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1. The respondent herein, namely, Kh. Iboton Singh, while working as a constable in 95 Bn. of the Border Security Force (in short, 'the BSF'), was arrested, on 15-12-84, by police in connection with Moreh Police Station Case No. 65 (12/1984) under Section 302 IPC on the allegation that he had stabbed to death constable Gharbaran Ram of 95 Bn. of BSF, the FIR against the accused having been lodged by the Coy. Commander, Moreh Coy. The BSF authorities exercised their discretion, under Section 80 of the Border Security Force Act, 1968 (in short, 'BSF Act'), to institute a General Security Force Court (in short, 'GSFC'). A GSFC was accordingly convened and the respondent herein faced the trial on the charge of having intentionally caused death of constable Gharbaran Ram, on 14-12-94, by stabbing him with a knife, and committing thereby the civil offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the case of the prosecution being, in brief, thus: On 14-12-84, while Barbar Keshab Thakur of 95 Bn. BSF was cooking chicken in the kitchen-room of Coy HQ, the accused-respondent was also present there along with constable Ghabaran Ram (since deceased). At that time, CQMH Mazumder came there and enquired as to why so many children were , dining in the kitchen-room daily. Constable Ghabaran Ram replied by saying that the children had been dining there since long. Reacting to what constable Gharbaran Ram had said, the accused remarked by replying that his child had taken food in the kitchen only once and he (the accused) would make payment for the same. Ghabaran Ram retorted by saying as to who he (the accused) was to make the payment. Following exchange of words between the accused and the deceased, a scuffle took place between them and both of them hurled abuses on each other. The deceased, then, left for the barrack, but the accused remained inside the kitchen-room. Shortly thereafter, Ghabaran Ram was heard shouting, "Iboton sale aoo; main batata hun." It was quite a dark night and as the deceased shouted exhorting the accused to come out of the kitchen- room, the accused also replied by saying, "Sale mareko mat bulao, accha nahi hoga." Barbar Keshab Thakur, in the meanwhile, went to fetch water and the accused went out of the kitchen-room. Moments thereafter, Barbar Keshab Thakur heard HC Lal Bahadur and constable Choubay Singh uttering, "Ghabaran Ram ko marker Iboton bhag gaya" or words to that effect. The other witnesses had also heard the deceased exhorting the accused to come out and the accused uttering to the effect that he was coming out and, two or three minutes thereafter, the deceased was seen coming back towards the door of the kitchen with injuries on his person and a knife in his right hand, the deceased holding the grip of the knife pointing towards himself and blade towards the opposite direction. Looking at the condition of injured Ghabaran Ram, HC Lal Bahadur Chetri asked the injured as to what had happened to him and the injured replied by saying, "Iboton ne maar diya" or words to that effect. The injured was, then, taken to Moreh hospital and while undergoing treatment there, the injured succumbed to his injuries. The accused disappeared in the darkness and remained untraceable. Pursuant to an FIR lodged by Coy. Commander, a case was registered, as mentioned above, against the accused. Thereafter, the accused was arrested and put on trial as indicated hereinabove.

10. While considering the scope of judicial review of the findings of a SFC, it also needs to be borne in mind that a SFC is not subject to power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Though the proceedings of the SFC fall outside the purview of Article 227, these proceedings are nonetheless subject to the, overall, power of judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. If a SFC has been properly convened, there is no challenge to its constitution and if the procedure, which it followed, was in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the BSF Act and the BSF Rules, the High Court would not interfere with the findings of such a Court unless the findings reached by it are perverse, that is, when the finding reached is wholly without any supporting evidence or wholly against the evidence. The proceedings of a SFC are not to be compared with the proceedings of a trial, in the ordinary criminal courts, under the Code of Criminal Procedure. A SFC remains, to a great degree, an integral and specialized part of the overall mechanism by which discipline is maintained in a 'force ', such as, BSF. It is for the special needs of such a 'force' that instead of ordinary criminal court, the offenders are tried by SFC even when the offence is punishable by Indian Penal Code. At the same time, what cannot be ignored is that a SFC functions as a Court to which the provisions of the Evidence Act are applicable. The concept of relevance of admissibility of evidence, the burden of proof, and the standard of proof, as envisaged in the Evidence Act, are applicable, without exception, to the trial of an accused by SFC. Viewed thus, it is clear that a SFC has the same responsibility, as any other criminal court, to protect the rights of an accused arraigned before it and, therefore, follow the procedural safeguards given to an accused in order to ensure that he has a fair trial.

14. While considering the scope of judicial review by the High Court in matters of the proceedings of a trial by a SFC, what is also pertinent to note is that Article 33 of the Constitution has conferred, on Parliament, the power to abridge the fundamental rights of not only armed forces, but also of the forces entrusted with the maintenance of public order. This, however, does not mean that merely because of the fact that a person belongs to an armed force or a force entrusted with the maintenance of public order, he is denuded of the constitutional guarantees given to him by Article 21 of the Constitution, which ensures to every person a fair trial in accordance with law. Viewed from this angle, it is clear that when the procedures prescribed are followed as a mere formality by a SFC and not in substance or in its true spirit, the accused may, in an appropriate case, be held to have been denied a fair trial and such a proceeding may warrant interference by the High Court in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. The procedure prescribed adopted for trial by a SFC has to be tested on the touchstone of Article 21 and if the procedural safeguards given to a person from the Border Security Force, under the BSF Act and/or the BSF Rules, are violated, violation thereof would, in substance, be denial of the right to a fair trial. A person, even when he comes from the BSF, is as much a citizen as any other citizen of India and he is entitled to all such protections as have been given to him by making various laws in conformity with the provisions of Article 21. The Constitution-makers were conscious of the fact that no more restriction should be placed than what are necessary and indispensable for ensuring maintenance of discipline and proper discharge" of duties by the armed forces and the forces entrusted-with the maintenance of public order. Hence, when an Indian citizen, being a member of any such forces, is tried under its own established mechanism, such as, SFC, on a charge of having committed the civil offence of 'murder' punishable under Section 320 IPC, it is the duty of the High Court to examine, when such a person approaches the High Court with an application under Article 226, to determine if, while holding the trial, the provisions of the BSF Act and the Rules made thereunder, which provide protection to the accused, have been adhered to or not and whether, for the purpose of reaching its findings, the SFC has kept itself informed of all the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and the Indian Penal Code.

19. Bearing in mind, as indicated above, the scope of judicial review of the decisions reached by adjudicatory authorities, we, now, revert to the case at hand. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the procedures for trial by SFCs are prescribed in Chapter-VII of the BSF Act and the procedures, so prescribed, are similar as those contained in Sections 128 to 152 of the Army Act, which prescribe the procedure for trial by court-martials. There are three different kinds of Security Force Courts as conceived in Chapter-VI of the BSF Act. These three Courts, according to Section 64, are General Security Force Courts (GSFC), Petty Security Force Courts (PSFC) and Summary Security Force Courts (SSFC). In the present case, the Court convened for trial of the accused-respondent was a General Security Forc Court which, according to Section 68, shall consist of not less than five officers, each of whom has held the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police for not less than three whole years and of whom not less than four are of a rank not below that of a confirmed Deputy Superintendent of Police.