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10. The question germane for consideration in this case is whether the common law maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" that personal right of action which dies with the person, can be imported to a social welfare legislation so as to deny the benefits to legal heirs and legal representatives of a deceased claimant, to the advantage of a wrong doer? Above principle once upon a time was strictly enforced so as to deny compensation to the claimants accepting the principle that if any injury was done either to the person or property of another, for which damages only could be recovered in satisfaction, the action died with the person to whom the wrong was done. Supreme Court in several decisions diluted the strict application of the above principle in certain fact situations. Reference be made to the decisions of the apex Court in Girija Nandini Devi Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhury - AIR 1967 SC 1131, Hazari Vs. Neki - AIR 1968 SC 1205, Lakhiram Vs. Management of Sangramgarth Collery & ors - 1994 (1) SCC 292 and other decisions. The apex Court also noticed that the maxim "actio personalis mortiur cum persona" though part of English Common Law has been subjected to criticism even in England. Punjab and Haryana High Court in Calcutta Insurance Ltd. Vs. Bhupinder Singh (supra) as well as the Division Bench of Madras High Court in C.P. Kandaswamy and ors. Vs. Mariappa Stores and ors (supra) had however literally applied the maxim "actio personalis mortiur cum persona" and denied the benefit to the claimants since the original claimant had died.

9.03. Similar view has been expressed by the learned Single Judge in another decision in the case of Amrishkumar Vinodbhai (supra) wherein the learned Single Judge in para 10 and 14 has observed and held as under :-

"10. Section 306 as well as the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 came to be considered by the Supreme Court in M.Veerappa V. Elelyn Sequeria, AIR 1988 SC 506. The Supreme Court has quoted with approval a passage occurring in Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. T.G.Nair, AIR 1986 SC 411 and held that, though Sec.306 speaks only of executors and administrators, Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure sets out the right of legal representatives to continue the proceedings instituted earlier by a deceased plaintiff if the right to sue survives, the Courts have taken the view that the legal representatives stand on par with executors and administrators regarding their right to seek impledment in order to complete the suit. In the said case, the Supreme Court pointed out that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona is inapplicable in those cases where the injury caused to the deceased person has tangibly affected his estate or has caused an accretion to the estate of the wrongdoer or where the cause of action arises out of beach of contract. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court of India, it becomes evident that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona would not apply to the cases where the injury caused to the deceased person has tangibly affected his estate and to that extent, right to sue survives.
14. Since the aim of award of damages is to compensate the person wronged, there is no reason why measure of damages pertaining to estate should be in any way affected or limited by the death of the original victim of the accident. In my view, the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona is considerabley abrogated by the judicial pronouncements. The scope of the provisions of Sec.306 of the Succession Act and the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona appears to be well settled and the claim of damages on account of loss to the estate of the injured would not abate on his death. The claim regarding loss caused to the estate would include several items such as medical expenses, miscellaneous expenses, actual loss of income from the date of injuries till the death of the injured etc. But for the injuries sustained, the inured would not have been required to incur the said expenses nor would have suffered actual loss of income. Therefore, even after the death of the injured, the claim petition does not abate and right to sue survives to his heirs and legal representatives."

178. a Division Bench of the Madras High Court subscribed to this view while constructing the provisions of Section 306 of the Succession Act. It was held that a plain reading of Section 306 of the Succession Act would undoubtedly go to show that the cause of action regarding the injury sustained by the victim does not survive on his death. In Santoline Fernandes v. M/s. Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co., 1968 ACJ 102 (Bom.)= AIR 1968 Bom 328 relied upon by Mr.Shishodia, the matter was entirely different. That case related to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The learned Judge of the Bombay High Court took the view that the liability to pay compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act is created immediately upon the occurrence of an accident. As such, the liability amounts to a debt payable by the employer to the workmen. The application for compensation does not, therefore, abate if the applicant dies during the pendency of the application. That is not the case here in hand. There are certain observations made by the learned Judge, in which he accepted the applicability of the maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona" in cases arising out of the torts. In para 9 of the judgement he accepted the view that application of the maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' is limited to actions in which remedy is sought for a tort or for something which involves, at any rate, the notion of wrong doing. Thus, the doctrine embodied the maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' was held applicable to a case relating to personal injuries. The authority, thus, renders no assistance to Mr.Shishodia. On the contrary, it subscribes the view which I am taking.