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5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the property in dispute includes both that are mentioned in the schedule to the application made by the petitioner in the year 2011 under Section 12 read with Section 23 of the DV Act, as well as the properties mentioned in the schedule enclosed with the application dated 30.10.2021. It is stated that given the definition of the terms "aggrieved person", "domestic relationship", "domestic violence", "shared household" appearing in section 3 of the DV Act, as well as the term "economic abuse" appearing in Explanation 1 to Section 3 of the DV Act, the properties in dispute are well within the jurisdiction of the courts under the DV Act. It is stated that the Magistrate is empowered to grant protection orders for prohibiting the respondents from committing any act of domestic violence as well as for prohibiting the respondents from alienating any assets of the aggrieved person that may be held jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the petitioner, including her 'stridhan' or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them. It is further contended that given the provisions of Section 26 of the DV Act, any relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before civil court, family court, or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent, whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of the DV Act, and any relief referred in that provision could be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court. However, the only condition that is imposed on the aggrieved person is that in case any relief has been obtained by her in any proceedings other than the proceeding under the DV Act, she shall be bound to inform the magistrate for the grant of such relief. The contention is that given the fact that the family settlement of 8.12.1969 that was reduced in writing on 16.7.1970 which has been admitted by the respondent no. 2 time and again in various proceedings including in the proceedings under the D.V. Act, the courts exercising jurisdiction under the DV Act had jurisdiction to grant an appropriate order under Section 23 of the DV Act, and it is a case of failure to exercise jurisdiction by the courts concerned against which the petitioner is aggrieved. The learned counsel has referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja3 to contend that the court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 18 of the DV Act would exercise civil jurisdiction. The learned counsel has referred to Annexure No. 1 in the rejoinder affidavit to contend that the appellate court had noticed that the Protection Officer in its letter dated 28.4.2018 had no right to travel beyond the scope of the inquiry that she was required to conduct. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further sought to contend that the delay attributed to the petitioner in filing the subsequent application dated 30.10.2021 was not as a result of any deliberate act on her part but was actually attributable to the circumstances emerging out of transfer of properties by the respondent No. 2 in the year 2021.

9. Thereafter, certain plots of agricultural land situated in Mauza Kodopur, Pargana Ramnagar, Tehsil & District Varanasi, that are stated to be part of an oral family settlement, which later came to be recorded in a memorandum, were being alienated by the respondent no.2 despite the fact that, as stated, the petitioner alone was the owner under the family settlement. Therefore, the aforesaid fresh application dated 30.10.2021 was filed by the petitioner under Section 23 of the DV Act seeking protection order under Section 18 in respect of those immovable properties.

12. The appellate court framed a point for determination that whether another application under Section 23 of the DV Act can be filed during the validity of the order dated 2.10.2011 (sic 21.10.2011) passed in the previous application under Section 23 of the DV Act.

13. The appellate court noted that the previous order dated 21.10.2011 mentioned in the application dated 30.10.2021 reflects that an order under Section 23 of the DV Act was passed and on the part of the properties in possession reflected in Annexures C-1 and C-2, the respondent no. 2 was restrained from evicting the petitioner, creating any obstruction to persons meeting her and creating any obstruction with regard to the repairs being carried out by the petitioner in her portion of the properties; the complaint under Section 23 is pending trial. The appellate court observed that the issue whether the respondent No. 2 had right to execute the sale-deeds dated 20.7.2021 and 24.8.2021, can be decided by a civil court in a civil suit. Under the DV Act, a summary proceeding is prescribed in which the criminal procedure is used and under the circumstances, at the stage of the appeal or the trial, the issue cannot be looked into.

14. As noted above, initially the application/complaint dated 11.10.2011 under section 12 read with section 23 of the DV Act was filed seeking relief in respect of the shared household that was mentioned in Annexures C-1 and C-2 to that application. The interim order passed by the Magistrate dated 21.10.2011 is effective till the disposal of the complaint case.

15. Sections 12 to 29 of the DV Act fall under Chapter IV of the DV Act, which relates to procedures for obtaining orders seeking reliefs. Under Section 12 of the DV Act, an aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of an aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the DV Act. The reliefs sought for may include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such persons to institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent. Every application is required to be in the prescribed format or as nearly as possible thereto. The Magistrate is enjoined to endeavour to dispose of every such application within a period of 60 days from the date of its first hearing. Section 13 provides for service of notice on the respondent concerned and on any other person, through the Protection Officer. Section 14 gives power to the Magistrate to direct the respondent or aggrieved person to undergo counselling with any member of the service provider possessing such qualifications and experience in counselling as may be prescribed. Section 15 deals with assistance of welfare experts to the Magistrate. Section 16 gives a discretion to the Magistrate to conduct the proceedings under the DV Act in camera. Section 17 deals with the right of every woman in a domestic relationship to reside in the shared household whether or not she has right, title or any beneficial interest in the same. The aggrieved person cannot be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Section 18 deals with protection order that may be passed by the Magistrate on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place. Section 19 deals with residence orders that may be passed by the Magistrate on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, where the matter concerns the residence of the aggrieved person in a shared household. Section 20 provides for direction regarding monetary relief which may be made by the Magistrate while disposing of the application under sub-section (1) of section 12. Section 21 deals with custody orders that may be passed by the Magistrate at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order in respect of temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf. Section 22 deals with compensation orders that the Magistrate may pass in addition to other reliefs as may be granted under the DV Act. Section 23 invests power in the Magistrate to pass an interim ex-parte order as he deems just and proper, on the basis of an affidavit of the aggrieved person under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 or, as the case may be, Section 22, against the respondent. Section 25 provides for the duration and alteration of protection orders made under Section 18. Section 26 reads as follows:-