Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

(6) Therefore, the question for consideration is whether the conduct of the respondent in the office premises where he came in drunken condition used abusive language, against his superiors, amounts to moral turpitude ? Can this conduct attract the provisions of Section 10(l)(d)(i) of the Banking Regulation Ac;t ? The fact that respondent was convicted on these facts, and that be pleaded guilty are not indispute. The learned counsel for. the respondent, however, contended that respondent under wrong advise pleaded guilty. He further contended that even for argument sake it is accepted that the respondent under the influence of liquor misbehaved with his superiors in ths office, that by Itself will not fall under the definition of "moral turpitude". That act of the respondent was only a petty offence. A petty offence cannot fall in the definition of "moral turpitude". Since the offence was petty hence A the respondent was prosecuted under Section 110/112 of the Bombay Police Act. For such an offence under Section 117 of the said Act maximum punishment is fine of Rs. 100.00 only. This shows it Was a petty offence. There was no question of involvement of "moral turpitude".

(7) Counsel for the appellant refuted these arguments and urged that "moral turpitude" has a wider concept. Indecent behaviour in public would fall under the definition of "moral turpitude". So will be disorderly behaviour in a street or in a public place or in an office. Since the respondent committed indecent behavior in the office, by using abusive language against Senior Manager, such behaviour is nothing short of "moral turpitude". The very fact that respondent was convicted for offences under Section 110j 112 of the Bombay Police Act for his indecent behaviour this by itself amounted to his involvement in "moral turpitude".

(9) From the harmonious reading of these provisions namely of Banking regulation Act, Bipartite Settlement, Probation of Offenders Act and of the Bombay Police Act, one can conclude that the Legislature, was conscious enough to treat the indecent conduct and behaviour of an official in the office or in the public place as some-thing not expected otherwise the discipline in the office and decency in the society nobody would bother. To curtain such like behaviour and conduct the legislature made these behaviors and conduct as an offence. Using abusive language in the office to superior during office hours cannot be passed of as a joke The mere. fact that the offence committed incurred a lesser punishment by itself docs net indicate that that offence did not have flavouring of "moral turpitude."

(13) Applying the tests to find out whether offence involved "moral turpitude" and as enumerated above, we have to see the facts and circumstances of this case i.e. whether the act committed by the respondent was such which in any way amounted to "moral turpitude ?" If so then under Section 10(l)(d) of the Banking Regulation Act, the appellant bank was within its right to dismiss him from services without holding an enquiry. Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Personnel Officer Vs. T. R. Challappan, , in no uncertain words stated that if the rules permit automatic termination of service without holding an enquiry then the employer will be within its right to do so. Therefore, in order to attract the provisions of Section 10(11)(d) of the Banking Regulation Act, the appellant bank has to satisfy this Court that the conduct of the respondent was such which amounted to "moral turpitude". For this the facts which lead to the conviction of the respondent arc not in dispute. Rather respondent pleaded guilty to the charge of In's indecent behaviour in bank premises during office hours and threatening and abusing his superiors. Appearing as Public Witness -1 he admitted that he was under the influence of liquor when he came to the bank. He threatened and abused the Manager under the influence of liquor. This indecent misbehaviour of the respondent led to police report as well as to the higher authorities. He was under the influence of liquor, this fact is supported by the medical examination report submitted by the police. It cannot be said that that indecent behaviour of the respondent in the office premises during office hours whereby he not only abused the Manager of Bank but also threatened him physically would not amount to "moral turpitude". The use of the abusive language and threatening posture by an employee towards his superior during working hours in the presence of customers. What respect other employees would have for such a Manager whose Daftari could abuse him in their presence and in the presence of customers. Admittedly, there was no provocation except that respondent came to office under the influence of liquor. This indecent behaviour must have been looked down upon by other employees in the office in particular and public who came to transact business in the bank in general. As already pointed out above "moral" stands for "right and wrong conduct". In this case the conduct and behaviour of the respondent was not only wrong but one which every one would look down upon. He had no right to go to the office during office hours after consuming liquor. Thereafter threaten his superior i.e. the Manager of the Bank. Use abusive language against him. Such behavior of an employee in the office during office hours in the gaze of the public cannot be but a case of perversity. If such a behaviour cannot be called "moral turpitude" then I am afraid no other indecent behaviour can be called "moral turpitude". Indecent behaviour as defined under Section 11( of the Bombay Police Act induces use of indecent language in the office. As per respondent's own admission when he pleaded guilty to the charge that he did so under the influence of liquor, he was under the influence of liquor was no excuse to behave indecently. Consumption of liquor did not give him any licence to use abusive language against his superior. His misbehaviour is fortified with his admission when he pleaded guilty before the criminal court. In fact the offence shows an element of weakness of character of the respondent, therefore, the disciplinary authority was not required to consider the facts and circumstances of the case afresh to find out whether the motive led to the conviction was deprave. Nor the disciplinary authority was required to hold an independent enquiry, particularly when the respondent himself accepted the facts levelled by way of charge and pleaded guilty of those charges. Thus I am of the considered view that the behaviour of the respondent in the office involved "moral turpitude". There was nothing else to be proved before the enquiry authority. The facts being admitted the appellant bank was not required to hold departmental enquiry. In this regard, reference can be made to our own High Court in the case of Director of Postal Services and Anr. V. Daya Nand 1972 Slr Vol. 7 page 325 (3), where it was observed that :-- "PROVISO(a) to Article 311(2) exempts the punishing authority from compliance with the giving of both these opportunities under Article 311(2). The reason for the dispensing with both these opportunities by proviso (a) seems to be following : Firstly, the accused person has a much better opportunity of rebutting the charges against him in a criminal trial as compared to a departmental inquiry. Secondly, the conviction on a criminal charge is generally a greater punishment than the departmental punishment of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank etc. As the accused had an opportunity to show cause why he should not be given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be convicted and sentenced by a criminal court it is thought needless that he should be given an opportunity to show cause against the lesser penalty of a departmental punishment such as a dismissal or removal. At any rate, for whatever reasons, the framers of the Constitution have decided by enacting proviso (a) that both the opportunities in Article 311(2) should be dispensed with. Whenever a Government servant is convicted of a criminal offence (unless in an exceptional case the charge is trivial or technical one like a traffic offence) the punishment of dismissal would be inflicted on the convict as a matter of course. It is only in theory that it is true that the punishing authority has to consider which particular punishment should be imposed on the convict person. In practice, however, continuance of a convict in Government service would be always regarded as undesirable unless the conviction was for a "technical offence,"