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This section was introduced by C.P.C. Amendment Act 104 of 1976. The object and reason were that the Code did not contain any provision as to the holding of a Civil proceeding in open Court and as to the power of the Court to hold the proceedings in camera. The matter was being dealt with under Section 151. It was considered to be appropriate to have an express provision on , the subject on the lines of Section 327 of the Cr. P.C. According to the plain interpretation of the section, a suit in any civil Court shall be tried in the open Court and the public in general shall have access to it. This is more so because a Court of law is always deemed to be a public place. The parties to the suit, lawyers and all shall have the opportunity of watching the civil proceedings. This is the general rule, but the proviso lays down the exception. In exercise of its discretion and if the Court thinks fit, the Court may order that the trial of any suit may be held in camera and the public generally shall have no access or to remain in the Court room or building used by the Court. The exception by its very nature requires exercise of due care and caution before the Court directs trial of a suit out of the public gaze. In AIR 1967 SC 1 (supra) it was held in para 20 as follows :

It was also held in para 21 as follows :

"Having thus enunciated the universally accepted proposition in favour of open trials, it is necessary to consider whether this rule admits of any exceptions or not. Cases may occur where the requirement of the administration of justice itself may make it necessary for the Court to hold a trial in camera. While emphasising the importance of public trial, we cannot overlook the fact that the primary function of the judiciary is to do justice between the parties who bring their causes before it. If a Judge trying a cause is satisfied that the very purpose of finding truth in the case would be retarded, or even defeated if witnesses are required to give evidence subject to public gaze is it or is it not open to him in exercise of his inherent power to hold the trial in camera either partly or fully? If the primary function of the Court is to do justice in causes brought before it, then on principle, it is difficult to accede to the proposition that there can be no exception to the rule that all causes must be tried in open Court. If the principle that all trials before Courts must be held in public was treated as inflexible and universal, and it is held that it admits of no exceptions whatever, cases may arise where by following the principle, justice itself may be defeated. That is why we feel no hesitation in holding that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera if the ends of justice clearly and necessarily require the adoption of such a course. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that this inherent power must be exercised with great caution and it is only if the Court is satisfied beyond a doubt that the ends of justice themselves would be defeated if a case is tried in open Court that it can pass an order to hold the trial in camera, but to deny the existence of such inherent power to the Court would be to ignore the primary object of adjudication itself. The principle underlying the insistence on hearing causes in open Court is to protect and assist fair, impartial and objective administration of justice; but if the requirement of justice itself sometimes dictates the necessity of trying the case in camera; it cannot be said that the said requirement should be sacrificed because of the principles that every trial must be held in open Court. In this connection it is essential to remember that public trial of causes is a means, though important and valuable, to ensure fair administration of justice; it is a means, not an end. It is the fair administration of justice which is the end of judicial process, and so, if ever a real conflict arises between fair administration of justice itself on the one hand, and public trial on the other, inevitably, public trial may have to be regulated or controlled in the interest of administration of justice. That, in our opinion, is the rational basis on which the conflict of this kind must be harmoniously resolved. Whether or not in the present case such a conflict did in fact arise, and whether or not the impugned order is justified on the merits, are matters which are irrelevant to the present enquiry."

6. The next question for consideration is whether a free hand should be given to defendants 1, 2 and 3 and the press in general for publication of the obscene matters brought out in the evidence of the witnesses including that of the plaintiff. In this connection, it is useful to quote the following from para 30 of AIR 1967 SC 1 (supra) :

"If the High Court thus had inherent power to hold the trial of a case in camera, provided, of course, it was satisfied that the ends of justice required such a course to be adopted, it would not be difficult to accept the argument urged by the learned Attorney-General that the power to hold a trial in camera must include the power to hold a part of the trial in camera, or to prohibit excessive publication of a part of the proceedings at such trial. What would meet the ends of justice will always depend upon the facts of each case and the requirements of justice. In a certain case, the Court may feel that the trial may continue to be a public trial, but that the evidence of a particular witness need not receive excessive publicity, because fear of such excessive publicity may prevent the witness from speaking the truth."