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1. In this suit the plaintiffs claimed to recover possession of 40 bighas 15 cuttahs and 13 1/2 dhoors of kasht land. It is not disputed that one Manrup Lai was at one time the owner of this land. He died in 1886 leaving two widows Musammat Basmati Kuer and Musammat Rajbansi Kuer. Basmati Kuer who survived her co-widow died sometime in 1919. The plaintiffs claim that they are the reversionary heirs of Manrup Lal and are, in the events which have happened, entitled to immediate possession of the disputed land. The suit was resisted by the defendants who based their title on conveyances executed in their favour by Basmati Kuer; and the only question which arises before us in this appeal is whether there is legal necessity to support the conveyances upon which the defendants rely. I may mention that there were various other questions raised in the Courts below, but in this Court we are only concerned with the question of legal necessity. There are four documents which we have to consider in this appeal Ex. L-1 executed by Basmati Kuer on 30th March, 1903, to raise a sum of Rs. 541, Ex. L-2 executed on 17th May, 1906, to raise Rs. 89-6-0, Ex. L-7 executed on 12th August, 1911, to raise a sum of Rs. 399 and Ex. L-5 executed on 6th February, 1913, to raise a sum of Rs. 376-8-0. The learned Subordinate Judge found that so far as the transaction evidenced by Ex. L-1 is concerned there was legal necessity to support that transaction to the extent of Rs. 175-8-0 and he set aside the conveyance on terms that the plaintiffs paid Rs. 175 8 0 to the vendees. The learned District Judge in the lower Appellate Court has found that the entire transaction should stand: and he has refused to set aside the transaction of the 30th May, 1903. So far as the transaction of 17th May, 1906, is concerned, the learned Subordinate Judge thought that there was no legal necessity to justify that transaction and in the result he set aside that sale. The learned District Judge has taken a different view and has upheld the transaction. So far as the transaction of 12th August, 1911, is concerned, the learned Subordinate Judge set aside the transaction holding as he did, that there was no legal necessity to support it. The learned District Judge has agreed with the Court of first instance that the sale should beset aside; but he has directed the plaintiffs to pay Rs. 324 to the defendants as a condition for setting aside the sale. So far as the transaction of 6th February, 1913, is concerned, the Court of first instance set aside the sale. The lower Appellate Court has modified to order and has directed the plaintiffs to pay Rs. 265-8-0 to the vendees as a condition for setting aside the sale. Both sides appeal to this Court.

2. I will first consider the transaction of 30th March, 1903. As I have mentioned, the property was sold by Basmati Kuer for a sum of Rs. 541. The learned Subordinate Judge held that Rs. 175-8-0 out of the consideration money was properly payable by the widow to discharge a debt of her hushand; and in this view he directed that the plaintiffs should pay the vendees Rs. 175-8-0 as a condition for setting aside the sale. The fact appears to be this. In 1872 Manrup Lal, the husband of Basmati Kuer executed a zerpeshgi deed as a security for an advance of Rs. 351. He also borrowed a sum of Rs. 32. On 18th July, 872, Manrup executed a zerpeshgi deed in other to discharge his prior liability under the zerpeshgi of 1872. On 8th November, 1892, that is to say, after the death of Manrup Lal, Basmati Kuer and Rajbansi Kuer jointly executed a zarpeshgi to pay off the debts due by their husband. The debt amounted to Rs. 388 and it appears that Basmati Kuer made herself responsible for Rs. 194. This is the first item mentioned in the transaction of 30th March, 1903. The learned Subordinate Judge took the view that as Manrup Lal executed a zarpeshgi deed as a security for the loan and as the creditor could not under the terms of the zarpeshgi deed bring a suit for the realization of the money, there was consequently no pressure on the estate of Basmati Kuer. She was, therefore, in the view of the learned Sub Judge, not entitled to sell a portion of her husband's estate to pay off the debt. With all respect, I am unable to agree with this mode of reasoning. The question of pressure does not arise where the debt to discharge which a part of the estate is sold was a debt of the full proprietor. Mr. Khurshed Hussain before us contends that there was in fact no debt because the zarpeshgidar was in possession and he had precluded himself from bringing a suit in respect of the loan. This, in my view, is an impossible argument. The debt was there; it was a subsisting debt, only the creditor was in possession of a part of the estate and was unable to recover it by instituting a suit in the Civil Courts. But the result was that a considerable portion of the income was withdrawn from Basmati Kuer who had succeeded her husband. It is well-established that where a case of necessity exists, an heiress is not bound to borrow money, with the hope of paying it off before her death. Nor is she bound to mortgage the estate, and thereby reduce her income for life. She is at liberty, if she thinks fit, absolutely to sell off a part of the estate As it has been put in Venkaji Sridhar v. Vishnu Babaji Beri 18 B. 534 Widow, like a manager of a family, must be allowed a reasonable latitude in the exercise of her powers, provided she acts fairly to her expectant heirs.

3. Now, I can see no unfairness on her part in selling a portion of the estate to discharge the liability of her husband. I held, therefore, that the learned District Judge was right in taking the view that Basmati Kuer was entitled to sell a portion of the estate to discharge the liability of her husband.

4. The next item is one of Rs. 50. It appears that on 15th Sawan, 1292, Manrup Lal executed a bond as a security for an advance of Rs. 49. On 9th Pous, 12 3, he borrowed Rs. 36 and executed a chita as a security for the loan It appears that Basmati Kuer and Rajbansi Kuer executed a zarpeshgi deed as a security for the debt due by their husband to the creditor and that Basmati Kuer was liable for half the amount for which the zerpeshgi was executed. This is the second item mentioned in Ex. L-1 and in my opinion she was entitled to sell her husband's estate to pay off the debt due by her husband....

7. The next transaction is one of 12th August, 1911; and it is evidenced by Ex. L-7. By this transaction Basmati sold some of the properties in suit to some of the defendants for a sum of Rs. 399. The learned District Judge has practically upheld the transaction; but I am unable to agree with the view which has been taken by him. Now, we are concerned with six items and in my view not one of these items can be established as against the reversioners. The first item is one of Rs. 72. It appears that there was a suit between Ramdeo Lal and Basmati Kuer and there was a decree for Rs. 72 for costs as against Basmati Kuer; and it is impossible to take the view that the widow was entitled to incur costs in a frivolous litigation and charge her husband's estate with it. If indeed there was a finding to the effect that she was defending her husband's estate in that litigation, then something might be said in favour of the decision of the learned District Judge; but there is nothing to show in the judgment of the learned District Judge what that, suit was, and in what capacity Basmati Kuer was defending that suit. The next item is one of Rs. 126 which was the amount decreed against Basmati Kuer in a suit between her and Sughar Ahir. In my opinion, it is impossible to hold that the widow was entitled to charge the estate with the costs of that suit. The next item is one of Rs. 45 which was required by Basmati Kuer for payment of rent to the malik. It is well-established that the limited owner cannot make the estate liable for the payment of rent. The next item is one of Rs. 56 required for costs of cultivation; but the fruit of cultivation belonged to the limited owner and it is obvious that she had to incur all the costs necessary for cultivation. The next item is one of Rs. 25 necessary for domestic expenses. There is no evidence to show that there was any necessity for the widow to raise this sum of money and the item must be disallowed. The last item is one of Rs. 75 which has been properly disallowed by the learned District Judge. The result is that so far as the transaction 12th August, 1911, is concerned, the plaintiffs must succeed and they are entitled to a decree for possession in respect of the properties covered by Ex. L-7.