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3. The application of the petitioner was opposed.

4. The DRT passed the impugned Ext. P7 order to the following effect:

Heard both sides. This is an application filed by the defendants to initiate proceedings under Section 340 Criminal Procedure Code. According to them, some of the documents were forged and later on produced before this Tribunal. It is well settled that if a document is forged before its production before court no proceedings can be initiated under Section 340 Criminal Procedure Code. If any authority is required we find the same in Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar . Hence this IA is only to be dismissed.

8. Chapter XXVI of Cr.P.C, wherein fall Sections 340 and 341 and other attendant provisions, deals with "Provisions as to Offences affecting the Administration of Justice". Section 340 provides that when any Court is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1)of Section 195, which may appear to have been committed in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, the Court may proceed to act in accordance with the different clauses under Section 340(1), after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary. This is eloquent enough a legislative material to note that the embargo in Section 195(1) is absolute and any prosecution for offences enumerated therein could be only by following the procedure prescribed in Section 340. Section 195(1) imposes an inhibition on a Court to take cognizance of the different offences as enumerated therein except upon satisfaction of the conditions laid down therein. Section 195 and Section 340 insulate persons from criminal prosecutions by all and sundry and by persons actuated by personal malice or ill-will. This is ensured by insisting on there being prosecutions, only when the interest of public justice renders it necessary. The said provisions effectively interdict prosecutions when public interest cannot be served. They provide protection to persons from prosecutions on insufficient grounds and ensure that there shall be prosecution only when the Court, after due consideration, is satisfied that there is a proper case to put a party to trial. At the same time, if offences affecting the administration of justice are committed, then the offender ought not to escape from the due process of law. Striking a balance between the public requirement to bring an offender against public justice to face the consequences and to insulate misuse of the law, is the legislative wisdom in providing the mechanism available by a conjoined application of Section 195 and Section 340 Cr.P.C.

12. The underlying purpose of Section 195(1)(b) is to control the temptation on the part of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds, inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. Certain offences have therefore been selected for the court's control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The observation to this effect made by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh AIR 1931 All. 443 was quoted with approval by the Apex Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah's case (supra). Section 195(1)(b)(ii) was considered in Sachida Nand Singh's case (supra) to state that it is difficult to interpret the said provision as containing a bar against the initiation of prosecution proceedings merely because the document concerned was produced in a court albeit the act of forgery was perpetrated prior to its production in the court. It was construing the scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section 340(1) Cr.P.C. in the backdrop of the said finding that it was laid down in Sachida Nand Singh's case (supra) that the scope of the preliminary enquiry is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in respect of a document produced in court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court. The question as to whether there could be no prosecution at all at the instance of the court for offences referable to Section 195(1)(b)(i) in relation to documents in the nature of affidavits and evidence tendered with support of affidavits and falling within the domain of those offences enumerated in Section 195(1)(b)(i), did not fall for consideration either in Sachida Nand Singh's case (supra) or in Iqbal Singh Marwah's case (supra). The order impugned in this writ petition has been passed by holding that "it is well settled that if a document is forged before its production before court no proceedings can be initiated under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code". The proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. is a preliminary enquiry to find out whether a prosecution proceedings in relation to the offences to which the bar under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code is attracted, has to be initiated by the filing of a complaint. The embargo created by Section 195(1) is only to take cognizance of the offences except on satisfaction of the conditions prescribed therein.

13. Even in relation to offences which are not enumerated under Section 195, if the Court is of the opinion that such offences have been committed in relation to any proceedings in any court, the law does not prevent the making of a complaint by that court before the competent court under the Code, though the enquiry under Section 340 is required to be followed only in relation to those offences enumerated under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code.

14. The allegation made by the petitioner as noticed, among other things, is that in the proof affidavit filed in the proceedings before the DRT, certain statements are made, which run contrary to the materials on record and that the materials show that there was a concerted effort to give false evidence before the DRT by producing false documents and giving false statements. Tendering evidence by affidavit is on oath. I refer to the said averments in the affidavit only to pinpoint that this was not a case where the application seeking proceedings under Section 340 should have been dismissed at the threshold, by referring to precedent, which directly holds the field only as regards offences enumerated in Clause (b)(ii) of Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. The view in the impugned Ext.P7 that no proceedings can be initiated under Section 340 Cr.P.C. if a document is forged before its production before a court would not apply in a case where an offence under Section 199 or Section 200 IPC is made out during consideration of the application under Section 340. In this view of the matter, the impugned order does not stand. The same is accordingly quashed.