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Based on the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court, learned Special Public Prosecutor requested to dismiss the Revision Petitions confirming the impugned common order passed by the Special Judge.

Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the points that arise for consideration are as follows:

1) Whether the order dismissing an application under Section 239 Cr.P.C is interlocutory in nature?. If so, whether the revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C r/w Section 401 Cr.P.C is maintainable, in view of the bar under Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C?

At this stage, it is relevant to advert to the very intention of the Legislature in incorporating sub-section (2) of Section 397 Cr.P.C, since, there was no such bar prior to amendment of Cr.P.C. Subsection (2) is a new provision and interlocutory orders have been excluded from the purview of revision. Therefore, the very intention of the legislature in incorporating Subsection (2) is to exclude revisions to expedite the disposal of the cases by the Courts, but not to regulate the procedure for expeditious disposal. Thus, Section 397(2) Cr.P.C was incorporated in the new Code with the avowed purpose of cutting out delays and ensuring that the accused persons to get a fair trial without much delay and the procedure was not made complicated. The term 'interlocutory order' has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial. (vide V.C. Shukla v. State (referred supra)).

(1) Was the order made upon an application such that a decision in favour of either party would determine the main dispute?
(2) Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could have been decided?
(3) Does the order, as made, determine the dispute?
(4) If the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on.

In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose,19 the Supreme Court considered the requirements as to whether the order is interlocutory or not with reference to Section 397(2) Cr.P.C and came to a conclusion that giving the expression interlocutory order is a natural meaning according to the tests laid down as discussed above in S. Kuppuswami v. The King (referred supra) and it is clear that, so far as the the expression interlocutory order has been used in the natural sense and not in a special or in the wider sense in Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. This view appears to be in consonance with the object of the Act to provide a bar under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C to do substantial justice and to prevent unnecessary hurdles in the process of completion of trial.

Taking advantage of the principle laid down in the above judgment, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that, the order under challenge affects the substantial rights of the parties, therefore, a revision lies against such order under Section 397(1) and Section 401 Cr.P.C before this Court.

In Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (referred supra), Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (referred supra) and Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd and ors. V. Central Bureau of Investigation (referred supra), the only basis for arriving at such conclusion is the order that affects the substantial rights of the parties is amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. No doubt, framing of a charge against the accused would certainly affect substantial rights of the parties, but I am unable to comprehend which are the orders passed during pendency of the main sessions case or calendar case, that would not affect the substantial rights of the accused. For instance, if a petition is filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C to recall a witness or summon a witness, or a petition is filed under Section 91 Cr.P.C which deals with summons to produce document or other thing and, such application is dismissed, it is difficult for the accused to prove his positive case or to prove his innocence, for the charges framed against him. If, no revision is permitted against said orders, MSM, J CrlRC.Nos.1726 & 1998 of 2017 certainly it would affect the substantial rights of the accused, but the Apex Court in Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam22 took a view that the order passed under Section 311 Cr.P.C or Section 91 Cr.P.C are not amenable to revisional jurisdiction of either Sessions Court or High Court, since it is an interlocutory order.