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4. Now, the principles of law which apply to the facts which I have just stated are really not difficult to enunciate. An order of detention under the Security Act can only be justified in a Court of law provided it is made bona fide : an order of detention cannot be made for an ulterior motive or for a collateral purpose. The detaining authority must only consider the objects for which the Act was passed, and the only consideration which must weigh with the detaining authority is public safety, maintenance of public order, and the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the Province of Bombay. If in making the order his mind is influenced by any consideration extraneous to the Act, then the order would be bad and cannot be upheld. And the question that we have to consider in this case is whether in making the order the Commissioner of Police was influenced by any collateral purpose and whether any extraneous factor weighed on his mind when he made the order. When we speak of an order being made mala fide, it does not mean that we attribute to the detaining authority any improper motive. An order is made mala fide when there is malice in law although there may no malice in fact; and the malice in law is to be inferred when an order is made contrary to the objects and purposes of the Security Act or when the detaining authority permits himself to be influenced by considerations which he ought not to permit.

5. Now, on the facts of this case, can it be said that the detention order was made solely for the purpose of public security? And can it be said that the only thing which weighed with the detaining authority were those considerations which were legal and legitimate and within the ambit of the statute? In fact, the Police did carry on the investigation of the offence under the Criminal Procedure Code after the applicant was arrested under the Criminal law; and, in fact, the investigation was--if one might so call it--a secret investigation or an ex parte investigation without any reference to the criminal Court, as required by the Criminal Procedure Code. And all this was being done while the applicant was detained under the Security Act. In our opinion, on these facts, the only inference that can be drawn--and it is an irresistible inference--is that the purpose of detaining the applicant, or at least one of the purposes of detaining the applicant, was a collateral purpose, and that was to deprive him of his rights and safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code and to carry on an investigation without the supervision of the Court.

7. One of the persons who was arrested in connection with this procession and who was also detained made an application before another bench of this Court consisting of Bavdekar and Chainani JJ., and the facts on which the learned Judges were called upon to decide whether the detention order was valid or not were identical with the facts of this case. And as we felt, with very great respect to that bench, that we could not come to the same conclusion as they did, this Pull Bench was constituted. Now, those two learned Judges accepted the facts which I have Bet out, namely, that the applicant was arrested in connection with the offence, that the investigation into the offence commenced on 8th May 1949, and that no safeguard provided by the law with regard to investigation was given effect to; and yet, they came to the conclusion that, because there was evidence that the detaining authority had been satisfied as to the likely conduct of the applicant in future, the order of detention was a valid order. Now, in our opinion, once these facts were found, that while the applicant was under detention a secret investigation was carried on into the commission of the offence, then the only reasonable inference which the Court should have drawn was that the order was made for a collateral or ulterior purpose. We should also like to point out that Bavdekar J. has taken the view that, even though an extraneous circumstance might have weighed upon the mind of the detaining authority, if in fact he was satisfied as required by the law, then that satisfaction was a good satisfaction and the order of detention must be upheld. With great respect, in our opinion that is not the correct position in law. If an extraneous circumstance influences the making of the order, then that order can never be said to have been made bona fide. Even if the detaining authority was satisfied, still, in the eye of the law, it was an order which was made for a collateral purpose, it was made mala fide, and it cannot be sustained.