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1. The applicant was appointed as Tradesman 'B' on 20.4.1987 in the Indian Rare Earths Ltd., Rare Materials Plant (RMP), Mysore (Govt. of India Undertaking), on application submitted by him in response to the advertisement No. nil dated 18.11,86 published in the newspaper (Annexure A-1). At the time of appointment, the applicant was asked to furnish certain informations in the proforma regarding particulars pertaining to age, qualification, religion, etc. and these proformas was submitted by the applicant on three different dates, i.e., 20.11.86, 3.3.87 and 6.4.87 respectively, (Annexures A-2, A-3 and A-4). The qualification as prescribed in the advertisement was SSLC or equivalent (I Class) with science subjects. The applicant served in the said company (RMP) upto 31.1.91. The RMP, Mysore was taken over by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) vide order dated 7.2.91 and placed under the administrative control of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, (BARC) Mumbai which is the constituent unit of DAE and the Rare Material Plant was renamed as Rare Material Project (RMP) and all the employees on the rolls of Indian Rare Earth Limited were brought under the rolls of RMP/BARC. Consequent to taking over of RMP, by DAE/ BARC, the applicant came to be appointed on the same terms and conditions as are applicable to the employees of BARC and came to be governed by the rules and orders in force from time to time as are applicable to Central Government Employees in BARC. The applicant was appointed in a temporary capacity in the regular establishment of BARC with effect from 1.5.93 and subsequently appointed in a substantive capacity with effect from 1.5.93 vide order dated 29.7.93 (R-2). The applicant was promoted to the post of Tradesman 'C' and 'D' with effect from 1.5.91 and 1.5.95 respectively.

3. Heard both Counsel and perused documents on record including the inquiry proceedings.

4. The Counsel for the applicant stated that the verification of the attestation forms submitted by the applicant has been carried out at the time of appointment which was 11 years prior to the issue of the charge sheet stating that the applicant had suppressed factual information regarding the higher qualification which the applicant possessed. The applicant contends that the alleged suppression of information, i.e., non-mentioning of higher qualification at the time of his appointment in 1986-87 in IREL is not an act committed during the applicant's service in RMP/BARC. However, it is seen that the IREL was taken over by DAE with effect from 1.2.91 and placed under BARC and all employees were deemed to be the employees of DAE vide letter dated 7.2.91 (Annexure R-1). It is also seen from letter dated 29.7.92 (R-2) that staff including the applicant were appointed in the substantive capacity with effect from 1.5.93. It is thus clear that the applicant at the time of issue of the charge sheet was an employee of the BARC/DAE and was subject to the provisions of the CCS (Conduct) Rules and CCS (CCA) Rules and the respondents were therefore within their rights in issuing the charge sheet even though the charge pertained to suppression of information which had taken place at the time the applicant was recruited by IREL.

5. The next ground advanced by the applicant is that the charge sheet was issued by an authority other than the appointing authority. It is seen that the memorandum of charges dated 26.10.98 has been issued by the CAO and Disciplinary Authority. The respondents have pointed out that consequent on taking over RMP by DAE/B ARC, the HPD/BARC was the appointing authority in respect of Group 'C' employees of RMP. However, vide notification of DAE dated 27.8.98, CAO/RMP was notified as disciplinary/appointing authority in respect of Group 'C' employees of RMP. Accordingly, on the date of issue of charge sheet to the applicant, CAO/RMP was the competent appointing authority/Disciplinary Authority in respect of the applicant. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in the contention of the applicant that the charge sheet was issued by an authority other than the appointing authority.

