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Subsequent precedent has left it in doubt that even in the legislative field, the Governor equally, if not doubly, is. bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. See U.K. Garg v. The Union of India and Ors. (supra). This constitutional position is undisputed, and, consequently in the promulgation of an Ordinance under Article 213, the Governor acts only as the Constitutional Head on the Cabinet's advice and not in his personal capacity. Therefore, when truly and correctly read, Article 213 when it talks of the satisfaction of the Governor, in essence and in substance, it is the satisfaction of his Council of Ministers. This factor again creates a crucial distinction. Wilst the subjective satisfaction of an individual may, perhaps, be possible of scrutiny and testing it on the anvil of extraneousness or otherwise, the satisfaction of a large body of persons, by the very nature of things, eludes such scrutiny at all and very far indeed from a precise judicial introspection thereof. One may probe the working of the mind of an individual, but even the attempt to probe the minds of 20 to 30 or more persons, acting as a body, and that too in strict confidence, is a vain, if not impossible attempt. It is well settled that the Cabinet in its collective decisions acts confidentially. It was authoritatively said long ago that the devil himself knows not what may be in the mind of a map, and, the situation is only compounded beyond reprieve, when one is dealing with not one man but a large body of men. Consequently, where the core issue is the subjective satisfaction of the Council of Ministers as a body, on principle it becomes something beyond the ken of Courts, both on the doctrine of an inconvenienti and also perhaps the rule of ad impossibilita.

19. Herein perhaps what is pre-eminent, if not conclusive, is the fact that the power under Article 213, though exercised by the executive head, is, in essence a pristinely legislative function. The Constitution, in Chapter IV, leaves this aspect in no manner of doubt, when in. the very heading it proclaims it to be the "Legislative Power of the Governor", and, Clause (2) of Article 213 declares that an Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. Now, once it is held, as it must be, that Article 213 envisages a legislative function, then it deserves highlighting that considerations pertaining to the exercise of executive or administrative actions are altogether alien thereto. These fall in an altogether different field than the one of the exercise of the sovereign function of legislation. Therefore, to draw any analogy from the field of subjective satisfaction of an individual acting administratively or executively, with the satisfaction of a legislative body is not only inapt but wholly misleading. By way of example, one may imaginatively consider a situation where the Constitution requires that the legislature itself must be satisfied regarding the immediacy of a legislative action. Could it possibly be said that the satisfaction of the legislature as a body in this context would then be tested and become justiciable ? I believe the answer must necessarily be rendered in the negative. Even learned Counsel for the petitioners very fairly conceded that where the satisfaction is of the legislature itself, the matter would be beyond the pale of justiciability. Indeed, it is axiomatic that the propriety, expediency and the necessity of a legislative act are for the determination of the legislative authority and not for adjudication by the Courts. However, Mr. Basudeva Prasad had continuously harped on the supposed distinction that under Article 213, though the power was legislative, it was exercised by the executive, and, on that premise, it was contended that the test of an executive and administrative action can equally be applied under Article 213. This specious submission must fail, because, once it is held under Article 213 that it is a legislative power, then all the attributes of legislation must attach thereto, subject to the limitations under the aforesaid article. The mere fact that it is exercised by the Governor is thus irrelevant to its nature, force and effect. The exercise of this legislative power is neither to be bisected into its executive source and its legislative effect, nor thereafter to be dissected by the probing knife of justiciability.

The above view has been approved by another Constitution Bench of this Court in A. K. Roy v. Union of India 1982 2 B.C.R. 272. Both these decisions have firmally established that an ordinance is a 'law' and should be approached on that basis. The language of Clause (2) of Article 123 and of Clause (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution leaves no room for doubt. An ordinance promulgated under either of these two articles has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament or an Act of the State Legislaure, as the case may be. When once the above conclusion is reached the next question which arises for consideration is whether it is permissible to strike down an ordinance on the ground of non-application of mind or mala fides or that the prevailing circumstances did not warrant the issue of the Ordinance. In other words, the question is whether the validity of an ordinance can be tested on ground similar to those on which an executive or judicial action is tested. The legislative action under our Constitution is subject only to the limitations prescribed by the Constitution and to no other. Any law made by the legislature, which it is not competent to pass, which is violative of the provisions in part III of the Constitution of any other constitutional provision is ineffective. It is a settled rule of constitutional law that the question whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power of the legislature concerned, dependent upon the subject matter of the statute, the manner in which it is accomplished and the mode of enacting it. While the courts can declare a statute unconstitutional when it transgresses constitutional limits, they are precluded from inquiring into the propriety of the exercise of the legislative power. It has to be assumed that the legislative discretion is properly exercised. The motives of the legislature in passing a statute is beyond the scrutiny of courts. Nor can the courts examine whether the legislature had applied its mind to the provisions of a statute before passing it. The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act are for the determination of the legislative authority and are not for determination by the courts. An ordinance passed either under Article 123 or under Article 213 of the Constitution stands on the same footing. When the Constitution says that the ordinance making power is legislative power and an ordinance shall have the same force as an Act, an ordinance should be clothed with all the attributes of an Act of legislature carrying with it all its incidents, immunities and limitations under the Constitution. It cannot be treated as an executive action or an administrative decision.

31. Equally significant it is to notice that in the aforesaid case, Chandrachud, C. J., and D. A. Desai, J. (who were party to the judgment in A. K. Roy's case) have unreservedly assented to the aforequoted view. Therefore, this must now be taken as the last word on the subject and in the long symphony of precedent extending over more than half a century a single discordant note is now overwhelmed and. merges in a consistent harmony.

32. learned Counsel's for the petitioners reliance on the observations of Bhagwati, J., (as his Lordship then was) in The State of Rajasthan v. The Union of India (supra) are again of no aid to him. Admittedly chat was a case under Clause (1) of Article 356. There is no dispute that the presidential action under the said Article is executive in its nature. The significant difference is that under Article 213 the exercise of the power is pristinely legislative. The language of Clause (1) of Article 356 and that of Article 213(1) ii not in pari materia and the considerations for the exercise of the power under the two provisions are entirely different. Apart from principle in T. Venkata Reddy's case (supra), it has been now authoritatively said that the ordinance-making power is clothed with all the attributes of an Act of the legislature carrying with it all incidents, immunities and limitations and that it cannot be treated as an executive action or an administrative action. The case is thus entirely distinguishable.