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10. The Supreme Court in Dadu @ Tulsidas vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 437, had interpreted Section 32A of the NDPS Act, as an issue and controversy had arisen whether the said section would affect the Court's power to grant parole. Section 32A of the NDPS Act, reads as under:

"32A. No suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under this Act.- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of Section 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than Section 27) shall be suspended or remitted or commuted."

Rejecting the contention that Section 32A would completely and entirely control the grant of parole, it was held that Section 32A takes away the right of the Court to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict, but it would not affect the power and authority of the Court to grant parole or furlough even when a person is convicted and sentenced under the NDPS Act, and his appeal has been dismissed. A convict can apply for parole and his prayer should be considered and disposed of in accordance with the statutory provision, if any; Jail Manual, or government instructions, without strictly applying Section 32A of the NDPS Act. To articulate and pronounce the said axiom, the Supreme Court referred to the distinction between "parole" and "bail" to hold that "parole" cannot be equated with "bail" and "suspension of sentence" for the said terms have acquired different meanings. If a person applies for suspension of sentence or bail, he has to comply with Section 32A or 37 of the NDPS Act, as the case may be. The aforesaid decision clearly illustrates that the bar of section 32A, would not prohibit grant of "parole" when it is justified and necessary and parole applications should be dealt with and examined in accordance with the statutory framework or Jail Manual or Government Instructions. The aforesaid decision was referred to in Atik Ansari (supra) and "interim bail" was granted to the applicant for a period of two weeks from release. The Single Judge in the reference order has highlighted the counsel's contention that when a convict under the NDPS Act can be granted parole, there is no reason or justification to hold that an accused or convict under the NDPS Act cannot be granted "interim" bail.

16. In the light of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, right or discretion to grant regular bail is exactingly restricted, for the specified offences under the NDPS Act have serious repercussions on the society and are pernicious. The balance, therefore, mandates that regular bail should not be granted unless the negative stipulations of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are satisfied and mere satisfaction of conditions of Section 437 of the Code are not sufficient. However, we must accept that there can be, at times, circumstances where even in cases of grave and serious offences covered by the NDPS Act, where the accused or the convict should be granted a limited indulgence by way of "interim" bail. The extenuating and extreme circumstances may somewhat tilt the balance. On this aspect reference can be made to Dadu @ Tulsidas (supra), which interprets Section 32A of the NDPS Act and upholds right to parole even when an accused stands convicted. Courts are bound by statutes which regulate their exercise of discretion and power to grant bail, and they equally interpret these statutes, when there is an ambiguity and doubt regarding their application, restriction etc.. Interpretation must elucidate the meaning which should be given to the statutory provisions, keeping in view the language used in the provision and if necessary adopt purposive interpretation when the language is capable of different interpretations. Legal interpretation is required in consonance with the statute and also the principles of bail jurisprudence.