10. Yet another ground raised by the applicant is that the applicant was denied the services of a defence assistant (DA) and the names suggested by the applicant for appointment of a DA was not approved by the I.O. and moreover, his request during the inquiry proceedings seeking more time to produce a DA was rejected. Accordingly, it is argued by the Counsel for the applicant that the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated and require to be quashed. From the records it is seen that the applicant had forwarded the consent letter from his DA, Shri P. Ravindran to the I.O. on 9.2.99 (Annexure A-15). However, the I.O. did not accept the nomination of Shri P. Ravindran as his DA on the ground that engaging a DA from outstation will delay the conduct of the proceedings besides involving the expenditure to the Government and this was intimated to the applicant vide letter dated 10.2.99 (Annexure A-16). The applicant represented through letter dated 24.3.99 (Annexure A-18) to the Disciplinary Authority regarding rejection of Shri P. Ravindran as his DA by the I.O., but the Disciplinary Authority upheld the decision of the I.O. and informed accordingly vide letter dated 25.3.99. The applicant, thereafter submitted a representation on 1.4.99 (Annexure A-20) addressed to the Head, Personnel Division, BARC but was informed by the Disciplinary Authority vide letter dated 9.4.99 to engage a DA from Mysore itself. The applicant, had therefore written a letter dated 22.4.99 (Annexure A-27) to the I.O. to reconsider the decision in not allowing or engaging of outstation DA but the same was not accepted by the I.O. vide his letter dated 8.5.99. When the next hearing was held on 13.5.99, the applicant did not bring his DA and the applicant was informed by the I.O. that since sufficient time had already been given the hearing cannot be postponed and thereafter the PO presented the case and the next hearing was fixed on 7.7.99. The applicant vide letter dated 7.6.99 (Annexure A-30) intimated the I.O. about the nomination of Shri Chabaque, retired Central Govt. employee from Bangalore as his DA and was informed by the I.O. vide letter dated 15.6.99 stating that Shri Chabaque must submit a certificate stating that he did not have more 5 case on hand including the one for which he has given his consent, On 8.7.99, when the next hearing was held the applicant gave a letter stating that his DA has 5 cases in hand but the I.O. did not agree to grant permission to nominate Shri Chabaque as his DA and the next hearing was fixed for 20.8.99 and the applicant was informed by the I.O. to bring his DA on that date, failing which proceedings will be held ex pane. The regular hearing rescheduled on 20.8.99 was postponed and the I.O. vide letter dated 11.8.99 directed the applicant to indicate the particulars of the DA on or before 31.8.99. Through the detailed order dated 23.9.99, the applicant was informed by the I.O. that this will be the final chance for the applicant to present the case before the regular hearing by engaging a DA, failing which the proceedings will be held ex-parte. In the regular hearing held on 20.10.99, the applicant did not bring his DA and he was asked to produce his DA in the afternoon, but when the proceedings were taken up at 1400 hours, the applicant was unable to produce his DA. Under these circumstances, the applicant was asked to present his case himself but the applicant sought for one week's time to bring his DA but was informed by the I.O. that enough opportunities have already been given and thereafter proceeded with the inquiry. It was strongly argued by the Counsel for the applicant that the turning down of the request of the applicant to engage a person from outstation, Shri Ravindran and the subsequent turning down of the request of the applicant to take Shri Chabaque as his DA and insisting that Shri Chabaque should produce a certificate that he does not have more than 5 cases in hand including that of the applicant was illegal and not covered by rules. The Counsel for the applicant referred to the judgment of the Mysore High Court in the case of K. Santhanam v. Union of India and Anr., 1970 Lab. IC Vol. 3 CN 27; and the judgment of the High Court in the case of Shri V.S. Iyengar v. The Karnataka Handloom Development Corporation Limited and Ors., 1991 Lab.IC 2110, and the orders passed by this Tribunal on 3.9.2002 in O.A. 387/2002. On the other hand, it was argued by the Counsel for the respondents that sufficient opportunity had been given to the applicant to obtain the services of a DA but the applicant was unable to obtain the services of a DA and thereafter the applicant had not protested the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings but in fact participated in the inquiry. If the applicant had been aggrieved, he should at that stage has not participated in the inquiry and should have approached the Central Administrative Tribunal but the applicant had not done so. It was therefore argued that in the circumstances, the reliance could not be placed on the judgments of the Karnataka High Court supra referred to. It is no doubt correct that in the case of K. Santhanam v. Union of India and Anr. (supra), the Mysore High Court had held that the Disciplinary Authority cannot refuse permission on plea of inconvenience. In that case, the Disciplinary Authority had not allowed the petitioner the assistance sought for on the ground that it would entail unnecessary delay and expenses but this plea was not accepted by the Mysore High Court. However, on going through the facts, it is seen that in that case, the petitioner had not participated in the inquiry and immediately on being informed that the applicant's request for appointing a particular person as DA had been rejected had filed a petition before the High Court. However, in the case of the applicant, it is seen that the applicant had participated in the inquiry. Accordingly, the facts and circumstances of the applicant are different, in the case of V.S. Iyengar v. Karnataka Handloom Development Corporation supra, the Court had held that employees right to use the services of a particular co-employee restricted to 2 inquiries was discriminatory since there was no such restriction in the rules in this behalf. Here again it is seen that on going through the facts that when permission to utilise the services of a particular co-employee was denied to the petitioner, the petitioner had not participated in the inquiry but the inquiry had been conducted in absentia of the employee. Here, once again, the facts are different. In the case of the applicant, the applicant had participated in the inquiry. The applicant has also referred to the orders passed by this Tribunal on 3.9.2002 in O.A. 387/2002. In this O.A. it is seen that the office memorandum dated 23.1.2002 was quashed on the ground that the Disciplinary Authority was not the competent authority to pass an order in the matter of engaging a DA. Accordingly, the facts are entirely different and not relevant to the case of the applicant. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit in this contention of the applicant.