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1. Present orders shall govern the decision and disposal of these five petitions which present a common question. I feel that, I am concerned to a great extent, with the principles of Judicial Discipline, Judicial Comity and Judicial Concomitance.

2. The provision of law which required to be kept in view would be, Section 19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 ("TADA Act, 1987" for short), which runs thus:

19. Appeal. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Designated Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law.

6. It requires to be appreciated that, Mr. M.G. Doshit, learned Counsel who appears on behalf of the petitioners would like to characterise the above said orders in challenge as interlocutory orders. The contention coming from the learned Counsel is that, the interlocutory orders, though made and said to be final under the provisions contained under Section 19 of the TADA Act, 1987, would be amenable to my writ jurisdiction while exercising the powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The learned Counsel urges with great vehemence that, untrammelled powers of this Court under the above said two Articles would permit me to examine the question regarding the legality and validity of the said orders which have been brought in challenge before me. As indicated by me at the initial juncture, I throughout feel that, I am concerned with the question regarding the judicial discipline, judicial comity, and judicial concomitance. 1 say so because, many a times when the orders of particular Court or a judicial Tribunal are made or said to be final in nature against which, no proceedings would lie, they are at times taken as amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court which would be acting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, but this general principle does not appear to be attracting here, regard being had to the provisions contained in Section 19 of the TADA Act, 1987. The whole scheme of the Act when examined closely, would make it clear that the powers have been invested in the Designated Court and that the party aggrieved is required to approach the Supreme Court. In other words, the intermittent judicial step of the High Court has been taken away. This appears to have been done with a great purpose because, the Legislature wanted to curb the terrorist and disruptive activities which were found to be on a rise at the relevant time, in the country. Therefore, when the question comes regarding such powers being amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the purpose and the scheme of the TADA Act, 1987 shall have to be kept in mind.

7. The Supreme Court decision in the case of Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab appears to be a guiding pronouncement. Both the views, namely, the majority and the minority one, would go to suggest that, even if certain orders under the TADA Act, 1987 could be said to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, acting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, then also, the High Courts shall have to be on their guard and such powers shall have to be exercised in rare cases only. The emphasis is being placed upon the principles of judicial disciplines, judicial comity and judicial concomitances. The majority and the minority views, though worded differently, the principle enunciated appears rather, one and the same. The Supreme Court in Kartar Singh (supra) was concerned with the powers and the jurisdiction of the High Courts to grant bail while acting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has read the relevant provisions of the TADA Act, 1987 along with Section 20(7) of the Act. Upon doing so, following are the observations of the Supreme Court:

10. Mr. Doshit, learned Counsel, who appears on behalf of the petitioners urges that the present petitioners are not the accused persons and that no case or offence against them has been registered under TADA Act, 1987. The learned Counsel points out with clarity and vehemence that the question before me is in respect of certain monies lying in the Bank Accounts of the petitioners and much would depend upon the answer to the question as to whether the above said monies could be said to be muddamal money. The endeavour on the part of the learned Counsel is to emphasise that, ultimately, I am concerned with the question of the character and nature of the monies lying in the Accounts of the petitioners and not with any of the offences which could have been said to be committed under the TADA Act, 1987. Nonetheless, it requires to be appreciated that the orders are passed by the Designated Court and certain proceedings are pending under the TADA Act, 1987. The whole question has bearing with certain offences allegedly committed by some people which would allegedly fall within the purview of the TADA Act, 1987. Regard being had to the clear language employed by the Legislature while drafting the provisions contained under Section 19 of the TADA Act, 1987 and the above said principles enunciated by the Supreme Court emphasising upon the principle of judicial discipline, judicial comity and judicial concomitance, I am of the opinion that, I should refrain from exercising my jurisdiction and power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.