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6. And it is not in the texts alone that sanction is to be found for the view that dispositions for religious or charitable purposes are favoured: the leaning of the Courts too is in the same direction. Thus in the Mayor of Lyons v. E.I. Co. (1836) 1 Moo. I.A. 175, it was said "Their Lordships are well aware that in pursuing this course they are sanctioning a proceeding for which there is no exact and complete precedent in the administration of charitable funds in this country; but in one respect there is sufficient authority, viz., as far as regards a postponement of distributions and the not declaring the gift void on account of any present difficulty in giving it effect: the case of A.-G. v. Bishop of Chester (1785) 1 Bro. Ch. 444; 28 E.R. 1229 furnishes a direct authority for not declaring a legacy void, because it was for an object which could not at the time be accomplished and for retaining the fund in Court until it should be possible to apply it."

(i) Does the principle of Hindu law, which invalidates a gift other than to a sentient being capable of accepting it, apply to bequests to trustees for the establishment of an image and the worship of a Hindu deity after the testator's death, and make such a bequest void?
(ii) Whether the cases of Upendra Lal Boral v. Hem Chundra Boral (1897) I.L.R. 25 Calc. 405, Rojomoyee Dassee v. Troylukho Mohiney Dassee (1901) I.L.R. 29 Calc. 260 and Nogendra-Nandini Dassi v. Benoy Krishna Deb (1902) I.L.R. 30 Calc. 521 have been correctly decided, so far as they lay down the proposition that a gift to a Hindu deity, whose image is to be established and consecrated in future, is void?
(i) Does the principle of Hindu law, which invalidates a gift other than to a sentient being capable of accepting it, apply to a bequest to trustees for the establishment of an image and the worship of a Hindu deity after the testator's death and make such a bequest void?
(ii) Whether the cases of Upendra Lal Boral v. Hem Chundra Boral (1897) I.L.R. 25 Calc. 405 Rojomoyee Dassee v. Troylukho Mohiney Dassee (1901) I.L.R. 29 Calc. 260 and Nogendra-Nandini Dassi v. Benoy Krishna Deb (1902) I.L.R. 30 Calc. 521 have been correctly decided, so far as they lay down the proposition that a gift to a Hindu deity, whose image is to be established and consecrated in future, is void?

73. All these commentators, therefore, understand the definition as limited to secular gifts as contradistinguished from gifts of the nature of jaga, which is a technical word meaning Sradhabibeka, Chandi Charan's Ed. p. 18, "or relinquishment of property intended for a deity or other religious dedications, such as that of the sacred bull at a sradh." The subject of dana or gift, however, is dealt with in some detail by Narada in the chapter on the subtraction of gifts, and in making a subdivision he says: "In civil affairs the law of gift is fourfold--(i) what may be given, (ii) what may not be given, (iii) what is given or a valid gift, (iv) what is not given or invalid gifts. Colebrooke's Dig., Vol. I, page 401. In commenting on the above, Jagannath Tarkapanchanan says:" the rule to be established that gifts made by a man afflicted with disease and the like are void, regards civil gifts not donations for a religious purpose. This title of law does not extend to a gift made for a religious purpose: the donation is valid if it be made by the owner of the thing." Jagannath then quotes the text of (Katyayana):