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19. In my judgment, no appeal lies on the first point taken by the appellant. There was some evidence of non-access, shadowy though it may be, but the quantum of evidence necessary to discharge the onus of proof is not a substantial question of law.

20. The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.

Divatia J.

21. The material portion of His Lordship's judgment is as follows.

22. The second point urged by Mr. Tulzapurkar on behalf of the appellant is that even taking opponents Nos. 2 and 3 to be the children of Fatechand, they are not illegitimate children within the meaning of Hindu law which governs them, and that therefore, they would not be entitled to any share in the compensation. He relies upon two decisions of our Court. One of them is Vithabai v. Pandu (1925) 28 Bom. L.R. 595, according to which under Hindu law, the connection between a man and the married wife of another does not cease to be adulterous, simply because the husband of the woman connives at the adultery. A son bora of such union is not a dasiputra. The other decision in Tukaram v. Dinkar (1930) 33 Bom. L.R. 289 says that under Hindu law, where a woman is in the sole keeping of a shudra and the relation lasts till the death of the paramour, a son born of the connection is the illegitimate son of the deceased, provided the son is not the fruit of adulterous connection. It is no doubt true that the relationship between the parties is to be ascertained on the personal law governing them, and according to that law as interpreted in these two authorities an illegitimate child of a person would not be entitled to any share in the inheritance of the deceased if the child is born of adulterous or incestuous intercourse. The question, however, so far as we are concerned in this appeal, is not whether the child is the heir of the deceased but whether it is a dependant of the deceased. Under Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the compensation is to be paid to each of the dependants of the deceased workman, and "dependant" is defined in Section 2, as, among other persons, a minor illegitimate son and an unmarried illegitimate daughter. It may be noted that a mistress is not included in the class of dependants, but an illegitimate son and an illegitimate daughter are so included. In view of this definition it cannot be said that an illegitimate child even though born of adulterous intercourse is not a dependant of the deceased if it appears from the evidence that it was supported by him. Even under these two authorities, it cannot be said that the child bom of adulterous intercourse ceases to be an illegitimate child of the father even though it cannot inherit his property. It does not follow that the child should not get any share in the compensation if it is found to be a dependant even though an illegitimate child. In my opinion, therefore, these two authorities do not assist the appellant's case, and as it has been proved that they were dependant upon the deceased because their mother was in the permanent keeping of the deceased, they do fall within the definition of "dependant", and therefore, they are entitled to the compensation awarded by the lower Court.