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16. It is contended that this compromise in terms dealt with matters which were within the scope of the suit and also with matters which were outside the scope of the suit, having regard to the cause of action pleaded in the plaint. The learned Judge's duty with regard to the acceptance of the compromise and his obligations relative thereto are provided for by what is now Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, formerly Section 375 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882. Except for some verbal alterations the old section and the present rule are substantially the same. In the present rule the words "shall order the agreement to be recorded" have been substituted for the words "shall record." This really is the substantial difference which seems to me to be of any importance so far as this case is concerned. What is the obligation which is cast upon a Subordinate Judge or upon any Subordinate Judicial Officer in dealing with a compromise such as we have to consider in this suit? If the compromise deals with matters directly within the scope of the suit, then his duty is clear; he must accept the compromise and record it, and having so accepted and recorded it, he must prepare and draw up a decree in accordance with it, so that the same may be executed in the due and ordinary course of procedure. If the compromise contains matters outside the scope of the suit, what then is the obligation cast upon the learned Subordinate Judicial Officer? It appears to us that such officer must make an order recording the entire compromise and when he has done this, he must draw up a decree giving the parties the right to execute the decree in respect of the matters which properly fall within the scope of the action; leaving it to the parties to enforce by whatever means they like that portion of the compromise which refers to the matters outside the scope of the suit. The entire compromise must be recorded, and be embodied by an order in the record of the suit or proceeding. Each case must depend upon its own facts, as to whether or not the compromise does in fact include within its terms matters outside the scope of the original suit. The learned Judges in a case reported as Joti Kuruvetappa v. Izari Sirusappa 30 M. 478 : 16 M.L.J. 354, in construing this section, say that the language of the section is wide and general and does not preclude parties from settling their disputes on such lawful terms as they might agree to without being restricted to such relief as one only of the parties had chosen to claim in the plaint". It is necessary for us to consider whether the compromise that was arrived at in Suit No. 8 of 1901 did in fact include within its terms matters outside the scope of the suit; or, to use the words in Section 375 itself, matters which did not relate to the suit. I have indicated as clearly as I can the issues which were raised for determination on the pleadings in Suit No. 8 of 1901 and I have stated already what plea was taken by way of defence in exoneration of the defendant's liability for rent under the lease of 1895, and under the provisions of Clause 14 thereof. And it would appear to us that the compromise was really an adjustment of the rights and differences in respect of all matters in dispute between them, whether as framed in the plaint or set up by way of defence in the written statement; and that the compromise purported to be a final settlement and adjustment of these disputes on a fair and satisfactory basis acceptable to all, and, therefore, in our opinion, viewing the compromise of the 10th March 1902 as a whole, it was referable to the matters properly relating to the issues then in suit between the parties. The decision reported as Joti Kuruvetappa v. Izari Sirusappa 30 M. 478 : 16 M.L.J. 354 seems to us to apply, and the words relates to the suit" must receive a more extended meaning than has been contended for in the argument before us, and they must be deemed in effect to mean referable to the claim put forward. Therefore, in our opinion, Exhibit I merely dealt with matters referable to and relating to the claim in Suit No. 8 of 1901 and as such the learned Judge might have given effect thereto by his decree passed in that suit. Mr. Pugh argued that though that may be the correct legal view now to adopt of the case, yet the learned Judge, whether rightly or wrongly, did not think fit in 1901 to enforce that portion of the decree which was conversant with the alteration of the terms of the lease as to royalty and commission henceforth to be payable. I think myself the learned Judge might very easily have drawn up a decree in the form of a declaration embodying the altered terms of the lease agreed upon by the compromise. He did not do so but merely ordered that the suit be decreed in terms of the compromise and that the decree be executed for Rs. 500, the balance due in respect of the money provided to be paid by the compromise. But did the learned Judge's failure to make provision by his decree for the carrying out of the compromise, so far as the altered terms of the lease are concerned, really affect the validity of the compromise as a binding agreement between the parties? It had been accepted by the Court on the 18th March 1902 expressly by an order made on that date. The learned Judge in his judgment referred to the solenama in its entirety; his attention was directed to all its terms and he stated that in his opinion a portion of the compromise was outside the scope of the suit; but he drew up a decree expressly incorporating the entire compromise by reference. We think that, although the learned Judge did not expressly give effect to the entire compromise as an executable decree, nevertheless he did record the compromise and by reference necessarily and impliedly incorporated and made it part of his decree. The learned Judge did not expressly narrate in extenso in the decree the several terms of the compromise. When I say that the compromise was impliedly incorporated in the decree I mean to convey that it would be impossible to construe the decree of the 25th March 1902 without reference to the compromise and that the compromise and the decree, must necessarily be read and construed together, and, therefore, I take it on the authorities, which appear to me to be reasonably clear, that such reference must of necessity incorporate in the decree the entire compromise upon which that decree is founded.