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(4) Whether Rule 4 (A) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules is contrary to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as some other government employees are not excluded or prohibited from going on strike whereas other classes of government employees are prohibited from going on strike?

36. We shall deal with these contentions seriatim.

37. It is true that the petitioner Shri Deshpande has impleaded the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the Union of India as parties to this petition. But, Shri Deshpande has not asked for any relief against any of them directly. On behalf of these respondents, it is contended that the Union of India or the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India being outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, Shri Deshpande cannot ask for any relief in respect of an order which was the subject-matter of appeal before the respondent No. 4. It is undoubtedly true that the appeal stands dismissed. But according to Mr. Mudholkar, learned Counsel for the respondents, the order of the respondent No. 1 has merged in the order of the respondent No. 4. For this proposition Mr. Mudholkar has invited our attention to a recent decision of their, Lordships of the Supreme Court in Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secy. to the Govt. of Orissa, Civil Appeal No. 407 of 1961, D/- 16-3-1962 : . In that case, the facts are given in sufficient detail in the opening paragraph of the judgment. The Government of Orissa decided to grant a lease in favour of Tatas in preference to Rungta though his application was prior in time. The Government referred this decision for approval to the Central Government. The appellant, that is Rungta, made a representation to the Central Government against the recommendation of the State Government, and eventually on 9th April, 1957, the Central Government turned down the recommendation of the State Government about the grant of the mining lease to Tatas. The Central Government further directed that the applications received prior to the application of Tatas should be considered according to the Rules in force. But they added that in case the Government of Orissa desired to work the area on a departmental basis, the Central Government would have no objection to consider a proposal for that purpose. Thereafter the State Government rejected the application of Rungta in December, 1957, on the ground that the State Government proposed to arrange for the exploitation of the area in the public sector. Against this order, Rungta filed a review application to the Central Government under Rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules. This application was rejected by the Central Government in June, 1959. On its rejection, Rungta filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the High Court of Orissa. The petition was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter under Article 226 as the final order in the case was passed by the Central Government which was located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The appellant then came before the Supreme Court on grant of special leave to appeal by that Court. In support of the appeal, it was contended on behalf of Rungta, on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 : 1958 SCR 595, that there was no reason to consider that the order of the State Government should be taken to have merged in the order of the Central Government so as to deprive the appellant of his remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This contention was repelled by their Lordships with the following observations with reference to Moharmmad Noon's case, AIR 1958 SC 86.

38. On these observations the decision in Mohammad Nooh's case, AIR 1958 SC 86 was distinguished and held inapplicable for the decision of the case in Rungta's appeal . In the later paragraph, however, their Lordships have indicated how the facts in the Rungta case, , and the provision of law clearly distinguished that case from the principle on which Mohammad Nooh's case, AIR 1958 SC 86 was decided. It has been pointed out:

"It is not in dispute that if the Central Government was so minded it could have allowed the review and directed the Orissa Government to grant the mining lease to the appellant. Therefore when the Central Government rejected the review petition, it in effect rejected the application of the appellant for the grant of the mining lease to him. This order of the Central Government in effect rejecting the application of the appellant for the grant of the mining lease to him and confirming the rejection of the application of the appellant by the Orissa Government is clearly not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Orissa under Article 226 in view of the fact that the Central Government is not located within, the territories subject to the jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court. It would, therefore, have been useless for the Orissa High Court to issue a writ against the Orissa Government for the Central Government's order rejecting the review petition and therefore in effect rejecting the application of the appellant for grant of the mining lease would still stand. This is made clear by Rule 60 of the Rules, which provides that the order of the Central Government under Rule 59 and subject only to such order, any order of a State Government under these rules, shall be final'. Clearly therefore Rule 60 provides that where there is a review petition against the order passed in the first instance by the State Government, the order of the Central Government passed in review would prevail and would be the final order dealing with an application for a mining lease under the Rules. Therefore, quite apart from the theoretical question of the merger of the State Government's order with the Central Government's order, the terms of Rule 60 make it perfectly clear that whenever the matter is brought to the Central Government under Rule 59, it is the order of the Central Government which is effective and final."

39. In our opinion, Rule 26 (3) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, would also make this position clear. Rule 26 is in Chapter IV providing for the grant of mining lease in respect of land in which the minerals belong to Government. Under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 26, no mining lease for any mineral specified in Schedule IV shall be granted except with the prior approval of the Central Government. A perusal of Schedule IV would show that it includes almost all minerals, and manganese, which was the mineral for which Rangta had made an application for mining lease. Thus, a bare perusal of the Mineral Concession Rules would show that the final arbitrator as to whether a mining lease should be given to a person is the Central Government. That being the position under the rules, it is difficult to see how the State Government namely, the Government of Orissa could be said to have arrived at a final decision in granting a mining lease. We are, therefore, of opinion that the facts on which Rungta's case, was decided before the Supreme Court or Orissa High Court are distinguishable and do not support the proposition for which the Counsel for the respondents is contending. On the other hand we are of opinion that the decision in Mohammad Nooh's case, AIR 1958 SC 86 in respect of the departmental enquiries still holds the field. In that case, the following observations in paragraph 13 at page 95 are apposite: