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Showing contexts for: waive in Murlidhar Agarwal And Anr vs State Of U.P. And Ors on 26 July, 1974Matching Fragments
Mr. Gupte, appearing for the appellants, referred to the decision of this Court in Lachoo 'Mal v. Radhey Shyam(1) and said that (1) [1971] 3 S.C.R.693.
M185 Sup. CI/75 it was open Lo the respondent to waive the benefit of the provision of s. 3 as it was enacted for the benefit of tenants and that no question of public policy is involved. In that case this Court was considering the question whether it was open to a landlord to waive the benefit of a provision enacted for the benefit of landlords under the Rent Control Act. This Court said that if a provision is enacted for the benefit of a person or class of persons, there was nothing which precludes him or them from contracting to waive the benefit, provided that no question of public policy was involved.
"If the object of a statute is not one of general policy, or if the thing which is being done will benefit only a particular person or class of persons, then the conditions prescribed by the statute are not considered as being indispensable. This rule is expressed by the maxim of law, quilibet potest renuntiare juri pro se introducto. As a general rule, the conditions imposed by statutes which authorise legal proceedings are treated as being indispensable to giving the court jurisdiction. But if it appears that the statutory conditions were inserted by the legislature simply for the security or benefit of the parties to the action themselves, and that no public interests are involved, such conditions will not be considered as indispensable, and either party may waive them without affecting the jurisdiction of the court .... "(1) Maxwell states the rule of law as follows:
"Another maxim which sanctions the non- observance of a statutory provision is that culibet licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto. Everyone has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy. Where in an Act there is no express prohibition against contracting out of it, it is necessary to consider whether the Act is one which is intended to deal with private rights only or whether it is an Act which is intended, as a matter of public policy, o have a more extensive operation...... (2). So, the question is, whether s. 3 was enacted only for the benefit of tenants or whether there is a public policy underlying It which precludes a tenant from waiving its benefit. There can be no doubt that the provision has been enacted for protecting one set of men from another set of men, the one from their situation and condition are liable to be oppressed and imposed upon. Necessitous men are not free men.
In the Nineteenth-Century the doctrines of laissex faire capitalism were accepted as part of the natural order of things and the doctrine was reinforced by the idea of the early utilitarians that to achieve social justice, it would suffice to produce formal equality before the (1) See Craies on Statute Law, 7th ad,. pp. 269-270. (2) See "Interpretation of Statutes", 11th ed., (1962), pp.
375-376.
583law. These views were reflected in contemporary legal thought by the idea that freedom of contract was the supreme article of public policy, a notion which ignored utterly those cases where there was no genuine equality of bargaining power as for example between master and servant or between landlord and tenant.(1) There can be no doubt about the policy of the law, namely, the protection of a weaker class in the community from harassment of frivolous suits. But the question is there a public policy behind it which precludes a tenant from waiving it?