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In this case the question was with reference to the grant of licence for constructing a latrine without leaving the required space as per the Kerala Municipal Corporation Building Rules. There the view as noted above is that even though a persona] injury is not caused, a suit will lie. The Madras High Court in Shanmughavel Chettiar v. Sri Ramkumar Ginning Firm AIR 1987 Madras 28 has laid down that a suit for injunction restraining defendants from starting brick kiln on their adjacent land is maintainable on the basis that proposed brick kiln would bring about the hazard of fire in ginning factory and godown. Therefore, there was an actionable nuisance. In this case a very though investigation has been made by the learned Judge in respect, of the nuisance, namely, actionable nuisance, the other infectious disease which may be caused to the neighbours etc. This Court in Mathew Lukose v. Kerala St. Pol. Con. Board (1990) 2 Ker LJ 717 has held as follows :

In all the above cases of this Court and the Madras High Court, the principle laid down was that while putting up a factory near the land of the plaintiff causing actionable nuisance, a suit will lie for injunction. The facts of those cases are when examined with the facts of the present case on hand, the present suit appears to be maintainable. However, at which stage it is maintainable is another point to be examined on the basis of the decision reported in Kuldip Singh v. Subash Chander Jain (2000) 4 SCC 50 : (AIR 2000 SC 1410). In fact the facts of the case in the above decision are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case on hand. There the Supreme Court has held as follows :

"In our opinion a nuisance actually in existence stands on a differing footing than a possibility of nuisance or a future nuisance. An actually existing nuisance is capable of being assessed in terms of its quantum and the relief which will protect or compensate the plaintiff consistently with the injury caused to his rights is also capable of being formulated. In case of a future nuisance, a mere possibility of injury will not provide the plaintiff with a cause of action unless the threat be so certain or imminent that an injury actionable in law will arise unless prevented by an injunction. The Court may not require proof of absolute certainty or a proof beyond reasonable doubt before it may interfere; but a strong case of probability that the apprehended mischief will in fact arise must be shown by the plaintiff. In other words, a future nuisance to be actionable must be either imminent or likely to cause such damage as would be irreparable once it is allowed to occur. There may be yet another category of actionable future nuisance when the likely act of the defendant is inherently dangerous or injurious such as digging a ditch across a highway or in the vicinity of a children's school or opening a shop dealing with highly inflammable products in the midst of a residential locality..... In our opinion, the suit as filed by the plaintiffs should be demissed with liberty to file an appropriate suit on proof of cause of action having accrued to the plaintiffs consistently with the observations made hereinabove....... The licence having already been issued by the Municipal Corporation to appellant-defendant 1, the trial Court rightly observed that the plaintiffs were at liberty to approach the Municipal Corporation and seek cancellation of license or pray for withholding the renewal thereof by making out a case for the grant of such relief within the framework of the legal provisions governing the grant and renewal of such licence. Needless to say, in the event of the plaintiffs being illegally or unreasonably denied relief by the Municipal Corporation, they would be at liberty to pursue the remedy of appeal or approach the superior authorities within the framework of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act or such other remedy as may be available to them in accordance with law."

9. On the principle laid down in the above decision, the facts of the present case now can be examined. In the present case on hand the respondent applied for the licence for running the factory under Sections 96, 97, etc. of the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960. On following all the formalities laid down in the Act, licence was granted under Exhibit B1 dated 7-1-1992 and it was renewed thereafter under Exhibit B2 dated 25-4-1992. A reading of Exhibits B1 and B2 would go to show that they were issued for running the factory as provided in Sections 96, 97 etc. of the Act. Therefore, it is not correct to say that for the purpose of running the factory alone licence has been issued and no sanction was accorded for the construction of the cement cavity Box. Exhibits Bl and B2 have been issued for both to construct the factory and to run the same. As held by the Supreme Court when the licence issued for running the factory and the sanction accorded for the construction of the building are not in accordance with the provisions in the Act, that can be rightly challenged by the appellant before the Appellate Authority. In this instant case it seems that it is not challenged before the Appellate Authority. However, if law permits it is open to the appellant to challenge the same before the concerned authority. Regarding nuisance, as pointed out above, the version of the appellant would be that on account of the construction of the factory and running the same for manufacturing the cement cavity box, the air will be polluted, it will cause so many diseases to the members of her family and the neighbours, it will affect the education of the children studying in the educational institutions near the locality, the sound caused by the running of the factory will impair the hearing of the appellant and other neighbours, etc. Even if these facts are accepted for the sake of arguments, they do not satisfy the requirements for instituting a suit at this stage as held by the Supreme Court in the above said decision. Therefore, when an actionable nuisance arises, that is to say, a cause of action erupts on account of the manufacturing of the cement cavity box or construction of the factory, as per the law laid down in Kuldip Singh's case (AIR 2000 SC 1410) (stated supra), a suit will lie. In that circumstance, I am of the view that the concurrent findings entered by both the Courts below need no interference. Hence, the appeal is only to be dismissed. However, the dismissal of the appeal (suit) shall not prejudice the right of the appellant to bring another action and seek an appropriate relief on proof of cause of action having accrued.