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2. By this application, it was not disputed that the M.P. Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1960 is in force in District Raigarh where the rice was seized. 'Rice' under Clause 2(f) of the Levy Order is defined to mean any variety of rice produced or manufactured in a rice mill worked by power. Clause 3 of the order requires that every licensed miller and licensed dealer shall sell to the Purchase Officer at the controlled price certain quantity of rice held in stock by him. Any breach under this order is punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The Parliament has now enacted the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 (Act No. 18 of 1981) with a view to make special provision by way of amendment to the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, for a temporary period for dealing more effectively with persons indulging in hoarding and blackmarketing of, and profiteering in essential commodities and with the evil of vicious inflationary prices or any matter connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 12 of the Essential Commodities Act has been omitted and instead new Sections 12A, 12AA, 12AB and 12AC have been substituted. Special Courts have been constituted to try the offences under the Essential Commodities Act. It will be useful to reproduce Section 12-AA and its relevant clauses which are as follows:

4. I am unable to agree with the argument advanced by Shri M. V. Tamaskar, learned Government Advocate, that the provisions of Section 12-A A are attracted only when a person is arrested of an offence under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The contention is that a reading of Section 12-AA excludes the operation of Section 438 of the Code. Particular reference was made to clauses (b), (c) and (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12-AA. In my opinion, the argument is fallacious. Clauses (b) and (c) have special reference to Section 167 of the Code. What is laid down there is that when a person accused of or suspected of commission of an offence under the Essential Commodities Act is forwarded to a Magistrate for purposes of remand, the Magistrate may direct his detention in custody for a period of 15 days in the whole if he is a Judicial Magistrate or for 7 days in the whole if he is an Executive Magistrate. The Magistrate to whom the person is so forwarded may release him on bail in terms of proviso to Clause (b) else in terms of Clause (c), he has to forward such person to the Special Court having jurisdiction. The Special Court shall exercise the same powers as the Magistrate may exercise under Section 167 of the Code in relation to the person so forwarded to him. Even this exercise of power under Section 167 is subject to the provisions of Clause (d). So far the reference is only to the exercise of power either by the Magistrate or the Special Court under Section 167 of the Code in relation to the person forwarded to them as aforesaid. Clause (c) is followed by Clause (d) which contains a general provision regarding release on bail of a person accused of or suspected of commission of an offence under the Act. It begins with a qualifying clause "Save as aforesaid". This, in my opinion, has a reference to the proviso to Clause (b) which speaks of the powers of- the Magistrate to release a person on bail in terms of proviso to Clause (b) and in that case the restriction imposed by proviso to Clause (d) shall not apply. Clause (d) confers jurisdiction upon the Special Court or the High Court to release a person on bail when he is accused of or suspected of commission of the offence under the Act. Jurisdiction of other Courts to release such a person on bail except as contained in Clause (b) is taken away. Clause (d) unlike clauses (b) and (c) has no reference to Section 167 of the Code. It speaks of bail generally and only seeks to confer jurisdiction in that behalf in the Special Court or the High Court. The only restriction or curtailment on the exercise of that power is contained in the proviso which follows that clause. There is no other restriction. It will, therefore, be unreasonable to think that Clause (d) is attracted only in case when the person is arrested and not before it.