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Showing contexts for: flood direction in Deodatt Purshottam Patel vs Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. on 2 August, 1971Matching Fragments
13. The learned Advocate-General, however, in support of the construction canvassed for by him, urged that section 237 must be read subject to section 235 or section 237(b). It was urged that only if a requisite number of members gathered together as required by section 235 and approached the Central Government or anyone can draw the attention of the Central Government to the affairs of the company under section 237(b), on the Central Government being satisfied about one or the other thing set out in the three clauses of section 237(b), the Central Government may appoint an inspector. It is, therefore, not possible to conceive that the legislature would confer such wide jurisdiction upon the court under section 237(a)(ii), as to enable anyone to bypass these two sections. It was also urged that wherever the legislature wanted a single person to come to the court to take action against the company, it has in terms so provided. But, in all other cases, action against the company being representative action, one or the other individual should not be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of the court which would have the tendency to open the flood-gates of litigation. As a corollary, it was urged that a petition under sections 397 and 398 for reliefs against oppression of minority shareholders can only be filed if and only if certain number of members gather together and come to the court as required by section 399. Approaching the matter from this angle and proceeding further, it was urged that it would not be appropriate to read section 237 in isolation but it must be read subject to section 235. The scheme of sections 235, 236 and 237 is quite clear and unambiguous. The requisite number of members can request the Central Government to appoint an inspector. The legislature also conferred power upon the Central Government to appoint an inspector suo motu. But the legislature also thought fit to confer jurisdiction on the court to examine the allegation against a company even at the instance of a single shareholder, and, if satisfied, to direct the Central Government to appoint an inspector. By putting this construction, which appears to be grammatically correct and in consonance with the spirit of section 237, there should be no apprehension of opening the flood-gates of litigation. Whenever the court directs a thing to be done, there is judicious investigation of allegations by a judicially trained mind and reason is the hallmark of judicial approach, fairplay and moderation. A party who comes to this court requesting the court to direct the Central Government to appoint an inspector will have to satisfy the judicial conscience that there has been such Mal-administration in the affairs of the company, and the some one should at least look into the malpractices. In my opinion, the apprehension appears to be unfounded. Therefore, it appears that neither section 235 nor section 237 controls section 237(a)(ii) and this court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition under section 237(a)(ii) notwithstanding the fact that the party invoking the jurisdiction of this court has not approached the Central Government and notwithstanding the fact that the Central Government has taken no action on such an application already made to it. The petition, therefore, cannot be said to be premature or liable to be thrown out on this ground.