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2. Muin-ud-din died on the 6th of May, 1890, possessed of immovable property the inheritance to which is in dispute in the present case. He died leaving him surviving his widow, Musammat Maina, and his cousin, Musammat Barkat-un-nissa. Musammat Maina entered into possession of the entire estate and professed to remain in possession in lieu of her unsatisfied claim for dower. Musammat Barkat-un-nissa died on the 27th of June, 1892, and her husband Maslah-ud-din died on the 17th of August, 1897. Her mother, Musammat Khair-un-nissa, died on the 22nd of December, 1898. We refer to the husband and the mother of Musammat Barkat-un-nissa as under the Muhammadan law they and her children would be her heirs on her death. After her death and that of her mother and husband her sons became entitled to 72 sihams and her three daughters to 36 sihams in the estate of Muin-ud-din. Musammat Maina, the widow, was entitled to the remaining 36 sihams. On the 13th of May, 1899, two of her daughters, namely, Musammats Ummahani Bibi and Muiz-un-nissa Bibi, instituted a suit for the recovery of their share in the inheritance, namely, 24 sihams, impleading Musammat Maina and the other descendants of Musammat Barkat-un-nissa, as defendants in the case. One of the pleas on behalf of Musammat Maina was that at the time of the death of Muin-ud-din, his aunt and his step-aunt were alive, and Barkat-un-nissa was not an heir under the Muhammadan law to Muin-ud-din. She further pleaded that her dower-debt was Rs. 51,000 and in lieu of it Muin-ud-din before his death had gifted the immovable property to her. The pleas in defence were disallowed. The court held that Musammat Barkat-un-nissa was an heir of Muin-ud-din; that the dower debt of Musammat Maina was Rs. 51,000, and that no gift had been made by Muin-ud-din of the property in question in lieu of dower. The claim of the two ladies was decreed for the recovery of 24 sihams on the payment of Rs. 3,943-12-10, the proportionate amount of dower payable by them. The money was paid and the two ladies recovered possession of their share.

6. The decree of the lower court is challenged on three grounds only which we have already mentioned above. In support of the first ground, viz., that of res judicata, it is urged that the lower court and the plaintiffs are under a misapprehension in thinking that the position of a Muhammadan widow in possession of the estate of her deceased husband in lieu of dower is analogous to that of a mortgagee or that a suit by his heirs against the widow for the recovery of possession of their share in his estate is similar to a redemption suit. It may be that in some cases her possession is described, for want of a better expression and in a loose way, as that of a mortgagee, but the incidents appertaining to the position of a mortgagee are wanting in her case. The case of Ghulam Ali v. Sagir-ul-nissa Bibi (1901) I.L.R., 23 All., 432 is cited in support of the argument. In that case it was laid down that there was nothing to prevent a Muhammadan widow who was in possession of the property of her late husband in lieu of dower from suing to recover her dower from the heirs of her deceased husband. If the analogy of a mortgagee were applicable to a Mahammadan widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of dower, she could not sue for the recovery of her unsatisfied dower even by offering to surrender or surrendering her possession of the estate. The remarks of the learned Judges who decided the case of Mirza Mohammad Sharafat Bahadur v. Shazadi Wahida Sultan Begum (1914) 19 C.W.N., 503 are relied upon to show that the suit by a widow for the recovery of her unsatisfied dower or by the heirs against her for the recovery of their share in the estate of her deceased husband is really in the nature of an administration suit. And where a decree in an administration suit is not executed and is allowed to be barred by lapse of time, no second suit would lie. It is further contended that if the position of a Muhammadan widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her unsatisfied dower is analogous to that of a mortgagee, no second suit would lie, as was held in Sheikh Golam Hossein v. Mussumat Alla Rukhee Beebee (1871) 3 N.W.P., H.C. Rep., 62 and in Muhammad Zakariya v. Muhammad Hafiz (1917) I.L.R., 39 All., 506. In any case the present suit is barred by the condition attached to the decree of 1903 to the effect that in case of default the suit was to stand dismissed. Reliance is placed on the case of Lachman Singh v. Madsudan (1907) I.L.R., 29 All., 481. For the plaintiffs respondents the reply is that as far as this Court is concerned it has been held more than once that the position of a Muhammadan widow in possession of her late husband's estate in lieu of her unsatisfied dower is analogous to that of a mortgagee. See Aziz-ullah Khan v. Ahmad Ali Khan (1885) I.L.R., 7 All., 353. The case of Sita Ram v. Madho Lal (1901) I.L.R., 24 All., 44 is cited as authority for the proposition that a second redemption suit would lie where the right to redeem is not barred by act of the parties or by an order of court. The case of Lachman Singh v. Madsudan (1907) I.L.R., 29 All., 481 is distinguished on the ground that in that case the decree provided that if the redemption was not made within the time specified, the right to redeem would be barred. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs respondents contends that his right to inherit the property left by Muin-ud-din was not in dispute in the litigation of 1902. All that was in dispute in that case was whether the then plaintiffs could recover their share in the property without payment or if on payment, on the payment of what sum. The amount of dower, as also the rate of interest, were in dispute in that case. The amount of dower, the rate of interest and the amount payable at the time of the decree were determined by the court and are questions which cannot be re-opened. In the present case the plaintiffs are asking for an adjudication on the accounts since 1903. Their cause of action for the present suit is quite distinct from that in the suit of 1902. As to the conditions attached to the decree, that in case of non-payment within six months, the suit should stand dismissed, the order did not extinguish the right of inheritance but only the right to get immediate possession. In order to decide the point under discussion we must first have a clear idea of the position of a Muhummadan widow in possession of her deceased husband's estate in lieu of dower. Under the Muhammadan law her position is described by Macnaghten in his well-known book of Principles and Precedents of Muhammadan Law. Case X at page 356 is as follows: