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There is no difference between the above and the formulation by Das, C. J., in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, where he observed;

It must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior Court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior Courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior Court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of a certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies.

36. Laying down the position of law on the subject as to when, in the face of existence of the right of appeal or revision, a Court may interfere in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, the Constitution Bench in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86, laid down as follows :

"On the authorities referred to above, it appears to us that there may conceivably be cases - and the instant case is in point - where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obstructive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior Court's sense of fair play, the superior Court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the 'tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice. The superior Court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and may and should exercise it. We say no more than that."

38. In Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheswari v. Antaram Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556, it has been held that though the existence of statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ, the fact remains that the existence of an adequate legal remedy needs to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs and if such a remedy exists, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in the writ jurisdiction unless there are good grounds for such exercise of jurisdiction. It has been further clarified that there are, at least, two well-recognized exceptions to the doctrine with regard to the exhaustion of statutory remedies. In the first place, it is well settled that where proceedings are taken before a Tribunal under a provision of law, which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court under Article 226 for issuing appropriate writs for quashing them on the ground that they are incompetent without his being obliged to ; wait until those proceedings run their full course. (See Carl Still G.M.B.H. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 1615). In the second place, the doctrine has-no application to a case, where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. (See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86).