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19. Lastly it is argued that the company being a juristic entity, cannot be prosecuted for an offence where imprisonment is a mandatory punishment. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner invokes the doctrine of "casus omissus" as a fundamental premise of the argument that since corporeal punishment which is provided for in Section 272 of the IPC cannot be attributable to a juristic entity and as company cannot be sent to prison the prosecution is not maintainable. The decision in Kumar Kamalaranjan Roy v. Secretary of State has been cited where it was observed that the Court cannot put into an Act, which are not expressed and which cannot reasonably be implied on any recognized principles of construction and that would be a work of legislation, not of construction and outside the province of the Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that right from early Bench decision of this High Court in 1980s to the Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd. it has been consistently held that as company has no body or soul it cannot be awarded any corporeal punishment and accordingly statutory provision for corporal punishment together with fine as a compulsory imprisonment becomes nugatory and the judiciary cannot supplement to the words of the statute which in a given situation are unworkable. It has been submitted that in the Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd., 2003(4) RCR (Cri) 695 it has been held that since company being a juristic person cannot be made to undergo imprisonment, prosecution cannot be launched against the company. The decision in Mehboob Dawood Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra 2004 SCC (Cri) 551 has been cited and it is submitted that till Velliappa Textiles case it has been the perception in the Indian judiciary that no matter what are the words in the statute. Corporate bodies cannot be prosecuted against primarily because of the fact that awarding corporeal punishment is impossible and secondly mens rea was absent. So far as the mens rea or guilty mind is concerned, I have discussed the point in the preceding paragraphs with reference to the observation of the Supreme Court in Standard Chartered Bank and the observation in Treaties of Craies on Statute Law. Now the question is whether in view of the decisions of this Court in the early nineties, the prosecution against the company can be dropped on the premise that it cannot be sent to prison. Mr. Bhattacharjee invokes the doctrine of casus omissus to argue that it was only in the Standard Chartered Bank that the majority view held that even though company cannot be sent to prison as it is impossible to do so, it can be visited with fine and in spite of mandatory imprisonment provided in the statute, company can be prosecuted against and punished with payment of fine and it cannot be argued that the intention of the Legislature has been to exclude the companies in the grave offences. Mr. Bhattacharjee's contention is that the principle underlined in the decision of Standard Chartered to the effect that the company can be prosecuted against and visited with penalty of fine, cannot be made applicable to the instant case of ours, because the decision of the Standard Chartered came into being in May, 2005 while the offence was committed in 1993 and this decision cannot be made applicable to the offences which were committed before the decision came into being. It is argued with an analogy that Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 provides for punishment in case payment of provident fund dues is not made within the statutory period of time. There was a decision of this High Court that pre-launching of prosecution payment would absolve the accused of being prosecuted against. This was the view in Hooghly Docking and Engineering Co. 1980(1) CHN 280. Later a Division Bench of the High Court in Pranati Textiles v. State 1989 Cr. LJ 1804 held in reversal of the decision in Hooghly Docking case that once there was a failure to pay in time, a belated even though pre-prosecution payment would be no bar to a criminal prosecution and conviction. The decision in Pranati Textiles was rendered sometime in 1989, while Hooghly Docking case was decided immediately preceding the decision in Pranati Textiles. In Anup Kumar and Anr. v. State of West Bengal 1992 C Cr. LR (Cal) 1 similar question arose and the Division Bench held that a belated though pre-prosecution payment would be no bar to a criminal prosecution. Now in this Anup Kumar case (supra) which was decided in April, 1991, the Division Bench held that the defaults committed by the employers immediately before the decision in Pranati Textiles should not attract prosecution because the decision in Pranati Textiles did not take its birth when such defaults were committed. Therefore, it is argued that this Court should not take the aid of Standard Chartered case because the Standard Chartered did not originate when the instant company committed the offence. Mr. Swapan Kumar Mallick, Learned Counsel appearing for the State of West Bengal seriously contested the submission. He submitted that it is not that the quality or quantity of punishment as was provided in the Section 272 of the IPC changed subsequent to the commission of the offence. The West Bengal amendment came into being in its relation to Section 272 of the IPC with effect from April, 1974 and the accused knew that his act of adulteration was visitable with the punishment as was provided in the Act. Therefore, it is cannot be said that it was the Hon'ble Supreme Court which for the first time in the Standard Chartered decision supplemented the purported omission and invented a new punishment which was not in the statute. It is submitted that the intention of the Legislature is the law and right before the commission of the offence such intention was expressed in the statute and that expression has only been elucidated in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Standard Chartered to the effect that even though it is not physically possible to commit a company to the prison, it can be awarded with the punishment of fine and merely because of the fact that rigorous imprisonment which is a part of the punishment under Section 272 of the IPC cannot be implemented physically, it cannot be said that the other part of the sentence, as has been maintained by the Supreme Court in Standard: Chartered, and