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1. These two appeals are filed against the decree and judgment of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Guntur dt. 17-3-1989 passed in O.S.No. 191/1983 and O.S.No. 9/86 respectively.

2. The plaintiff in O.S.No. 191/83 who is the first respondents A.S.No. 1788 of 1989 had filed the said suit against the defendants 1 to 4 in that suit contending as follows: The plaint schedule house originally belonged to the first defendant in the suit, by name, Ogirala Venkata Subbamma. She had one son, by name, Krishnamurthy who is the father of the defendants 2 and 3 in the suit and the husband of Ramathulasamma who is the mother of the defendants 2 and 3. As the said Krishnamurthy was leading a way-ward life and was not looking after the family and attending to the welfare of the children, the first defendant who was holding the property settled the said property in favour of the defendants 2 and 3 who are her grand-sons and who were minors represented by their mother Ramathulasamma as guardian by executing a registered settlement deed dt. 13-12-1970 reserving life interest for herself and giving vested remainder rights in the property to the defendants 2 and 3. The property is situated at Guntur. The family of the defendants later on moved to Ongole and they were residing there. As the suit house, which is an old tiled- house, was badly in need of repairs and as it was not fetching proper rents and as they were also in a position to effect the required repairs, the first defendant, who was having life interest and the defendants 2 and 3, who were having vested remainder rights represented by their mother, as guardian wanted to dispose of the property and they entered into the suit agreement of sale dated 25-6-1980 in favour of the plaintiff agreeing to sell the same for an amount of Rs. 37,500/-. An amount of Rs. 7,500/- out of sale consideration amount was paid as advance to the defendants 1 to 3 who specifically agreed to obtain the permission of the District Court, Guntur for selling the property on be half of the minor defendants 2 and 3 and then execute the required registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within the specified period. Subsequently the defendants 1 to 3 filed a petition in the District Court seeking such permission and the District Court directed the mother of the defendants 2 and 3 to get herself appointed as guardian of the minors and as such they filed O.P.Mo. 206/80 on the file of the District Court and the mother was appointed as guardian of her two minor sons in the said petition. Subsequently the defendants failed to pursue the matter and obtain permission of the District Court for selling the suit house to the plaintiff. Later on the southern portion of the suit house, which was in the occupation of some tenants, fell vacant and the plaintiff was permitted to take possession of the said portion of the house and he accordingly took possession of the same and continued to reside in that portion. Later on the defendants 1 to 3 became evasive and failed to obtain the required permission from the District Court and execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in pursuance of the suit agreement of sale. Instead, the defendants started issuing notices setting up the plea that the plaintiff was occupying a portion of the suit house as their tenant and demanded him to pay the rent. In spite of the notice issued by the plaintiff demanding the defendants ± to 3 to execute the required registered sale deed after obtaining the permission of the District Court as agreed upon, they refused to do so. As such the suit O.S. No. 191 of 1983 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur was filed by the plaintiff against the defendants 1 to3 and also against the fourth defendant who was occupying the other portion of the suit house as tenant under the defendants 1 to 3 seeking specific performance of the suit agreement of sale from the defendants 1 to 3 and also recovery of possession of the property from all the defendants.

6. The points that arise for consideration in the present appeals are:

(1) Whether the plaintiff in O.S. 191 /83 is entitled for the relief of specific performance of Ex.A-2 agreement of sale from the defendants 2 and 3 as directed by the lower Court?
(2) Whether the defendants are entitled to seek recovery of arrears of rent from the plaintiff in O.S.No. 191/83.

7. Point No. 1: It is an admitted fact that the first defendant Ogirala Venkatasubbamma, who was the absolute owner of the suit house, had executed Ex.A-1 registered sale (sic. settlement) deed keeping life interest for herself and giving the vested remainder rights in favour of the defendants 2 and 3, who are minor sons of her son, by name, Krishnamurthy showing their mother Ramathulasamma as their guardian. It is also an admitted fact that the first defendant and the minor defendants 2 and 3 represented by their mother as guardian subsequently executed Ex. A-2 agreement of sale dated 25-6-1980 in favour of the plaintiff agreeing to sell the suit house. The contention of the plaintiff is that the defendants agreed to sell the suit house in his favour for Rs. 37,500/- and executed Ex. A-2 agreement of sale and received an amount of Rs. 7,500/- as advance and agreed to execute registered sale deed after obtainining permission of the District Court to sell the property on behalf of the minor defendants 2 and 3 by their mother and subsequently they however, failed to obtain such permission from the District Court and refused to execute the registered sale deed and that the suit O.S.No. 191 of 1983 was therefore filed for the relief of specific performance of the agreement against them. The defendants 1 to 3, however contended that such agreement was the result of fraud and misrepresentation committed on the part of the plaintiff by colluding with Krishnamurthy who is the father of the defendants 2 and 3, that the said agreement is also not for the benefit of the minors and as such it is not valid and legal and not binding on the defendants 2 and 3 especially as the permission of the District Court was not obtained for alienating the property on behalf of the minors and that the plaintiff therefore is not entitled for the relief of specific performance of such agreement. The lower Court has come to the conclusion on the basis of the evidence adduced that Ex.A-2 agreement of sale was in fact executed by the first defendant and the mother of defendants 2 and 3, who are minors, agreeing to sell the property in favour of the plaintiff, that such an agreement of sale was for the benefit of the minors and that it is therefore a valid agreement. The dispute in the present case relates to the factual aspect as well as the legal aspect regarding the validity and the binding nature of the suit agreement of sale. The factual aspect relates to the question whether the suit agreement was voluntarily executed by the defendants 1 to 3 and whether it was for the benefit of the minors. The legal aspect relates to the question whether such an agreement of sale executed by the mother of the minor defendants 2 and 3 without obtaining the permission of the District Court for selling the property is valid and binding on the defendants 2 and 3 and is enforceable against them.

