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5. As stated hereinbefore, the learned Munsif rejected the petitioner's application for temporary injunction and the learned Judge also dismissed the appeal. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Judge the petitioner has moved this Court.

6. In a forceful argument Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that this is an fit case where the High Court should interfere Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He emphasised that Sub-section (1)(c) of Section 115 and proviso (b) of the said Section are fully application to this case. The Lower Appellate Court has acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity and the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made He referred to Chapter IV-C relating to unfair labour practices and dealt with Sections 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 25-T of the Act relates to prohibition of unfair labour practices either by the employer or workman or a trade union and Section 25-U deals with penalty for committing unfair labour practices. He further referred to the Fifth Schedule of the said Act which defines unfair labour practices as contained in Section 2(ra). In this particular Schedule items Nos. 2 and 3 have been specifically singled out by Mr. Mukherjee to pinpoint indulgens in unfair labour practice by the Company. He submitted that at the instigation of and in collusion with the Company a fictitious Special General Meeting was held on 16th August, 1988 on the basis of a notice dated 8th August, 1988 claimed to have been attended by 900 members and a no-confidence motion was passed against the plaintiff-Union's existing Executive Committee and a new Executive Committee consisting of opposite-parties Nos. 1 to 13 was elected. It is the specific finding of the Lower Appellate Court that the plaintiff-Union's Executive Committee as mentioned in Schedule 'A' to the plaint was re-elected by majority of the members for the year 1988-89 in the General Meeting held on 30th June, 1988 in accordance to the constitution of the Union but the Special General Meeting held on 16th August, 1988 was not in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Inspite of this finding the learned Judge found the balance of convenience and inconvenience in favour of the opposite-parties Nos. 1 to 13 as they had already started functioning as the new Executive Committee. Also the learned Judge's finding includes that the suit is hit by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act apart from delay in filing the suit. The learned Counsel further submitted that the learned Judge did not consider the materials on record that except opposite-party No. 3, the rest of the members of the so called newly-elected Executive Committee are not even members of the union and so, in fact, no Special General Meeting of the Union did take place on 16th August, 1988 and the documents annexed to the written objection in the court below are but fictitious. From the documents filed in the Court below it appears that some of the signatures for the so-called requisition Special General Meeting of 16th August, 1988 was taken as far back as on 7th and 10th July, 1988 ; even some signatures for the said meeting of 16th August, 1988 for which notice, dated 8th August was given appeared to have been taken on 14th August, 1988 and the majority of the 201 signatories are not even members of the union. It is further contended that the Executive Committee of the petitioner-Union elected on 30th June, 1988 is still representing the workers of the Company in the industrial dispute pending before the Labour Directorate relating to retrenchment and suspension of 306 workers by the Company. The existing Executive Committee elected on 30th June, 1988 have settled dispute of unfair labour practices on the Dart of the Company and was preparing a Charter of Demand signed by 1100 members as the petitioner apprehended that the Company in collusion with the so-called newly-elected Executive Committee was going to retrench 700 more workers. Mr. Mukherjee took the Court through the judgments of both the Courts below and in particular the finding of the Lower Appellate Court. The learned Judge came to the specific finding, according to Mr. Mukherjee, that the Special General Meeting held on 16th August, 1988 was not convened in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of the Union, But on the basis of the recognition received by the Company, the Court found the balance of convenience in favour of the opposite-parties Nos. 1 to 13. Apart from that the Company's unfair labour practice of entering into the bipartite and tripartite settlements with the so-called newly Executive Committee on 18th August, 1988 (the very day of recognition) and 14th October, 1988 also weighed with the learned Judge. Another defect was the absence of any prayer in the plaint to set aside the election of the new Executive Committee elected on 16th August, 1988 which according to both the Courts below is hit by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. On this point Mr. Mukherjee's submission is that the declaration must be as to a legal character of the right to a property belonging to the plaintiff, a negative declaration regarding the defendant is merely a counter-part of plaintiff's right, i.e., that the plaintiff and not the defendant has been duly elected. He further submitted that as for example one's claim that one is the only legal heir and successor of the deceased is maintainable without a prayer for cancellation of a succession certificate granted earlier since the declared decree would prevail over the certificate. On the strength of a Supreme Court Judgment which I shall discuss afterwards he submitted that if there is any lacuna in this respect the plaintiff must be allowed to make necessary amendment if he wanted to do so. He strongly refuted the allegation of the opposite-parties Nos. 1 to 13 that the so-called elected Executive Committee is at all in possession of the office of the Union or is at the helm of the affairs of the union. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the plaintiff-union is agreeable to hold a fresh election on the basis of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's Order in the case of Philips Workers' Union. He also referred to an unreported Division Bench decision of Calcutta High Court.