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5. As regards the first point, it is clear that although a person who is a party to a compromise cannot challenge the validity of the consent decree by way of appeal, it is competent to a party to the suit, who has not joined in the compromise, to appeal against the decree if he has been prejudiced thereby. This has been recognised in suits for partition of joint properties where a decree has been made by consent of some only of the parties to the litigation: Nityamoni Dasi v. Gohul Chandra Sen 9 Ind. Cas. 210 : 13 C.L.J. 16. It is also clear that circumstances may be imagined in suits of other description, for instance, suits for contribution or even suits for possession of joint property where, in the event of a compromise amongst some only of the parties to the litigation, another person, a party to the suit but not a party to the compromise, may challenge the decree by way of appeal on the ground that he has been prejudiced thereby. In the present instance, we have the unquestionable fact that the contesting defendants did prefer an appeal against the entire decree. In that appeal, there was, to use the language of the decision in Ramchandara Gopal v. Antaji Vasudev 5 Bom. L.R. 735 the chance or risk of the Appellate Court modifying the decree of the trial Court. The entire decree was under appeal and was in peril. It is worthy of note that the contesting defendants were in a manner constrained to appeal against the entire decree. The plaintiffs sought a decree for ejectment of the defendants; the relief claimed was a joint decree against all of them. The result of the consent decree and of the decree on contest was that there was a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiffs against all the defendants, but against some, the decree was on consent while against others, it was on contest. The decree did not define the precise position of the defendants who had entered into the compromise. It did not specify their share in the property if they were in joint possession; if they were in occupation of demarcated plots, the decree did not define such portions. The result was that the decree, though made by consent as to a portion and on contest as to the remainder, was still a joint decree, in the sense that, if maintained, it entitled the plaintiffs to recover possession of the entire property in dispute from all the defendants jointly. The contesting defendants appealed against this decree. As the decree did not define their position, they were bound to appeal against the whole decree. It is thus plain that the validity of the entire decree was in controversy in the appeal, and from this point of view, the plaintiffs-decree-holders would undoubtedly be entitled to the benefit of Clause 2 of Article 182: Gopal Chunder v. Gosain Das 25 C. 594 : 2 C.W.N. 556; Badi-un-nissa v. Shams-ud-din 17 Aa. 103 : A.W.N. (1895) 20. Some stress has been laid upon the decision in Christiana Benshawn v. Benarasi Proshad 22 Ind. Cas. 685 : 19 C.W.N. 287, which is clearly distinguishable and is of no assistance to the appellants. In that case, there were two distinct decrees, one in favour of some of the defendants against the plaintiff, the other in favour of the plaintiff against the other defendants. An appeal was preferred against the latter portion of the decree; that appeal did not and could not imperil the other portion of the decree. In these circumstances, the decree-holder was rightly held not entitled to the benefit of Clause (2) of Article 182. Nor is the decision of the Judicial Committee in Batuk Nath v. Munni Dei 23 Ind. Cas. 644 : 36 A. 284 (P.C.) : 19 C.L.J. 574 : 12 A.L.J. 596 16 Bom. L.R. 360 : 27 M.L.J. 1 : 16 M.L.T. 1 L.W. 729 : 18 C.W.N. 740 of any avail to the appellants. In that case, there was no decree of the Court of Appeal, because the appeal preferred to the Judicial Committee never came up for disposal by their Lordships. The appeal was dismissed by the Registrar for non-prosecution, and it was ruled that the order of the Registrar was not a decree of the Court of Appeal.

6. As regards the second point, namely, the effect of the rule deducible from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ashfaq Husain v. Gauri Sahai 9 Ind. Cas. 975 : 15 C.W.N. 370 : 8 A.L.J. 332 : 9 M.L.T. 380 : 13 Bom. L.R. 367 : 4 Bur. L.T. 121 : 21 M.L.J. 1140 : 38 I.A. 37 : 33 A. 264 : 13 C.L.J. 351, we are of opinion that it is completely destructive of the contention of the appellants. There a joint decree for sale of land was obtained by the plaintiffs against the defendants. The decree was ex parte against one of the defendants and was on contest as against the other. The person against whom the decree had been made ex parte took steps to have the decree vacated in so far as she was concerned. The decree, however, remained untouched as against the other defendants. Ultimately, the suit was re-tried as against the person at whose instance it had been re-opened, and a decree was made against her which was confirmed on appeal. It was ruled that the decree-holders were entitled to the benefit of Clause (2) of Article 182, not only against the defendant at whose instance the case had been re-opened, but also as against the defendants against whom a decree had been made on contest in the first instance. The Judicial Committee pointed out that the plaintiffs were entitled to a joint decree against all the defendants, and that the decree originally made was merely a step for the attainment of that ultimate object, so that time ran as against the decree-holders from the date when the final decree was made. In the case before us, the plaintiffs were entitled to a joint decree against all the defendants. On appeal by the contesting defendants, the entire matter was re-opened. When the appeal was dismissed in the end, the decree of the trial Court stood confirmed; it is clear that the plaintiffs were entitled to wait till the final decree had been made in their favour. If this view were not taken, the plaintiffs might find themselves in a position of considerable embarrassment, as an attempt to execute against the consenting defendants alone a decree which did not define their liability, might lead to obvious complications. In our opinion, the plaintiffs were not bound to execute the decree till the final disposal of the appeal.