8. Regarding the factual aspect, as already stated above, the lower Court has clearly discussed the evidence and after giving valid and justifiable reasons has come to the conclusion that the said agreement of sale was executed by the first defendant and the mother of the minor defendants 2 and 3 voluntarily and out of their free will and the proposed sale of the property was for the benefit and in the interest of the minor defendants 2 and 3. There are absolutely no valid reasons to interfere with such findings given by the lower Court in view of the evidence adduced in the suit. It is seen even from Ex.A-1 registered settlement deed dt 30-12-1970 executed by the first defendant long prior to the suit agreement of sale that she chose to settle the property in favour of her two minor grand children who are the defendants 2 and 3 by giving vested remainder rights in their favour reserving life interest for herself by showing the mother of the minors as their guardian on account of the fact that her only son Krishnamurthy, who is the father of the defendants 2 and 3, was leading a way- ward life and was not looking after the interest of the minors. Even Ex.A-2 sale agreement executed by the first defendant and the mother of the defendants 2 and 3 clearly shows that such an agreement was sought to be executed as the house was not fetching proper rents and as it was an old tiled-house badly in need of repairs and as they were not in a position to incur the required expenditure for effecting such repairs thereof as they had gone and settled at Ongole which is far away from Guntur where the suit house is situated. It is also specifically mentioned in Ex. A-2 agreement, that the sale consideration amount shall be placed in a fixed deposit for the benefit of the two minor boys. The agreement also contemplated that the permission of the District Court shall be obtained by the mother of the minor boys for executing the sale deed within the specified time. These circumstances revealed from Ex.A-2 agreement itself clearly show that the proposed sale of the property was felt as a necessity and also for the benefit of the minor boys.

12. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the mother of the minor defendants 2 and 3 cannot be considered as a natural guardian when the father of the minors is alive cannot be accepted as an universal proposition of law. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case it is clearly found from the evidence adduced in his case, which is already referred to above, that the father of the minor defendants 2 and 3 was leading a way-ward life and not caring for his minor sons and the other members of the family and that it is on account of such circumstances the first defendant who is the paternal grand mother of the minors, had chosen to settle the suit house in favour of the minors under Ex.A-1 by giving vested remainder rights ignoring her son, who was alive. Even Exs.A-2, A-3 and A-4, which are already referred to above, clearly reveal that the father of the minors was not conducting himself in the interests of the minors and was leading a way-ward life and mat it is on account of such circumstances the mother of the minors chose to file a petition in the District Court at Guntur requesting the Court to appoint her as guardian of the minors for selling the property. Therefore it is clearly established from such evidence that the father of the minors though alive was not caring for his minor sons and not looking after their interests. Under such circumstances, the mother of the minors is to be considered as natural guardian of her minor sons and act as such guardian. As such, the execution of Ex.A-2 agreement cannot be considered as invalid on the ground that the father of the minors is alive, and that the mother, cannot therefore be considered as natural guardian. Such view is clearly expressed by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Gijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathakhan case, wherein it is observed that where a father is alive but had fallen out with the mother of the minor girl and was living separately for several years without taking any interest in the affairs of the minor who was in the keeping and care of the mother, the father should be treated as if non-existent and therefore the mother could be considered as natural guardian of the minor's person as well as the property and had power to bind the minor by granting lease of her property. In the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in B. Ramender Reddy v. Sathyanarayana Reddy, 1986 (1) ALT 240, which is sought to be relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant, it is observed that the right of the mother of the minor to act as guardian during the life time of the father comes into play when the father was disabled physically or mentally or abandoned or neglected his duty and that under such circumstances only the mother could act as natural guardian of the minors even when the father is alive as the law presumes as if the father was non-existent as far as the minor children are concerned. In the present case, as the father had distanced himself from his minor sons and was not looking after their interests and was leading a way-ward life and not caring for the family, the mother was entitled to act as natural guardian of her minor sons and as such Ex.A-2 agreement executed by her cannot be invalidated on the ground that the father was alive.