is
ununderstandable as to how and why the husband of the
complainant kept quiet, when transaction before his eyes was
taking place. If this is the main ground projected by the learned
senior counsel for the 2nd respondent, permitting further
proceedings would become an abuse of the process of the law.
14. The other factors that are narrated about transactions
happening between the 1st petitioner or the 2nd petitioner and the
husband of the complainant are all during the lifetime of the
husband of the complainant. While it is unfortunate that a life is
36
lost, but it is equally important that the accused who have nothing
to do with the loss of life of the deceased should not always have
the Damocles sword hanging on their head, as there is neither
abetment nor goading nor proximity of any incident whatsoever in
the complaint.
15. The learned High Court Government Pleader submitted
that the entire investigation was complete and what was awaiting
was filing of a final report before the concerned Court. Therefore,
to satisfy myself, I directed placing of the investigation papers. The
entire investigation papers were also placed. Even there, not a
titter of a document is found that would pin these petitioners down
for any act of abetment for suicide of the husband of the
complainant. As observed by the Apex Court, human mind is an
enigma. What drives a person to an extreme act of commission of
suicide is unfathomable, it may be due to myriad circumstances,
though it result in losing of a precious life. The lives of the living,
notwithstanding the fact they have nothing to do with such
commission of suicide, should not be made miserable by permitting
further proceedings.
37
16. What remains is the offence under Section 420 of the IPC.
Section 420 of the IPC has its ingredients in Section 415 of the IPC.
If the complainant's husband had been lured into something during
his lifetime, it was open for him to complain, not the wife of the
complainant after the death of her husband. The ingredients of
neither Section 306 of the IPC nor Section 420 of the IPC are even
found to its semblance in the case at hand. It becomes apposite to
refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
HARYANA V. BHAJAN LAL11 wherein the Apex Court has held as
follows:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of
the various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by
this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226
or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code
which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
11
1992 Supp. 1 SCC 335
38
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a
noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
39
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
16. The principles laid down by this Court have
consistently been followed, as well as in the recent judgment
of three Judge judgment of this Court in Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra2.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the facts as narrated hereinabove and the judgments
rendered by the Apex Court on the issue .
17. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) The FIR and further investigation in Crime No.172 of 2024 pending on the file of XXXII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru stands quashed qua the petitioners.
40(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of petitioners under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not come in the way of any other proceedings pending between the parties before any other fora.
Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2024 also stands disposed.
Sd/-
(M. NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