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(b) Save as otherwise provided in clause (a), no pregnancy shall be terminated except with the consent of the pregnant woman."

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra and another : 2024(6) SCC 327 had an occasion to deal with a similar issue and has held that as under:-

"28. The powers vested under the Constitution in the High Court and this Court allow them to enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. When a person approaches the court for permission to terminate a pregnancy, the courts apply their mind to the case and make a decision to protect the physical and mental health of the pregnant person. In doing so the court relies on the opinion of the Medical Board constituted under the MTP Act for their medical expertise. The court would thereafter apply their judicial mind to the opinion of the Medical Board. Therefore, the Medical Board cannot merely state that the grounds under Section 3(2-B) of the MTP Act are not met. The exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts would be affected if they did not have the advantage of the medical opinion of the board as to the risk involved to the physical and mental health of the pregnant person. Therefore, a Medical Board must examine the pregnant person and opine on the aspect of the risk to their physical and mental health.
29. The MTP Act has removed the restriction on the length of the pregnancy for termination in only two instances. Section 5 of the MTP Act prescribes that a pregnancy may be terminated, regardless of the gestational age, if the medical practitioner is of the opinion formed in good faith that the termination is immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant person. Section 3(2-B) of the Act stipulates that no limit shall apply on the length of the pregnancy for terminating a foetus with substantial abnormalities. The legislation has made a value judgment in Section 3(2-B) of the Act, that a substantially abnormal foetus would be more injurious to the mental and physical health of a woman than any other circumstance. In this case, the circumstance against which the provision is comparable is rape of a minor. To deny the same enabling provision of the law would appear prima facie unreasonable and arbitrary. The value judgment of the legislation does not appear to be based on scientific parameters but rather on a notion that a substantially abnormal foetus will inflict the most aggravated form of injury to the pregnant person. This formed the basis for this Court to exercise its powers and allow the termination of pregnancy in its order dated 22-4- 2024 [A v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 608] . The provision is arguably suspect on the ground that it unreasonably alters the autonomy of a person by classifying a substantially abnormal foetus differently than instances such as incest or rape. This issue may be examined in an appropriate proceeding should it become necessary.
30. Moreover, we are conscious of the fact that the decision to NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:39570 6 WP-33004-2025 terminate pregnancy is one which a person takes seriously. The guidelines to terminate pregnancy as well as the scheme of the MTP Act show the seriousness attached to the well-being of the pregnant person throughout the process envisaged under the MTP Act. Change in the opinion of the Medical Board may cause undue trauma and exertion to a pregnant person whose mental health is understandably under distress. While we understand the need for a Medical Board to issue a clarificatory opinion based on the facts and circumstances of each case, the board must explain the reasons for the issuance of the clarification and, in particular, if their opinion has changed from the earlier report. Pregnant persons seeking termination of pregnancy seek predictability for their future. The uncertainty caused by changing opinions of the Medical Board must therefore balance the distress it would cause to the pregnant person by providing cogent and sound reasons."
"64. When interpreting a sub-clause or part of a statutory provision, the entire section should be read together with different sub-clauses being a part of an integral whole. [Balasinor Nagrik Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606; Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 65 : 1962 Supp (3) SCR 973 : AIR 1962 SC 1543] In terms of Section 3(2)(b) of the MTP Act, not less than two RMPs must, in good faith, be of the opinion that the continuation of the pregnancy of any woman who falls within the ambit of Rule 3-B would involve : (i) a risk to her life; (ii) grave injury to her physical health; or (iii) grave injury to her mental health. Alternatively, not less than two RMPs must, in good faith, be of the opinion that there is a substantial risk of the child suffering from a serious physical or mental abnormality, if born. Women who seek to avail of the benefit under Rule 3-B of the MTP Rules continue to be subject to the requirements of Section 3(2) of the MTP Act.