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4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted and reiterated the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the petitioner has established reasonable cause for repaying the loan in cash and the order of the Commissioner that the petitioner has not established any reasonable cause for repaying the same in cash is not sustain-able in law. Learned senior counsel for the Income-tax Department has submitted that the section has been introduced with the object of preventing cash transaction above the limit prescribed in Section 269T and if the cash transactions are permitted, it will lead to innumerable complications in the matter of assessment of income, particularly, in cases where search operations are carried out and the cash is found in search and the explanation given by the assessee normally would be that the cash represented a loan. He also submitted that the provisions of Section 269T of the Act are wide enough to cover the loan. The further submission of learned senior counsel for the respondent is that since Section 269T was in force when the loans were repaid on April 8, 1991, and April 15, 1991, the provisions of Section 269T operate notwithstanding the fact that the loans were obtained prior to the introduction of Section 269T of the Act.

6. I am also of the view that the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of Section 269T are not applicable as the loans were obtained in the year 1983 or 1984 is not well founded. In my view, the date on which the loans were obtained is not relevant for the applicability of Section 269T of the Act and the question has to be considered when the loans were repaid. The loans were admittedly repaid in the year 1991 and at that time, the provisions of Section 269T have come into force and the question whether the provisions were in force on the date when the loans were taken is not relevant for the applicability of Section 269T. Admittedly, the provisions of Section 269T were in force on the date when the loans were repaid in cash and, therefore, I reject the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of Section 269T are not applicable as the loans were obtained prior to the introduction of the provisions of Section 269T as untenable.

7. However, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions are not applicable to the repayment of loans is well founded. Section 269T is found in Chapter XXB "requirement as to mode of acceptance, payment or repayment in certain cases to counteract evasion of tax". Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act deals with the mode of taking or accepting certain loans and deposits. Under Section 269SS of the Act, where any loan or deposit is taken or accepted from any person and the aggregate amount of the deposit or loan exceeds Rs. 20,000 or more, Section 269SS provides that such loans or deposits should be accepted by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft. In other words, the receipt of cash in such cases would attract the levy of penalty. We are concerned with Section 269T of the Act. Section 269T of the Act deals with the mode of repayment of certain deposits and under Section 269T of the Act, if the deposit is repaid otherwise than as permitted, i.e., otherwise than by way of account payee cheque or account payee bank draft by the company, co-operative society, etc., and the repaid deposit exceeds Rs. 10,000 or more, it shall be repaid by the account payee bank draft or account payee cheque. The expression "deposits" is defined in Section 269T to mean any deposit of money which is repayable after notice or repayable after the period and in the case of a person other than a company, includes deposit of any nature.

11. The submission of learned senior counsel for the Commissioner of Income-tax that the expression "deposit" is widely defined under Section 269T and it would include the loan is not acceptable. He submitted that considering the object behind the section there is no distinction between loan and deposit. According to him in the case of a loan, the amount is repayable after notice or it may be repayable after the expiry of the period and in any case, the expression deposit is widely defined to include deposits of any nature and therefore, according to him the repayment of loan should also be considered to fall within the scope of Section 269T. The expression deposit is defined to include an amount which is repayable after notice and includes a deposit of any nature, but there is no express provision to include the loan obtained by a person within the meaning of the term "deposit". All deposits may take the form of loan and it is not necessary that all loans should take the form of deposits. Even that apart, Section 269SS of the Act which occurs in Chapter XXB of the Act, deals with two different kinds of transactions, namely, loans and deposits. Section 269SS was introduced by the Income-tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1981, and by the same amendment, Section 269T was also inserted with effect from July 11, 1981. At the time when Section 269SS was introduced by the Income-tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1981, the amount covered under Section 269SS, was Rs. 10,000 which was increased to Rs. 20,000 by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1989. In my view, when the Legislature, while introducing both the sections by the same Amendment Act, 1981, made a distinction between loan and deposit and knowing very well the distinction between the two concepts, introduced Section 269T to cover one kind of transaction, namely, the deposit. It is not permissible for this court to enlarge the scope of the term "deposit" in Section 269T of the Act to include the transaction of loan. It may be true that the loan transaction may have some of the attributes, qualities and characteristics of the deposit. The loan may be repayable on notice or may be repayable after a fixed period. But, the intention of the party making the deposit and the intention of the person taking the loan are quite different. I am also unable to accept the submission of learned senior counsel that loan transactions have all attributes of deposits and, therefore, both should be equated together and Section 269T would apply even to loan transactions. As already observed by me, the mere presence of some of the attributes of the loan transaction in a deposit would not be sufficient to regard the loan as a deposit. As observed by the English judge, the chimpanzee may have a head, may have eyes, nose, ears, body, leg's but on that account, a chimpanzee cannot be treated as a human being. Similarly, the mere presence of some of the attributes of the loan in a deposit would not render the loan a deposit. They are two different transactions in the commercial world and by interpreting and by expanding the scope of the term "deposit" in Section 269T of the Act, it is impermissible for this court to enlarge the concept and take in the concept of loan transaction also within the meaning of Section 269T of the Act. In my view, the provisions of Section 269T are not applicable to repayment of loan transaction and this section is intended to cover and cover only the repayment of deposits over and above the amount prescribed in the section. Therefore, the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner after having held that the transactions in question were repayment of loans, have erred in holding that there was a violation of the provisions of Section 269T by the petitioner. I, therefore, hold that penalty levied on the alleged violation is not justified in law. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner which was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax is quashed. The writ petition is allowed. Rule nisi is made absolute. No costs. Consequently, W. M. P. No. 18512 of 1996 is dismissed.