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At the time of the partition, the shops bearing Door Nos. 16 and 17 had been allotted to Naga pillai, the grand father of the 2nd respondent and the shops bearing door Nos. 18, 19 and 20, were allotted to Parimanam Pillai, the maternal grand father of the appellant. The door numbers of the shops so alotted proceeded from east to west and the disputed wall was in existence in door Nos. 17 and 18, which belonged to Naga Pillai and Parimanam Pillai, respectively. The recitals in the partition deed thus clearly established that even as far back as 1898, the wall in dispute had been mentioned as a common wall. The window in the wall in dispute had been found to have been in existence ever since the construction of the house by the predecessors-in-title of the appellant. This is clearly established by the very ancient nature of the window, as could be seen from the report of the Commissioner. The lower appellate court was .therefore right in its conclusion that the wall dispute along with the window therein is common to the appellant and the respondents and that in the absence of evidence on behalf of the appellant to show that he had exclusively enjoyed the disputed wall by adverse possession, he cannot be heard to contend that he is exclusively entitled to the wall.

8. Learned Counsel for the appellant next contended that the appellant had acquired an ease-mentary right to free light and air through the window without any obstruction whatsoever over the statutory period and that right also should be declared in favour of the appellant.,On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant and the respondents being co-owners with reference to the wall as well as the easementary right relating to window, for, the enjoyment of the right of light and air through the window is rreferable only to the ownership of it and not with the knowledge of the existence of a dominant and servant tenement and that such rights are exercised over property not belonging to him. Reference in this connection was also made to the decisions in Nageswara Rao v. Mamachandra Rao (1973) 2 An.W.R.58 : (1973) 2 A.P.L.J. 297 A.I.R. 1973 A.P. 86 and K. Mohideen v. M.M. Abdullah . Earlier, it has been found that the wall in dispute as well as the window therein is common to the appellant as well as the respondents. In other words, they are the co-owners of the wall as well as the window therein. The act of enjoyment of light and air through the window is thus referable to a purported character of owner and cannot be equated to acts of enjoyment by the owner of a dominant tenement with reference to a servant owner. Further, the right, in the case of a common wall with a window therein, as in this case, has been enjoyed through common property jointly owned by the appellant and the respondents and exercise of rights regarding light and air through acts with reference to such jointly owned property, cannot validate or support a claim to an easementary right. A division bench of the Bombay High Court in Narayan Balwant v. Shankar Raman AIR. 1938 Bom.215 has held that it is not possible for a person to acquire an easement of light and air through window in a joint wall belonging to himself as well as to the owner of the other premises. Yet another decision in Nageswara Rao v. Ramachandran Rao has held that a co-owner of a joint wall could not acquire an easement in respect of light and air through windows in the joint wall whatever may be the period of his enjoyment prior to the date of suit, as the normal method of enjoyment of the joint wall includes the enjoyment by opening windows or ventilators which could not give rise to any trespass so as to give a cause of action for a suit to prevent it at the instance of the other owner. To similar effect is the decision in K. Mohideen v. M.M Abdullah ( where it has been held that a person cannot acquire an easement of light and air with refeerence to property jointly owned by him with others. In view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, the appellant's claim for an easementary right to light and air cannot be countenanced.

Thus, even considering the right of the appellant to have light and air through the window in the common wall, as one hot based on easementary right, the appellant cannot complaint of the enjoyment of the neighbouring property by the respondents, as owners thereof by building it upto the limit of their property, and if, in that process, the appellant is in any manner inconvenienced, he cannot have any cause for complaint. Thus, looked at from any point of view, the appellant cannot claim that he has acquired an easementary right to light and air or that he has acquired such a right in some other mode.

10. Learned Counsel for the appellant next contended that the respondents have scooped out portions of the common wall and had thereby caused damage to the wall and the respondents should therefore be injuncted from causing further damage and should also be directed to pay damages to the appellant as claimed. No doubt the report of the commissioner shows that some portion of the disputed wall has been scooped out. But there is nothing to show that damage as such has been caused to the wall. Apart from it, it is seen that the respondents have put up their wall after scooping the disputed wall for the purpose of dovetailing their wall with the disputed wall, it cannot therefore be said that there has been a weakening of the common damags as such has been caused to the wall by the construction put up by the respondents next to the common wall. Under those circumstances, the appellant is not entitled to the reliefs of permanent injunction and for recovery of damages. At best the appellant is entitled only to a declaration that the disputed wall and the window therein is common to him and the respondents herein and no more. Consequently, the second appeal is allowed in part to the limited extent indicated above and the appellant will be entitled to a decree declaring that the disputed wall and the window therein are common to the appellant and the respondents. Each party is directed to bear his or their costs throughout.