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13. Learned Counsel for the respondent relies on the decision in Mayan Kutti v. Kun-hammad (1917) 34 M.L.J. 167 : I.L.R. 41 Mad. 641 where the plaintiff's father had sued the defendants on a lease deed dated 1st September, 1871, and had obtained a decree in ejectment on 22nd August, 1895. That decree was allowed to become time barred. Long afterwards on 15th June, 1914, the plaintiff filed a suit in ejectment against the tenants who continued to be in possession under the original lease notwithstanding the earlier decree. The suit was dismissed by the District Munsiff and the District Judge on appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation viewed as a suit on a lease by a landlord against a tenant for the recovery of possession after the determination of the tenancy. It was contended that the suit was also based on title, apart from the lease and that it was in time. That contention was also negatived on the ground that more than 12 years had elapsed even from the date of the decree in the earlier suit. On second appeal this Court held that the suit was not sustainable as the cause of action had merged in the earlier decree and that the remedy of the plaintiff was only to work out that decree in execution and that if he had not enforced his decree his rights are gone. The earlier decision of this Court in Kutti Ali v. Chindan (1900) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 629 was dissented from and was regarded as overruled by the later Full Bench decision in Vedapuratti v. Vallabha Valiya Raja (1902) 12 M.L.J. 128 : I.L.R. 25 Mad. 300 (F.B.). The decision pointed out that the scheme of the Madras Act I of 1900 was to leave the decree passed under the Act for ejectment on payment of compensation, to be governed by the law of limitation with regard to the execution of decrees, and that it was not intended to interfere with the general principle, that a man who sues on his cause of action and obtains a decree and allows that decree to become barred has no further remedy. This decision, on which strong reliance was placed by the counsel for the respondent, does not deal with the right of redemption of a kanom, as the suit there was based only on an ordinary lease. Moreover this decision proceeds on the authority of the Full Bench decision in Vedapuratti v. Vallabha Valia Raja (1902) 12 M.L.J. 128 : I.L.R. 25 Mad. 300 (F.B.) which is no longer good law, as it has been overruled by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Raghunath Singh v. Hansraj Kunwar (1934) 67 M.L.J. 813 : L.R. 61 I.A. 36a : I.L.R. 56 All. 561 (P.C.). If there is a sustantive right of redemption in favour of jenmi under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act and if that right of redemption is capable of being exercised in a second suit except where it has been extinguished by the act of parties or by a decree of the Court then it is difficult to see how the decision in Mayan Kutti v. Kunhammad (1917) 34 M.L.J. 167 : I.L.R. 41 Mad. 641 can be relied on in a case relating to redemption of mortgages inclusive of Malabar kanoms. Whatever may be the case with reference to the right of ejectment by a landlord against his tenant, based on a mere lease document, by reason of the special provisions of the Madras Act I of 1900, there is nothing in the terms of Sections 5 and 6 of the said Act which is inconsistent with or takes away in any manner, the exercise of the right of redemption by a second suit where the general law allows the same No doubt even with respect to redemption suits relating to kanoms the provisions of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act would have to be applied as the term " tenant " includes also mortgagee in possession of land and the terra 'ejectment' includes redemption or recovery of possession of land mortgaged. Provision is made, therefore for working out the rights of the kanomdars to payment of the value of the improvements and of the jenmis for recovery of arrears of rent and future rent due from the kanomdars in possession. Under Section 5 of the Act a tenant to whom compensation is due shall, notwithstanding the determination of the tenancy or the payment or tender of the mortgage money be entitled to remain in possession until ejectment in execution of a decree or order of Court. Clause 2 of Section 5 provides that, a tenant so continuing in possession shall during such continuance hold as a tenant subject to the terms of his lease or of the mortgage, as the case may be.

Section 6 clause 3 provides for revaluation of the improvements with reference to the condition of improvements at the time of the execution of the decree and the adjustment of subsequent rents from the date of the decree to the date of ejectment in execution proceedings and allows the Court to vary the decree accordingly. Section 6 clause 4 which is an important clause in relation to the present question in controversy is as follows:

Every matter arising under Sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be a question relating to the execution of a decree within the meaning of Clause (c) of Section 244 (now Section 47) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is only questions arising under Sub-section (3) of Section 6 that cannot be the subject-matter of a separate suit later on by reason of Section 6 Sub-section 4 of the Act and Section 47, Civil Procedure Code.

