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14. It is an accepted rule of construction that if a particular word is not defined under the statute and if different meanings are possible, the meaning used in common parlance and appropriate to the context would have to be adapted. Therefore, in this context, if the word possession alone is considered, it could be used in several contexts for securing possession. Not only in the case of securing possession from a tenant defined under the Act or a non-statutory tenant who is continuing in possession despite efflux of time or termination of the tenancy, but can also be when a owner of a property has been divested of his possession in different ways i.e., either by trespass, holding hostile possession, adverse possession and the like and in such circumstances, the owner of the property loses actual possession of the property. Yet in another circumstance, i.e., either when the property is let-out to a tenant as defined under the Rent Act and if such tenant continues to be in occupation after determination of the tenancy or in the case of the tenancy, lease, licence or permissive possession granted to a tenant the handing over of possession or creation of such tenancy or the likes is by lawful means at the inception and even though the erstwhile tenant remains to be in actual and physical possession, the possessory rights by way of ownership and constructive possession would continue to remain with the landlord and the fact that the person in physical possession becomes an unlawful occupant of the property after the efflux of time or the termination of the tenancy is only a legal fiction. Therefore, even in such circumstance the only course to be adapted is to eject, evict or ease out such person from the property. Hence the word 'ejectment' can be used even in such situation. In effect ejectment would mean getting back actual possession, after sending out the person who at that point of time has no right to continue in occupation of the property though at the inception, while he entered occupation, he had a right. This would only indicate that the word 'possession' includes all types of possession and therefore the said term is all encompassing and includes the word ejectment. Hence, in our view, the word 'possession' is generic in nature and the word 'ejectment' is a specifies. They are however not interchangeable inasmuch as the word ejectment could be used only in respect of person whose initial entry was lawful and continues to be lawful or has become unlawful by legal fiction whereas the word possession could be used in respect of both who have entered lawfully or otherwise.

Ejectment, the 'mixed' action at Common Law to recover the possession of land (which is real), and damages and costs for the wrongful withholding of the land (which are personal).
It is with reference to the same, the learned senior counsel sought to contend that an action for ejectment carved out form the excepted category would include not only possession but damages and costs for wrongful withholding of the property or premises.

27. However, according to us, since the definition of ejectment is not provided in the Act, the said definitions referred to cannot be applied in abstract but should be considered in the context the word is used by the legislature. In this regard what requires to be noticed is as to whether the word 'ejectment' used in Article 4 of the schedule is used without any rider attached to it. A close perusal would indicate that even though the legislature has permitted suits for ejectment before a Small Causes Court, the same has not been let loose like a unruly horse to run amuck but the same is controlled by the reins attached to it in Sub-articles (a), (b) and (c). As such it is necessary to understand the limitations provided therein even while entertaining a suit for ejectment. Anoticeable feature is that the legislature while permitting the suit for ejectment has circumscribed the same to lie before Small Causes Court only when the property has been let under lease or permitted to be occupied, by a written instrument or oral and the Court of Small Causes would be competent to take cognizance of a suit and decide the substantial issue as to whether lease has come to an end or terminated in accordance with law. By bearing this aspect in mind, the issue requires to be examined. While doing so, the discussions made in the earlier part of the judgment would indicate that in respect of a tenant defined under the Rent Act i.e., the tenant of a premises to which Rent Act would apply, would continue to be a tenant even after efflux of time or after determination of the period by notice or if the permission to occupy has been withdrawn and even during the period after such eventuality and until the ejectment or eviction is made such person would remain to be a tenant and the consideration payable for the occupation of the premises either during the subsistence of the lease or subsequent to determination or efflux would be rent and the same cannot be called in any other nomenclature and therefore the same would satisfy Sub-article (b) and the only substantial question would be as contained in Sub-article (c). As such in so far as such a tenant is concerned, it is needless to mention that Small Causes Court would have the jurisdiction to pass an order of ejectment even though a suit for possession of immovable property or interest in such property is excepted.

32. Therefore if Sub-article (b) is kept in view and if Sub-article (c) is analysed, it would indicate that the point at which the landlord seeks ejectment of such person by filing a suit would be in a circumstance where the tenancy has come to an end by efflux of time or determined by notice or permission to occupy has been withdrawn which means at the point of filing the suit, this eventuality would have arisen and that would be the only substantial issue to be decided unless and otherwise any other defence is put forth by the erstwhile tenant. At this stage, we would do well to pause and notice all the decisions of the learned Single Judge on this subject in the case of Baduva Kunhibeary v. Venkatesha Shanbhogue 1972 (1) MLJ 211, Monappa Mulya v. Kusuma Shetty 1971 (2) MLJ 356, Sheena Bhandary v. Thanuja Bhandary 1970 MLJ SN 310, Hanumantha Acharya v. Madhavaprabhu 1988 (2) KLJ 362, Laxminarayana Rao v. Janardha Shettigara and B. Krishnappa v. Chandrika G. were all rendered in a circumstance where only the substantial question as contemplated in Sub-article (c) was involved in the facts of those cases but the effect of Article 4 as a whole was not considered and as such the decisions cannot be considered as precedents to decide the proposition. But the most distinguishing feature between a tenant as defined and an erstwhile tenant is that on such day the consideration payable cannot be termed as 'rent' in respect of erstwhile tenant since the possession would have become wrongful possession. If this is kept in view, it would be clear that for a suit for ejectment to be maintainable as per Article 4, before the Small Causes Court, Sub-article (a) prescribes the pre-requisite and Sub-article (c) prescribes the scope of enquiry which indicates the summary nature and it is Sub-article (b) which holds the key to deciding the jurisdiction when all the three are read conjunctively since the words "would be competent to take cognizance of a suit for rent of the property" as contained in Sub-article (b) would assume all importance, more particularly the words 'would be' which denotes that as on the date of presenting the suit to the Small Causes Court, the Court should be competent to take cognizance of a suit for rent. The term 'rent' can be used only in respect of a tenant and not otherwise. Therefore on that particular day, the Small Causes Court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Sub-article (b), unless he is a tenant of a premises to which the Rent Act is applicable which continues his status as tenant. Having said this, if Section 43 of Rent Act is perused, it takes care of the requirement of Sub-articles (a) and (c) and Section 45 of Act emphasises the right of the landlord to receive rent even at the stage of ejectment as envisaged under Sub-article (c) to Article 4 of the schedule. The reliance placed by Sri Surana, learned Counsel to the decision of a learned Single Judge in the case of Motwane Private Limited v. Mohd. Asif (D) by Lrs. 2006 (1) AIR Karn 61 cannot be of any assistance since it has proceeded only on the basis that there was no prayer for rent and in any event in view of our analysis of this aspect, we are not persuaded by the same. In the words of Scrutton, L.J. "You do sometimes read 'or' as 'and' in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because 'or' does not generally mean 'and' and 'and' does not generally mean 'or'. In the cited decision, there is no such obligation explained and therefore, we would have to read it as it exists.

Regarding The Confusion On Three Judgments Ofthis Court:
1. Ramesh P. Seth v. M.S. Krishnamurthy and Anr. (SUPRA)
2. Bangalore Printing and Publishing Co. Limited v. Soukar T. Premnath
3. Khandelwal Brothers Co. Limited v. G.S. Nisar Ahmed .

35. From the arguments addressed before us, there appears to be some confusion in respect of these three judgments rendered by the respective Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court and hence, we think it fit to clarify the position.

36. The decision in the case of Ramesh P. Seth (Supra) referred to supra is with regard to a tenant defined under Section 3(r) of Karnataka Rent Control Act. In such cases no Court would have jurisdiction to grant prayer for damages or mesne profits and such a prayer would be redundant and the Court would proceed only for ejectment and rent. As such the learned Single Judge keeping in view the provisions of the K.R.C. Act has rightly held that the question of damages does not arise and has held that the suit for ejectment and rent is maintainable before Small Causes Court. In the case of Bangalore Printing and Publishing Co. Limited v. Soukart. Premnath (Supra), it is under the provisions of Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. Though the reasoning adapted is not similar to our reasoning, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge is that in respect of a premises which is not governed by Rent Act, the jurisdiction to file suit is before the Civil Court which is similar to our view and as such the said decision is the correct view as to its conclusion in so far as deciding jurisdiction is concerned. With regard to the decision in the case of Khandelwal Brothers Co. Limited v. G.S. Nisar Ahmed (Supra) which is also under Rent Act, 1999, the learned Single Judge insofar as mesne profits and damages has held that suit would not be maintainable before Small Causes Court but a suit for ejectment only would be maintainable and written statement would decide jurisdiction. This view is taken by referring only to Sub-article (c) of Article 4, whereas in our order we have examined the conjoint scope of (a) (b) and (c) and have held that a suit even for ejectment in respect of an erstwhile tenant of a premises not governed under the Rent Act also is not cognizable by the Small Causes Court and as such we cannot uphold the view taken by the learned Single Judge to that extent.