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(i) that in the month of August 1968, the respondent had poisoned the meals of the appellant;
(j) that the appellant did not make any effort to bring back the respondent from the house of her parents, or to secure her society after she had left his house at Nangal in the month of September 1968.

4. 'Desertion' as contemplated by Clause (a) of Section 10 of the Act, means intentional permanent abandonment of one spouse by the other without the other's consent and without reasonable cause. So far as deserting spouse is concerned, there must be two essential conditions; (i) factum of separation, and (ii) intention to bring marital life permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly, two elements are essential so far as deserted spouse is concerned; firstly, absence of consent, and, secondly, absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to form necessary intention aforesaid. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. I am guided in the aforesaid matters by Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176, and Lachman Utam-chand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40, relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant. There may, however, be a case where a spouse is forced by the conduct of the other to live separately or to stay away. In such a case, desertion would not be attributed to the spouse who lives separately or stays away, for the simple reason that the said situation has been brought about by the act of the spouse who had misconducted himself or herself. So, if it is a natural consequence of the misconduct and misbehaviour of one spouse that the other spouse will have to stay away, the offending spouse must be presumed to have intended that such an eventuality will take place. Cases in which the parting of the spouses has arisen in such circumstances, are called constructive desertions end the apouse responsible for creating the situation in which the other spouse is forced to stay away, is guilty of constructive desertion. The words 'wilful neglect' in Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act, are designed to cover such constructive desertion, and mean that the guilty spouse has been acting knowingly or has been consciously failing in a reprehensible manner in the discharge of his or her marital obligations.

5. The rule enunciated in Section 23 of the Act which contains overriding provision, is based on the principle that wrongdoer should not be permitted to take advantage of his or her own wrong, while seeking relief under the Act from the Court. For that matter, it is necessary to take into consideration the conduct of the. petitioner who approaches the Court for any relief under the Act If he or she by his or her own misdeeds forces the other spouse to leave him or her and to stay away, the petitioner cannot be allowed to take advantage of his or her own wrong and ask the Court to perpetuate it. Therefore, the claim of a husband for judicial separation on the ground of desertion when he himself has been guilty of constructive desertion which compelled his wife to stay away from him, has to be disregarded on the principle enacted by Section 23 of the Act.

6. When the facts enumerated in para 3 above and the circumstances of the case, are viewed from the proper angle having regard to the connotation of desertion, as indicated in para 4 above, and the principle contained in Section 23 of the Act, referred to in the preceding paragraph, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the appellant had been guilty of constructive desertion.

According to him, there had been no genial sincerity or affection between the parties from the beginning of the merri-age, and he began to suspect her fidelity and character about six months after the marriage. He had obtained a search warrant under Section 100, Code of Criminal Procedure, against the respondent in the year 1963 and went to her parents' house at an inopportune moment. He had made a petition under Section 9 of the Act when the respondent had approached the criminal court for seeking maintenance allowance. Since there had been compromise between the parties in the year 1965 and they had lived together as husband and wife at Ambala, Gurgaon end Nan-gal, it can be said that there had been condonation of the defaults committed by the parties earlier to 1965. The appellant, however, maintained that he did not love the respondent. He suspected her of administering poison to him in the meals in the month of August, 1968. He had never gone to the house of the parents of the respondent to fetch her after September, 1968. He did not write any letter to her to return to his house and he did not send any letter to her father to send her back to him. He did not send any maintenance allowance to her. He did not 'file any application for restitution of conjugal rights against her during the period extending to four and a half years, i.e. from September 26, 1968 to April 16, 1973, when he made the petition for judicial separation. The aforesaid conduct of the appellant, in any opinion, constitutes constructive desertion. The marriage performed by a Hindu couple is a holy union and the same cannot be broken by the consent of the parties or by collusiveness. The promises made by a Hindu couple before the nuptial fire cannot be easily disregarded by them. Therefore, the appellant who is himself responsible for creating the situation which forced the respondent to stay away, is not, in my opinion, entitled to plead desertion as a ground for claiming decree for judicial separation. In addition to the facts that the appellant had no love for the respondent, and doubted her fidelity and character, and suspected her of administering poison to him in meals, he had last cohabitation with her in the month of June, 1968. All these factors coupled with the conduct of the appellant, referred to above, point out unmistakably that he afforded a cause, and reasonable too, to the respondent to stay away from him; and the said matters further give rise to a reasonable and legitimate inference that he was consenting to the living of the respondent at her parents' house. In that view of the matter and in view of the Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act. I am in agreement with the trial Court in finding that the appellant failed to substantiate the plea raised by him that the respondent had been guilty of desertion.