14. Suits for rent for period subsequent to the date of the decree would no doubt be barred as it is clear from the sub-sections of Section 6 that rent accruing due after the passing of the decree should be set-off against the value of the improvements payable to the tenant at the time of ejectment in execution proceedings under the decree. It was so held in S.A. No. 1301 of 1943 by Horwill, J., but as pointed out in that decision itself by the learned Judge i( was unnecessary there to deal with the further question whether any suit in ejectment would lie where in an earlier suit the decree was allowed to become barred. The decisions in Mooriath Variath v. Meledath Kunja Nangaymamma (1919) 37 M.L.J. 206 and Kunhipalu v. Jathavedan Nanibudiri, unreported decision in Appeals Nos. 374 and 375 of 194s on the file of this Court on which Mr. Venkatachala Sastri relies did not deal with the point now under discussion and therefore are not useful. They merely hold that the tenant who continues to be in possession notwithstanding the decree in ejectment is not liable for mesne profits till he is ejected in execution as he cannot be held to be in wrongful possession of the property. Under the very terms of Section 5 of the Act he is entitled to be in possession till the compenstion is paid to him and till he is ejected in execution thereafter. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Bench in Gopalan v. Sankaran Nair (1945) 1 M.L.J. 326. There the action was based on a lease pure and simple and it was not a case of a kanom. There was an earlier suit in ejectment and for arrears of rent on the basis of the lease document in which a decree was passed on 19th December, 1932. That was confirmed on appeal on 28th October, 1935. That decree, however, was not executed. On 10th September, 1939 the tenants made a deposit of the arrears of rent for faslis 1346 and 1347 and the previous decree was amended according to the terms of the Madras Act IV of 1938. The landlord subsequently filed a suit for recovery of rent for the years from 1939 to 1942. Dealing with the contention based on the provisions of Section 6 of the Madras Act I of 1900 the lower Courts held that the earlier decree was barred by limitation, that the lease sued on did not subsist by reason of that decree and that the suit was barred by the application of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that under Section 6 (4) of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act the light of the landlord to rent for the years subsequent to the decree had to be determined as a matter arising in execution and cannot form the subject of a separate suit. On appeal to this Court their Lordships after analysing the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act observed:

16. It is not necessary to deal in this case with the question whether a second suit in ejectment by the landlord against the tenant based on a lease document pure and simple (as distinguished from a kanom) to which the Madras Act I of 1900 is applicable is sustainable or not, where an earlier decree in ejectment on the same lease has been allowed to become barred. The decision in Mayan Kutti v. Kunhammad (1917) 34 M.L.J. 167 : I.L.R. 41 Mad. 641 may require reconsideration. Even under the terms of Section 5 of the Special Act there is a statutory tenancy created during the period of the continuance of possession by the judgment-debtor in the earlier decree, the tenancy being on the terms of the original lease or mortgage in his favour. In such circumstances subsequent possession of the original tenant cannot be regarded as adverse to the landlord. It may well be that there is a fresh cause of action in ejectment notwithstanding that the earlier decree for possession has been allowed to become barred. That was the view of the Division Bench in Chowakkaran Keloth Makki Keyi v. Koomulli Madhavi Amma (1915) 29 I.C. 559. 641. It is true that the provisions of Section 6, clause 4 were not referred to in that judgment but nonetheless their Lordships held that the second suit in ejectment would lie on the basis of a fresh cause of action. This decision is, however, dissented from in the latter decision Mayan Kutti v. Kunhammad (1917) 34 M.L.J. 167 : I.L.R. 41 Mad. already referred to. No doubt there appears to be an apparent contradiction between the terms of Section 5, clauses 1 and 2 of the Madras Act I of 1900. According to clause 1(1), Every tenant to whom compensation is due shall, notwithstanding the determination of the tenancy or payment or tender of the mortgage money if any be entitled to remain in possession until ejectment in execution of a decree or order of Court.