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This leads us to the main question in this case, namely, whether the appellants having obtained a consent decree oil January 23, 1951, in their suit against the vendees and having paid the amount due under the decree and having taken delivery of the property and thus having got themselves substituted in place of the original vendees, can legitimately defeat the rights of the plaintiffs, who, by reason of the aforesaid substitution, were only in the position of pre-emptors of equal degree vis-a-vis the appellants and therefore ceased to have any superior rights. The learned Counsel for the respondents contends that the appellants are hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and therefore the act of substitution, which was effected on April 23, 1951, could not be in derogation of their right of pre-emption, which they have exercised by filing their suit on February 15, 1951. It is now settled law in the Punjab that the rule of lis pendens is as much applicable to a suit to enforce the right of pre-emption as to any other suit. The principle on which the doctrine rests is explained in the leading case of Bellami v. Sabine (1), where the Lord Chancellor said that pendente lite neither party to the litigation can alienate............ the property so as to affect his opponent. In other words, the law does not allow litigant parties, pending the litigation, to transfer their rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice the- other party.

As a corollary to this rule it is laid down that this principle will not affect the right existing before the suit. The rule, with its limitations, was considered by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mool Chand v. Ganga Jal (2). In that case, during the pendency of a pre-emption suit, the vendee sold the property which was the subject matter of the litigation to a person possessing a right of pre-emption equal to that of the pre-emptor in recognition of that person's right of pre-emption. This re-sale took place before the expiry of the period of limitation for instituting a pre-emption suit with respect to the original sale. The Full Bench held that the doctrine of lis pendens applied to preemption suits; but in that case, the resale in question did not conflict with the doctrine of lis pendens. Bhide J. gave the reason for the said conclusion at page 272 thus:

" All that the vendee does in such a case is to take the bargain in the assertion of his pre-existing pre-emptive right, and hence the sale does not offend against the doctrine of lis pendens ".

Another Full Bench of the Lahore High Court accepted and followed the aforesaid doctrine in Mt. Sant Kaur v. Teja Singh (3). In that case, pending the suit for pre-emption, the vendee sold the land purchased

(i) (1857) 1 De G. & J. 566; 44 E. R. 842.

(2) (1930) I.L.R. 11 Lah. 258, 273. (3) I.L.R. [1946] Lah. 467, by him to a person in recognition of a superior right of pre-emption. Thereafter, the second purchaser was brought onrecord and was added as a defendant to the suit. At the time of the purchase by the person having a superior right of pre-emption, his right to enforce it was barred by limitation. The ]High Court held that that circumstance made a difference in the application of the rule of lis pendens. The distinction between the two categories of cases was brought out in bold relief at page 145 thus:

This case, therefore, expressly introduces a new element in the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens to a suit to enforce the pre-emptive right. If the right of the pre-emptor of a superior or equal degree was subsisting and enforceable by coercive process or otherwise, his purchase would be considered to be in exercise of that pre- existing right and therefore not hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. On the other hand, if he purchased the land from the original vendee after his superior or equal right to enforce the right of preemption was barred by Limitation, he would only be in the position of a representative-in- interest of the vendee, or to put it in other words, if his right is barred by limitation, it would be treated as a non- existing right. Much to the same effect was the decision of another Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mohammad Sadiq v. Ghasi Ram (1). There, before the institution of the suit for pre-emption, an agreement to sell the property had been executed by the vendee in favour of another prospective pre-emptor with an equal degree of right of pre- emption; subsequent to the institution of the suit, in pursuance of the agreement, a sale deed had been executed and registered in the latter's favour, after the expiry of the limitation for a suit to enforce his own pre-emptive right. The Full Bench held that the doctrine of lis pendens applied to the case. The principle underlying this decision is the same as that in Mt. Sant Kaur v. Te a Singh (2), where the barred right was treated as a non-existent right. The same view was restated by another Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court in Wazir Ali Khan v. Zahir Ahmad Khan (3). At p. 195, the learned Judges observed: