Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

23. It is needless to mention that when an interpretation of the jurisdiction of a Court is to be made, the interpretation should always lean in favour of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings. Therefore, if this argument is accepted, the same would only lead to such consequences. That apart, there is one more reason for not accepting such an argument i.e., Section 9 of the Act also would have to be kept in view. If for a moment it is assumed that a suit only for ejectment and rent is permitted before a Court, it would mean that the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes in this regard is upheld. Once that is done, the difficulty would arise in as much as under Section 9 the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes is contained, which indicates that a suit cognizable by a Court of Small Causes shall not be tried by any other Court having jurisdiction. This means if in one case, a suit for ejectment with rent is permitted before a Small Causes Court and if in another case the landlord chooses to file a suit for ejectment and mesne profits or damages and if the valuation is within the pecuniary jurisdiction, the first part of the ejectment becomes exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court and second part before Civil Court. Therefore it would not be maintainable before a Civil Court for the first relief whereas the second part for mesne profits and damages would be maintainable before the Civil Court and as such, in our view, an interpretation of this nature would only lead to absurdity and the same requires to be avoided.

Ejectment, the 'mixed' action at Common Law to recover the possession of land (which is real), and damages and costs for the wrongful withholding of the land (which are personal).

It is with reference to the same, the learned senior counsel sought to contend that an action for ejectment carved out form the excepted category would include not only possession but damages and costs for wrongful withholding of the property or premises.

27. However, according to us, since the definition of ejectment is not provided in the Act, the said definitions referred to cannot be applied in abstract but should be considered in the context the word is used by the legislature. In this regard what requires to be noticed is as to whether the word 'ejectment' used in Article 4 of the schedule is used without any rider attached to it. A close perusal would indicate that even though the legislature has permitted suits for ejectment before a Small Causes Court, the same has not been let loose like a unruly horse to run amuck but the same is controlled by the reins attached to it in Sub-articles (a), (b) and (c). As such it is necessary to understand the limitations provided therein even while entertaining a suit for ejectment. Anoticeable feature is that the legislature while permitting the suit for ejectment has circumscribed the same to lie before Small Causes Court only when the property has been let under lease or permitted to be occupied, by a written instrument or oral and the Court of Small Causes would be competent to take cognizance of a suit and decide the substantial issue as to whether lease has come to an end or terminated in accordance with law. By bearing this aspect in mind, the issue requires to be examined. While doing so, the discussions made in the earlier part of the judgment would indicate that in respect of a tenant defined under the Rent Act i.e., the tenant of a premises to which Rent Act would apply, would continue to be a tenant even after efflux of time or after determination of the period by notice or if the permission to occupy has been withdrawn and even during the period after such eventuality and until the ejectment or eviction is made such person would remain to be a tenant and the consideration payable for the occupation of the premises either during the subsistence of the lease or subsequent to determination or efflux would be rent and the same cannot be called in any other nomenclature and therefore the same would satisfy Sub-article (b) and the only substantial question would be as contained in Sub-article (c). As such in so far as such a tenant is concerned, it is needless to mention that Small Causes Court would have the jurisdiction to pass an order of ejectment even though a suit for possession of immovable property or interest in such property is excepted.

Conclusion Regarding Jurisdiction

33. Hence, the resultant effect is that the legislature while excepting a suit for possession has carved out ejectment and qualified the same by carving out rent from the excepted category of interest in the property and combining it with ejetment and then making it possible for the Small Causes Court only to eject the tenant who continues to pay (the consideration of rent) and Sub-article (a) and (c) ensure the summary nature of the proceedings which is further complimented by Sections 43 and 45 of Rent Act. Therefore the irresistible conclusion can only be that in respect of a tenant/lessee who is not protected under the Rent Act ejectment suit would not be maintainable before the Court of Small Causes since the Court would not have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of such a suit and could be instituted only before the Civil Court even if bare ejectment is sought.

Regarding The Confusion On Three Judgments Ofthis Court:

1. Ramesh P. Seth v. M.S. Krishnamurthy and Anr. (SUPRA)

2. Bangalore Printing and Publishing Co. Limited v. Soukar T. Premnath

3. Khandelwal Brothers Co. Limited v. G.S. Nisar Ahmed .

35. From the arguments addressed before us, there appears to be some confusion in respect of these three judgments rendered by the respective Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court and hence, we think it fit to clarify the position.

36. The decision in the case of Ramesh P. Seth (Supra) referred to supra is with regard to a tenant defined under Section 3(r) of Karnataka Rent Control Act. In such cases no Court would have jurisdiction to grant prayer for damages or mesne profits and such a prayer would be redundant and the Court would proceed only for ejectment and rent. As such the learned Single Judge keeping in view the provisions of the K.R.C. Act has rightly held that the question of damages does not arise and has held that the suit for ejectment and rent is maintainable before Small Causes Court. In the case of Bangalore Printing and Publishing Co. Limited v. Soukart. Premnath (Supra), it is under the provisions of Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. Though the reasoning adapted is not similar to our reasoning, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge is that in respect of a premises which is not governed by Rent Act, the jurisdiction to file suit is before the Civil Court which is similar to our view and as such the said decision is the correct view as to its conclusion in so far as deciding jurisdiction is concerned. With regard to the decision in the case of Khandelwal Brothers Co. Limited v. G.S. Nisar Ahmed (Supra) which is also under Rent Act, 1999, the learned Single Judge insofar as mesne profits and damages has held that suit would not be maintainable before Small Causes Court but a suit for ejectment only would be maintainable and written statement would decide jurisdiction. This view is taken by referring only to Sub-article (c) of Article 4, whereas in our order we have examined the conjoint scope of (a) (b) and (c) and have held that a suit even for ejectment in respect of an erstwhile tenant of a premises not governed under the Rent Act also is not cognizable by the Small Causes Court and as such we cannot uphold the view taken by the learned Single Judge to that extent.