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(vi) It is said in para. 13 of his affidavit that although the names of the parties and the cause title in the suit were correctly set out the registered number of the suit and the respective names of the solicitors were not correctly set out in the daily list of 5th May 1949.
(vii) The notice of motion was taken out as I have said before on 19th August 1949.

7. Mr. S. Sinha, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, has urged before me that the application is out of time and barred by Article 163, Limitation Act, and should therefore be dismissed. His argument is that the dismissal of the suit for default of the plaintiffs' appearance made on 5th May 1949, was under Order 9, Rule 8, Civil P. C., when a suit is so dismissed under Order 9 Rule 8 the Code provides by specific provision how the suit is to be restored. That provision is contained in Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code which gives the plaintiff the right to apply for an order to set the dismissal aside on sufficient cause being shown for his non-appearance. According to Mr. Sinha this application is and must be treated under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code and Article 163, Limitation Act provides that such an application should be made within 30 days from the date of dismissal. Unlike Article 164, Limitation Act, Article 163, Limitation Act, in my opinion, makes it clear that the starting point of limitation is the date of dismissal and not the date when the applicant has knowledge of the dismissal. The dismissal having taken place on 5th May 1949 and the notice of motion being dated 19th August 1949 the applicant is clearly out of time.

"Therefore Article 163, Limitation Act is part of the general law of land and in my view it applies on the original side of this Court. Article 163 is framed to meet all cases where steps are to be taken to aside dismissal of suits for default."

20. This decision is binding on me. It is also a decision on Order 9, Rule 9 and on Order 9, Rule 8 of the Code and on Article 163, Limitation Act. The same argument was made there as will appear from the report of the argument at pp. 229-30. The argument was this :

21. That argument did not find favour with the Court of appeal and was overruled. The argument that is made before me is on the same lines and I feel I am bound by the decision of the Court of appeal in Srichand Daga v. Sohanlal Daga and I am bound to hold that such argument cannot prevail.

22. The language of Article 163, Limitation Act is in my opinion such that it covers any application by the plaintiff for an order to set aside any dismissal for default of appearance and I find nothing in the Limitation Act either to exclude from its operation, or to give special privilege to, an application on the original side by the plaintiff to set aside a dismissal for default. I find nothing in the language of the Limitation Act on which to hold that the limitation of 30 days from the date of dismissal which is provided for in Article 163, Limitation Act does not apply to an application by the plaintiff on the original side of this Court to set aside a dismissal for default of appearance. That in my view is the proper interpretation and construction of Article 163, Limitation Act.

31. I am also of the view that it is not permissible for this Court to invoke the inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Civil P. C., to avoid the provisions of the Limitation Act. As I have said before Section 151, Civil P. C., should not be interpreted to mean that the Court has any power in the name of its inherent jurisdiction to suspend or dispense with the statutory provisions or the laws of the land. It is said that no limitation is provided for in an application under Section 151, Civil P. C., But if an application is of the nature which is before me i. e., an application by the plaintiff to set aside the order of dismissal then Article 163, Limitation Act, must be given effect to. It will not help the plaintiff applicant in such a case to say that the Court should invoke its inherent jurisdiction. One short answer to that is that even then it has to be regarded as an application under Section 151, Civil P. C. and if it is an application under the Code then there is no escape from Article 163, Limitation Act. As I have said before however that the language of Article 163 is not such which says that it must be an application under the Code at all. In that view of the matter whether the present application is treated as one under the Code or not it is in my judgment in any event barred by Article. 163, Limitation Act.