as it is already there in the statute, cannot be awarded to the accused upon conviction. Upon hearing the Learned Counsel for the parties, the reasons assigned by Mr. Mallick appears to be more powerful and cogent. The decision in Anup Kumar was completely in a different fact situation which cannot be made applicable here. Here the question is whether a company can be prosecuted against or not in view of the fact that it cannot be sent to prison. Till Velliappa Textiles case, the view was that it cannot be prosecuted against, but the decision was overruled by a Five-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Standard Chartered case where it was held that it was not the intention of the Legislature that in grave offences the companies should be made scot-free merely because of the fact that corporeal punishment cannot be given or that it can be visited with fine only in minor offences. It has to be reiterated here that the Supreme Court did not prescribe any new kind of punishment. The Supreme Court explained the law which is an outcome of intention of the Legislature. Therefore, the doctrine of casus omissus cannot be said to be applicable in the instant case. Mr. Bhattacharjee has referred to Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors. ; Prakash Amirchand Shah v. State of Gujarat ; Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and Ors. ; Pratap Singh v. State of Jharhhand and Anr. . The ratio of the decision in Delhi Transport (supra) is that under Article 141, the Supreme Court can make law. The decision in Son Devrajbhai Babubhai (supra) is that Section 304B is a new offence applicable from the date of the enactment. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted with reference to a decision in Mehboob Dawood Shaikh, 2004 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 551 where it has been held at paragraph 12 of the Judgment that a decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law and a Judgment should be understood in the light of facts of that case and no more should be read into it than what it actually says. It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the Judgment of the Court of the Supreme Court divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be a complete law decided by the Court. This decision was in a different situation as is reported in that case and there was no reason as to how this observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which is definitely a dictum of law, has relevance to the facts of the case which we are concerned with. Mr. Bhattacharjee has referred to a Privy Council decision in Kumar Kamalaranjan Roy v. Secretary of State where it has been held that Court cannot put words which are not expressed and which cannot be implied. I do not find that this decision is really necessary for us. Their Lordships held that it may be that there is a casus omissus, but if so, that omission can only be supplied by statute or statutory action. The Court cannot put into Act words which are not expressed and which cannot reasonably be implied on any recognized principle of construction as that would be a work of legislation not of construction. I do not think that this decision is appropriate as I think no casus omissus was there and so far as Standard Chartered is concerned, it did not put into Act words which were not expressed. In Prakash Amirchand (supra) it has been held in paragraph 26 of the judgment, "a decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the Court while the principle underlined the decision would be binding as a precedent in a case which comes up for decision subsequently. Hence while applying to the decision to a latter case, the Court which is dealing with it, should carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the previous decision". In Pratap Singh's case (supra) there is a reference to a good number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which are very relevant for our consideration. In this decision there is a reference to Ratan hall v. State of Punjab where Their Lordships have inter alia, held that "under Article 20 of the Constitution, no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. But an ex post facto law which only mollifies the rigour of a criminal law does not fall within the said prohibition". In Bashcer alias N.P. Basheer v. State of Kerala , Their Lordships observed, "If the Act had contained any provisions to the detriment of the accused, then undoubtedly, it would have been hit by the rule against post facto legislation contained in Article 20(1). However, we find that the amendments (at least the ones rationalizing the sentencing structure) are more beneficial to the accused and amount to mollification of the rigour of the law. Consequently despite retrospectivity, they ought to be applied to the cases pending before the Court or even to cases pending investigation on the date on which the Amending Act came into force. Such application would not be hit by Article 20(1) of the Constitution". Then in Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors. 2005(1) RCR (Cri) 166 (SC), Their Lordships held that rule against retrospectivity cannot be applied to legislations which are explanatory and declaratory in nature. In Dayal Smgh v. State of Rajasthan 2004(2) RCR (Cri) 609 (SC) it has been held that the ex post facto law which only mollifies the rigour of a criminal law did not fall within the prohibition and if a particular law made a provision to that effect, it would be valid despite retrospectivity in operation. These decisions clearly show that the laws which are declaratory or explanatory are retrospective. Craies on Statute Law 7th Edn. (page 395) observed that explanatory and declaratory Acts are always retrospective. It was held, "where an Act is in its nature declaratory, the presumption against construing it retrospectively is inapplicable. In Attorney General Theobald Section 11 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889, as to the liability of voluntary settlement to stamp-duty, was held retrospective although the litigation in which different terms were involved, it commenced before it was passed. Acts of this kind, like judgments, decide similar cases pending when the judgments are given, but do not re-open decided cases". This observation equally and appropriately applied in the instant case when the question of applicability of the decision in Standard Chartered in the given facts situation is raised.