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6. It is not possible to accept this contention for two reasons, namely (a) on a true construction of the amended Article 227(5) it is clear that judicial superintendence or judicial supervision though limited in extent has been retained with the High Court along with its administrative superintendence or supervision and (b) the decided cases on which reliance has been placed do not support the contention urged. Looking at the contention from the construction point of view it will be necessary to set out the material parts of the amended Article (5) being Sub-article (1) and Sub-article (5) thereof. These run' thus:

227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court.-
(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction.

XXX XXX XXX (5) Nothing in this article shall be construed as giving to a High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. On a true and proper construction of the language employed in the aforesaid provisions it will appear clear that superintendence which every High Court is said to possess over all courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction under Sub-article (1) includes judicial superintendence or judicial supervision. Under the Sub-article (1) it has been generally provided that every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts without specifying whether it is administrative, or judicial which ordinarily would mean superintendence of both kinds and this is made amply clear in Sub-article (5) according to which power of superintendence has been conferred upon the High Court to question any judgment of any inferior court provided that such judgment is otherwise subject to either appeal or revision to the High Court and it is obvious that judgments- can be questioned judicially and not administratively. In other words, it is plain that judicial supervision over inferior court's judgments is contemplated by Sub-article (5). It will further appear clear that under Sub-article (5) some limitation or restriction is placed upon the High Court's judicial supervision or superintendence over the judgments of any inferior court, in that such judicial supervision or judicial superintendence would be available to the High Court only in cases where such judgments are otherwise subject to an appeal or revision but such a limitation or restriction re-emphasises the fact that the superintendence spoken of by the amended Article 227(1) includes judicial supervision or judicial superintendence. Secondly, it would not be quite correct to any that Section 224(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 took away from the High Court its judicial supervision or superintendence over all courts subordinate to it. But on a fair reading of that provision it will appear clear that judicial supervision or superintendence which was unquestionably vested in the High Court over its subordinate courts under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 was merely limited or restricted to some extent and was not taken away altogether as has been suggested by Messrs. Paranjpe and Bhabha and therefore it would be incorrect to say that the amended Article 227 of the Constitution by reason of its being brought on par with Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 has the effect of taking away from the High Court its power of judicial supervision or superintendence over the subordinate courts. It is true that in the original Article 227 there was no provision similar to Sub-section (2) of Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and such a provision now finds a place in the amended Article 227 in Sub-article (5) thereof but by reason of such provision ail that could be said if that judicial supervision or superintendence conferred upon the High Court over all courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction could be said to have become limited Or restricted to the same extent as it had been limited or restricted under Section 224(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. This position as we shall point out later has been clarified by the decision of this Court in Kavasji Pestonji Dalal's case (AIR 1949 Bom 42). After all this power of judicial superintendence conferred by the amended Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C. J. in Dalmia Jain Airways' case (SB) to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.

It must be pointed out that the Court's decision that judicial superintendence was vested in the High Court under the original Article 227 actually rested on two grounds: (a) on construction the Court held that sub-Article (2) did not affect the generality of the provision contained in Sub-article (1) which included judicial superintendence and (b) the preponderance of judicial opinion in India was that Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1'915 gave the power of judicial superintendence to High Court. Therefore, the decision on the point was principally based on construction of the article. Further, while elaborating the second ground on which its decision rested the Court has observed that when Section 107 of the 1915 Act was replaced by Section 224 in the 1935 Act, Sub-section (2) of Section 224 was newly introduced and the idea presumably was to nullify the effect of the decisions of different High Courts but the expression 'the idea presumably was itself clearly suggests that that was not the definite opinion of the Court. It is thus clear that the two decisions on which reliance was placed by Counsel for the Union of India do not support the contention urged. In our view, on pure construction of Section 224(2) and amended Article 227(5) it Is clear that judicial supervision or superintendence, though limited in extent did vest and does vest in the High Court. The contention therefore that the amended Art-227 retains with the High Court only administrative superintendence over all courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction must be rejected.

8. Having come to the conclusion that even under the amended Article 227 power of judicial supervision or superintendence with the limitation Or restriction indicated above has been retained with the High Court over all courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction, we shall next deal with the contention urged by Messrs. Paranjpe and Bhabha on behalf of the Union of India and Counsel for the respondents that Article 227 is merely procedural and confers power of superintendence upon the High Court and it neither deals with nor confers any right of action on the litigant and therefore the amendment effected therein would normally operate retrospectively and cover pending petitions without express provision being made in that behalf. On the other hand, on behalf of the petitioners Mr. Seervai contended that Article 227 has never been regarded as an article dealing with the procedural matters or procedural rights but it confers substantive right upon a litigant to move the High Court and therefore the presumption would be the other way about, namely, that the amendment effected therein would ordinarily be prospective in the absence of retrospective operation being given to it either expresslv or by necessary intend-ment and as such the pending petitions will have to be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with unamended Article 227. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is whether Article 227 is purely procedural and deals with procedural matters like conferring power on the High Court to exercise judicial superintendence or it deals with and confers any right or substantive right on a litigant to move the High Court. In support of the contention that Article 227 is procedural and merely confers power of judicial superintendence upon High Court and not any right on the litigant reliance was placed upon the language of the article itself as also certain observations in decided cases. The unamended Article 227(1) ran thus: