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tiffs and defendants 3, 4 and 5 are undisputedly the next reversioners in regard to the Stridhan properties left by Manorama and Amala.

7. The point that was stressed on behalf of the appellant was that though Urmila, (defendant No. 2), could not acquire the benefits of an absolute owner under the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, as she had already made an absolute transfer in favour of defendant No. 1 prior to the coming of the Act, yet, on her death, those who will succeed to the suit property will be governed by Section 15 of the Act. In other words, the argument is, whether Urmila (defendant No. 2) is or is not an absolute owner will be immaterial. Section 15 provides for a devolution of the property of a female Hindu dying intestate. The defendant No, 2 is still alive and her death will come after the Act came into force, and during its continuance, the property in her hands will be on her death, that of a female Hindu dying intestate, and, therefore, it shall devolve upon the class of persons set out in section 15 read with Section 16. A "female Hindu" mentioned in Section 15-according to the contention, will include a female Hindu limited owner.

It is well known that there is no vacuum in succession to a property. Properties of female Hindus must have devolved upon one class or other heirs on their death, that occurred previous to 1956, according to the Hindu Law then prevailing. It cannot be suggested that those devolutions would undergo an alteration on the new Hindu Succession Act coming into force. Property already vested cannot be divested by introduction of a new enactment. No doubt, a Legislature is competent to give retrospective effect to an enactment, but that must be by the language used in that (sic). Every Act is prima facie prospective in its operation, and unless the language used by the Legislature is clear and unequivocal, retrospective operation cannot be inferred. This proposition was clearly laid down in the case of Gardner v. Lucas, (1878) 3 AC 582. Lindlay L. J, expressed the same view in Lauri v. Renad, (1892) 3 Ch. 402: 61 LJ Ch. 580. There is nothing in Section 1 5 to indicate that a retrospective application of that provision was intended by the Legislature. On the other hand, the words "shall devolve" point to the application of the provision to deaths that may occur after the Act.

18. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is entirely of a different character. It replaces the general rules of succession of the Hindus dying intestate in respect of all matters, of which provision has been made ia the Act. Those matters, of which there is no provision in the Act, are still to be governed by the old Hindu law. Section 4 makes that clear. Either of the Sections 8 and 15 provides an order in which there shall be devolution of property of a Hindu dying intestate. Chapter I of the Act deals with preliminary matters, such as, the application of the Act and definitions. Chapter II deals with intestate succession and it contains Sections 5 to 29. Chapter III provides for testamentary succession and Chapter IV gives the schedule of different class.es of heirs. In Section 8, the main part reads as follows: "Property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter". The words "shall devolve" unmistakably point out application of the Act to incidence of devolution of property that will be caused after the coming into effect of the Act, and that devolution will be on account of the death of the male Hindu in respect of his property (including the undivided interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary), Keeping in view the interpretation given by the Judicial Committee to the words "dying intestate", the section, re-read in that light, may be put like this: The property of a male Hindu "in the case of his intestacy" shall devolve according to the provisions of this chapter. The devolution oi property, spoken of in that section, refers to the first devolution on account of actual death; and to such devolution that would occur after the commencement of the Act. The other kind of devolution of property of a male Hindu, which happens on succession being again opened on the death of a limited owner, who inherited the property immediately on the actual death of the limited owner, is not envisaged by the section. The circumstances and incidence, relating to the existence of limited owners or restricted estates, have been kept out of the ambit of the Act. In that connection I have already referred to Sub-clause (2) of Section 1 4. Reading the Sections 8, 14, 15 and 16 together, I am left with the conclusion that succession of property oi a male or female Hindu on his or her actual death has been reoriented by this Act. Other kinds of succession about such property relating to the intervention by a limited owner are left to be governed by the Old Hindu Law.

Similarly, the interpretation of Section 8, about its application to only devolution on the actual death of a male Hindu, resulting in two orders of succession, according as the succession opens on the deatn of the full owner or a limited owner, will not be, in any way, inconsistent with the scheme of the Act, so as to rule out that construction. Any other Interpretation, such as, making Section 8 applicable to all cases of opening of succession (either on the death of the full owner or limited owner) would bring a strain on the language of the section, and would nullify the plain import and meaning of the word "shall devolve". If the death of a full owner occurs after the 17th June, 1956, there is no doubt that the inheritance will be governed by the Act, and there will be no room for intervention by any limited heir. The difference in succession arises only in cases where the death occurred prior, to the 17th June, 1956, and the first devolution of the estate took place at that time according to the old Hindu Law. If that devolved upon a limited owner, on whose death, the property would devolve once again on the next heir of that full owner according to the old Hindu Law.