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66. It is urged by Mr. Sudhanshu Kumar, learned Counsel for respondent nos. 5 and 8, that a similar approach should be adopted here to relieve the Statute of the vice of discrimination on the ground of sex alone and save it from unconstitutionality.

67. Mr. Rajeev Lochan Shukla, learned Amicus Curiae, has submitted that the provisions of Section 6(c) of the Act of 1956, that provide for a Hindu minor girl being subject to the guardianship of her husband, are now redundant in view of the provisions of the PCMA, and more particularly, the decision of the Supreme Court in Independent Thought, which has read down Exception (2) to Section 375 IPC by holding that in place of the words, "the wife not being 15 years", the words "the wife not being 18 years" be read. It is urged by Mr. Shukla that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Independent Thought, a husband being regarded the natural guardian of a Hindu minor wife, would constitute statutory rape. As such, the provisions of Section 6(c) are no more than a dead letter now. It ought to be suitably amended by the legislature to bring it in accord with the prevalent law, that in any case, renders it otiose.

69. It is true, no doubt, that the purpose of the harmonious construction in Githa Hariharan was ultimately to save the Statute from unconstitutionality, which was apparent, if it was read in any other manner, but to this Court's understanding the doctrine of reading down was not applied. These remarks, though again academic, the Court is compelled to make, because in the present case, there is no challenge laid to the vires of the provisions of Section 6(c) of the Act of 1956 by any of the parties, where the Court may have considered reading down the provision, instead of striking it down, if a case of constitutionally prohibited discrimination were ultimately established. In any case, that question does not seem to arise here. The reason is that Section 6(c) of the Act of 1956 appears to be a rudimentary provision, that was enacted in a different world and in a different social order. It was a time when going by the norms prevalent in society, much younger girls were married to older boys. Some of the girls would not qualify as major under the Indian Majority Act, 1875 as they would be less than 18 years and still regarded old enough by the prevalent social values to be married. It was in that context that the provisions of Section 6(c) were enacted, which were happily placed with the Penal provisions in the Code, where, according to Exception (2) to Section 375 "Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife being not under 15 years of age, is not rape". Thus, Exception (2) excluded sex with a wife, who was not under 15 years of age, from the purview of statutory rape, though the definition of rape otherwise provides that any of the acts of sex mentioned in Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 375, if done by a man, with or without the woman's consent, when she is under 18 years of age, would be rape.