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Then, dealing with the argument that Section 7 would not apply to compromise decrees, the learned Chief Justice pointed out:
Once a decree is passed, we can see no difference on principle between a decree passed on a compromise and a decree passed after contest.

9. For the respondent, Sri Chari would urge that the definition of ' tenant' in Section 2(8) of the 1960 Act, second part, means a tenant continuing in possession under circumstances contemplated in Section 116 which deals with the effect of holding over and that was the basis of the decision in Sanjeeva Naidu's case (1953) 1 M.L.J. 260 and the principle laid down therein does not apply to a case, like the present, where the parties come to an agreement that the relationship shall not be that of landlord and tenant. In this context, Sri Chari referred to the first amendment of Section 30 by Act II of 1962 which had the effect of determining all rights and privileges which, may have accrued to any landlord by virtue of Clause (ii) or (iii) of Section 30 of the Principal Act in so far as they relate to a building or part thereof which is not exempt under the aforesaid clauses and made them unenforceable. Act XI of 1964 similarly determined the landlord's rights in respect of non-residential buildings and in consequence brought such buildings within the purview of Act XVIII of 1960. But the contention is that the compromise entered into in the present case between; the applicant and the respondent had come into force long before this Act, that a consent decree had been passed on such compromise, and therefore the applicant having ceased to be a tenant from that moment the subsequent Amending Act of 1964 cannot have the effect of restoring the relationship and that the transition-from a common law tenant to a statutory tenant cannot be taken advantage of by the applicant when actually there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. Sri Chari also drew my attention to the language of Section 3 of Act XI of 1964 and emphasized the words 'proceedings...pending' and 'instituted' and urged that what was intended by the amendment was that if proceedings in respect of any non-residential building was pending or instituted, they were to abate and in the present case, there was no such proceeding as the matter had already been surrendered as per the said compromise. The applicant was, according to him, therefore, in the position of a permissive occupant and not a tenant holding over. But in the case on hand, there was not only a decree by consent for eviction which would normally put an end to the tenancy and the relationship arising out of it; but the provisions of Section 3 of Act II being vague and meaningless, the same cannot apply in any event to cases after the decree. Sri Chari would thus make a distinction between cases which are pending and cases which have proceeded to decrees. This, however, is not possible to my mind if we read Section 10(1) and Section 19 together and as a result of Act XI of 1964, the limit on the basis of rent has been removed in respect of non-residential buildings. The question then arises whether Act XI of 1964 could be given retrospective effect. A Full Bench of the Punjab High Court held in Shamsunder v. Ramdas A.I.R. 1951 punj. 52 (F.B.) that a statute, unless it be a statute dealing with procedure only, should not be construed as having retrospective effect unless the statute expressly makes its provisions retrospective or retrospective effect is given by necessary implication or intendment. The case before the Full Bench came under Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947 and the question for consideration was whether Section 9(1) of the Act is retrospective in its operation. The Act prohibited all Courts from making any order evicting any tenant in execution of decree passed before or after that Act came into force. The learned Judges held that the expression ' makes any order in execution of a decree evicting any tenant', in Section 9(1) applies to the stage when execution of a decree for ejectment is sought by the decree holder and that the argument that in ejectment suits the order for eviction is made when the decree is passed and that no order of eviction is passed in execution proceedings does not receive support from what is contained in Order 7, Rule 1, Order 20, Rules 6 and 12, Order 21, Rule 35, Form No. 23 Appendix 6 and Form No. 11 Appendix E, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judges further held that as Section 9(1) expressly governs transactions occurring before or after the commencement of the Act, Section 15 of the Act instead of preventing the application of Section 9(1) of the Act to the execution of decrees passed before the Act came into force is subject to the provisions of Section 9(1) of the Act .