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2. Before attempting to answer the question referred to above, it is necessary to briefly state the circumstances which led to the present reference. Smt. Balkaran Kaur respondent claiming to be the lawfully wedded wife of Joginder Singh petitioner before us made an application for maintenance under Section 488 of the Code in the year 1963 it being alleged by her that she and the petitioner after marriage lived together for three years but the latter developed illicit connections with other ladies and started maltreating her so much so that he turned her out and refused to maintain her. Summonses for service on the petitioner who was respondent in the .application for maintenance were directed to issue and efforts were made to serve him through the process serving agency attached to the Civil Courts- It is provided in Chapter 8 of the Rules and Orders of the : Punjab High Court, Volume IV. that in criminal cases which are not cognizable by the police, summonses are to be served through the civil process-serving establishment attach-ed to the Courts. On 15th November 1963 the process-server made a report to the effect that the petitioner was not staying in the village for a number of years as he was employed as a Teacher in a Government school on Simla side, There was later another attempt to serve him and the report as made on 2nd December, 1963, was that the petitioner had evaded service by disappearing on coming to know of the arrival of the process-server and that summons had been affixed on his residential house. The Magistrate recorded an order on 20th December. 1963, that since the respondent evaded service ex parte proceedings be taken against him. After recording evidence as was produced by Smt. Balkaran Kaur the Magistrate directed on 14th January 1964 that the petitioner should pay Rs. 60 per month as maintenance. The petitioner before us then made an application under Section .488 (6) of the Code first on 4th March, 1967. which was dismissed for default of appearance and then again another on 14th March 1967 praying that the ex parte decision taken on 14th January 1964 be set aside and that maintenance proceedings should be conducted in his presence. This application, after notice to the opposite party, was dismissed by the trial Magistrate on 3rd April 1967 on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. It appears that the petitioner through his counsel Shri Bhagwan Singh, Advocate. Rajpura, served some notice to the respondent who sent a reply to her through her counsel Shri Des Raj, Advocate Mansa. This reply was dated 27th July, 1965, and Shri Bhagwan Singh, learned Counsel appearing before the trial Magistrate, did not deny that he had communicated the reply indicating that the respondent had obtained an order granting maintenance to the petitioner. On the basis of the statement made at the bar and the documents shown to the Magistrate he came to the conclusion that the petitioner must be deemed to have obtained knowledge of the order at least from 30th July, 1965, by which time the letter dated 22nd July, 1965. sent on behalf of the respondent must have reached him. Irrespective of this view of the matter, the trial Court was further of the opinion that the application made more than three months after the date of the ex parte order could not be entertained by him in view of the mandatory bar as contained in proviso to Section 488 (6) of the Code.

6. The answer to the question is covered by a judgment of Gurdev Singh J. in Hari Singh v. Mst. Dhanno (1962) 34 Pun LR 59, where the learned Judge held that Sub-section (6) of Section 488 provides a period of three months for ail application to-have an ex parte order get aside and that the period of three months is to be reckoned from the date of the order and not from any other date, no matter when the respondent obtained knowledge of the order. This view was reiterated by the learned Judge in Smt. Parson Kaur v. Bakhshish Singh 1970 Cur LJ 172 : AIR 1971 Punj 88. It has been further held in this case that Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. applies to an application for setting aside an ex parte order made under the proviso to Sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Code, and that relief against hardship, if any, arising because of ignorance of the ex parte order, could be granted by condoning the delay if a case for the exercise of discretion for extending the period of limitation is made out supported by a proper affidavit. In other words, it is not necessary for obviating the chances of hardship that plain and ordinary meaning of the words be departed from.

14. For the foregoing reasons, it must be held that terminus a quo for reckoning the period of limitation for an application under proviso to Section 488 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to get an ex parte order of maintenance set aside is the date of the order and not that when the respondent obtained knowledge of the same. The aggrieved party can, of course, in an appropriate case, ask for extension of time on a sufficient cause being shown within the meaning of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, which applies to such an application. In the result, Criminal Revision 318 of 1968 stands dismissed.

Shri Y. P. Gandhi then contended that the period of three months prescribed under Sub-section (6) of Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be reckoned not from the date of the order, which is sought to be set aside but from the date on which the petitioner. who is aggrieved by this order, comes to know of it. This argument is untenable...."

45. After reproducing the language of the proviso, the learned single Judge took the following view:

The word 'thereof... leaves no manner of doubt that the period of three months has to be reckoned from the date of the ex parte order which is sought to be set aside and not from any other date. This is irrespective of the date on which the petitioner obtains the knowledge of the order. If the legislature intended that the period of three i months for making an application for setting aside an ex parte order should be reckoned from the date of knowledge. It could not have failed to state so. On a reference to the various provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, we find that wherever the legislature considered that the date of knowledge should be the terminus a quo it has specifically said so. If the argument of the learned Counsel is accepted, it would amount to incorporating in the relevant provision, the words, 'or from the date on which he comes to know of this order'. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, it has to be given effect to irrespective of the hardship it may entail on the parties concerned.