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13. It will be noticed that Rule 4 of Order 39 itself does not attach any finality to the orders in the nature of interlocutory injunction. Rule 4 enables the court to discharge or vary or set aside an order of interlocutory injunction, on finding the same to be necessary by a change in circumstances or if the order is found causing undue hardship to any party. The legislature has thus itself, not intended the principle aforesaid of finality or res judcata in relation to successive stages of the same proceeding to order under Order 39 of the CPC. Though Rule 4 deals only with vacation or modification of an interlocutory injunction granted, but in my view, the purport thereof being interim protection of the property, even if the Court had earlier not found enough reason to grant interim protection, the court on finding a change in the circumstances or undue hardship having been caused to a party who had been declined the interim injunction earlier, is competent to entertain a second application and to grant such injunction.

17. In the light of aforesaid position of law, it has to be seen whether the second application for interlocutory injunction in the present case is barred on the general principle of applicability of res judicata to interlocutory orders also or can fall in the exceptions carved out including change in circumstance, law or undue hardship.

18. The plaintiffs had approached this Court with a case of the mortgage of the property claimed by the defendant No. 1 to be void. It was prima facie view of that case only of the plaintiffs which was taken by this Court while dismissing the first application for interlocutory injection. Though para 23 as set out hereinabove existed in the plaint but it appears that that was not the contention of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not claim any relief that even if there was a mortgage, the defendant No. 1 was not entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 29 & 30 of the State Financial Corporation Act with respect to the property. The said case was naturally not considered by this Court while dealing with the earlier application. The Appellate Court also was not seized of the said matter and in fact dismissed the appeal primarily on the ground of no case for interfering with the discretion exercised, having been made out. Naturally when there was no reference to the applicability of the Sections 29 & 30 of the Act in the order of the Single Judge, no question of consideration of the same by the division Bench arose.

23. In my view, the principle underlying estoppel being of public policy and justice, justice cannot be permitted to be defeated on the ground of issue estoppel. The question raised in the present case by this second application for interlocutory injunction is a pure question of law and which admittedly has not been considered by this Court while considering the first application for interlocutory injunction. The judgment of the Apex Court in Karnataka State Financial Corporation (supra) appears to be taking a view with respect to the applicability of Sections 29 & 30 of the Act against the properties of the guarantor for the first time. There does not appear to be any earlier pronouncement on this aspect. While it can be argued that the counsel for the plaintiffs in this case also ought to have taken the said plea before this Court or before the Appellate Court while pressing for the first application for interlocutory injunction, but in my view, justice should not suffer and interlocutory injunction ought not to be denied to the plaintiffs because of the aforesaid interpretation of law by the Apex Court, published after the disposal of the first application by this Court and by the Appellate Court. It is not as if while dismissing the application a view was taken by this Court or by the Appellate Court on the applicability of the said provisions and which cannot be reviewed owing to a different view having been taken by a subsequent decision of the Apex Court. Present is a case where no view at all was taken. Since the suit is still pending, the plaintiffs, on the parity of Rule 4 of Order 39 of the CPC becomes entitle to move a second application for interlocutory injunction.