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5. The first point arising for consideration is what is the nature of the inam. It has been strenuously contended by the appellant that the inam was granted to the original grantee as a service inam, that is as a grant to him burdened only with the condition of rendering certain services, namely the performing of certain rites in a mosque. On the other hand it has been contended by respondents 2 and 3 that the grant was to the mosque itself and that the inam belongs to the mosque. Before discussing the documents bearing on this question it will perhaps be convenient to refer to some of the cases cited by both the parties and which may well be a guide in the construction of such grants. These cases show that there is a well-understood distinction between a grant to a religious institution such as a temple or a mosque and a grant to some person on condition of his rendering services to a religious institution, such as the archaka of a temple. It may be a nice distinction to find under which class a particular grant falls. An example of such a grant to a servant of the temple is M. Sarayya v. V. Vydyanathan [1915] 1 M.L.W. 490. The grant there was to a dancing-girl of a temple. There the title-deed was given to the dancing-girl in contrast to the other title-deeds which were issued to the manager of the temple, and the title is conditional on the fulfilment of the terms of the grant. "So long as the conditions of the grant are fully fulfilled" is the usual language in all the title-deeds of this kind. Srirangachariar v. Pranatharthihara Chariar [1915] 2 M.L.W. 632, was a grant to a person performing the service of acharya purusha in the Tirupathi temple. The title-deed describes the land as "devadayam" or "pagoda service inam" for the support of the pagoda called the service of "acharyapurusha" in the suit temple. It was held that the grant was not to the temple, but it was a grant to the temple servant on condition of performing the service of acharyapurusha in the temple, and, as it did not belong to the temple, there was no trust in respect of which a scheme' suit under Section 92 can lie. Muhammad Hussain Sahib v. Abdul Rahim A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 8 is the next decision I may refer to. There the holders of the inam divided the inam land between themselves. The suit was for a declaration that the division was illegal and that the land belonged to the mosque. It was held that the grant was. not to the mosque but to certain persons on condition of their rendering services in the mosque, namely, the proper upkeep of the mosque and other services. One of the inam registers in that case described the land in Col. 2 as devadayam." In Col. 8 it was said to be for the support of the great mosque at Guntur. In the other inam register it was said to be for performing certain services in the mosque. One would say that prima facie, where the grant is for the upkeep of the mosque, it was intended that the income of' the land granted should belong to the1 mosque, and, so far as one of the items there is concerned, one might perhaps say that the land belonged to the mosque but not the other which was given for service; but the District Judge found that, both were treated alike throughout. Spencer, J. who delivered the judgment of this Court also held that they were not grants to the mosque. I agree with his judgment. In Sikkandar Rowthen v. Secretary of State [1917] 5 M.L.W. 401 the inams are classified as "devadayam" and the grant was for the support of the mosque. The grantee was described as the mosque itself. The holders of the inam were described as trustees. In the inam register both the original inamdar and the "present enjoyer" are given as the mosque and the recommendation was that the inam should continue as long as the mosque existed.

7. Both being directly or indirectly connected with religion, both classes are indiscriminately described as "devadayam." Therefore the word " devadayam " does not conclusively show that the grant is a grant to the temple or mosque itself: vide Rule 3, Inam Rules. In Srinivasa Charyulu v. Pratyanga Rao A.I.R 1921 Mad. 677 it was held that the grant was not to the archaka but to the temple itself. In that case the grant was for the nivadyam and deeparathana which are expensive items and expenses were to be met out of the income of the inam. The sanad was in favour of the Swamiluvaru and not in favour of the archaka. The inam register showed that the grantee was Sri Venkateswara Swami and the title-deed was issued to the manager for the time being of the temple. The inam was said to be for the support of the temple. In the face of these unambiguous circumstances the learned Judges held that the conduct of the archaka, in appropriating the surplus income could have no weight in the matter and reference was made to the Attorney-General v. Master Warden & Co. of the Wan Chandler's Co. [1873] 6 H.L. 1. One sanad Ex. D in that case purported to be exclusively for archaka service in contrast to the other sanad which was for the support of the temple. In Seshadri Reddi v. S. Subramania Ayyar A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 163, Spencer and Devadoss, JJ. held that though the land there was described as " devadayam" or pagoda kandrigainas, and though the title deed was granted to the manager for the time being of the pagoda and though the later documents described the inam as "devadayam," the land belonged to the original grantee, because the sanad stated that he was to enjoy the property and it was a grant to him burdened with an obligation of doing certain services in the temple and all surplus left after the performance of the services belonged to the donee and his heirs. In Muhammad Esuf Sahib v. Abdul Sathar Sahib [l919] 42 Mad l61, the learned Judges before whom the case came up, Wallis, C.J. and Spencer, J. differed. The case then came up before a Bench of three Judges. All the three Judges expressed their opinion on the nature of the inam. Ayling, J. says:

26. But it has been contended that the description of the Inam as "Devadayam" should be taken as showing that the grant was made to the mosque. The meaning of this word has been discussed in Muhammad Jafar v. Muhammad Ibrahim [1901] 24 Mad. 243 Sikandar Rowthan v. Secy. of State [1917] 5 M.L.W. 401 and Pacha Saheb v. Muhammad Ruhimuddin Saheb A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 491. These cases certainly support the view that the use of the word devadayam " is evidence that the property so described constitutes a public endowment, but they establish nothing more. Indeed, the judgments in those cases show that in the particular instance the description of the property as " devadayam " was treated as conclusive because there was no other evidence, either documentary or oral, to displace the prima facie application of the word. Moreover, there is the authority of Seshadri Reddi v. S. Subramania Aiyar A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 163, that the word "devadayam " is also appropriate to describe a service inam. I think, therefore, that the word "devadayam" must be taken as being equally applicable to endowments and to service inams connected with religious institutions.