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If we were to examine the number of complaints filed which were compromised or settled before the final judgment on one side and the cases which proceeded to judgment and conviction on the other, we will find that the bulk was settled and only a miniscule number continued.

18. It is quite obvious that with respect to the offence of dishonour of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy which should be given priority over the punitive aspect. There is also some support for the apprehensions raised by the learned Attorney General that a majority of cheque bounce cases are indeed being compromised or settled by way of compounding, albeit during the later stages of litigation thereby contributing to undue delay in justice delivery. The problem herein is with the tendency of litigants to belatedly choose compounding as a means to resolve their dispute. Furthermore, the written submissions filed on behalf of the learned Attorney General have stressed on the fact that unlike Section 320 CrPC, Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides no explicit guidance as to what stage compounding can or cannot be done and whether compounding can be done at the instance of the complainant or with the leave of the court.

" This Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC 169: (2000 AIR SCW 3848: AIR 2001 SC 43: 2001 Cri.LJ 128), held that Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code mandates that no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error and that this section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by the Court of competent jurisdiction." (emphasis supplied) Therefore, it is evident that a trial, appellate or revisional Court, which has become functus officio cannot accept a subsequent composition and alter its own earlier judgment and convert the same to a deemed acquittal under Section 320(8) Cr.P.C. It is unnecessary to refer to other precedents. Binding precedents of the Supreme Court make it clear that a Court - Original, appellate or revisional, which has finally disposed of the matter cannot thereafter exercise any such powers which it could have invoked and exercised prior to such final disposal.

(emphasis supplied)

19. Later, the Supreme Court had occasion to specifically consider whether the stipulations under Section 320 Cr.P.C. would fetter the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The decision in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana (AIR 2003 SC 1386) makes the position clear and the Supreme Court speaks thus through Justice Y.K. Sabharwal in paragraphs 8 and 15:

"8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in S.482 of the code or extraordinary power under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, S.320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing, it is however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power."

(emphasis supplied)

21. Having so understood the sweep of the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., I need only mention that the powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution are coextensive if not wider in its sweep. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as also Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution are available with the Court to do justice in a given case when the conscience of the Court is satisfied that powers must be invoked.

22. It will be apposite to straight away look at Section 320 Cr.P.C. again. Section 320 does not specifically refer to composition prior to the commencement of the prosecution or of composition after the sentence has become final. Section 320, which must be reckoned as consolidating the law relating to composition, does not specifically refer to pre-cognizance and post-finality (of conviction) compositions. Section 320(9) Cr.P.C. only says that there shall be no composition except in accordance with the provisions of Section 320 Cr.P.C. In as much as Section 320 does not specifically refer to compositions - pre-cognizance or post-finality, and Section 320(1) only speaks of composition without any fetters or limitations about time and stage, section 320(9) cannot be held to fetter the powers in such situations.