Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

19. On the aspect of judicial interference at the interlocutory stage of the election process, learned counsel placed reliance on wp4072-2025-J-FF.doc the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Pandurang Hindurao Patil v. State of Maharashtra and Others , reported in 2023 (3) Mh.L.J. 95. In the said decision, the Division Bench, after considering the celebrated judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer [(1952) 3 SCR 218] and N.B. Khare v. Election Commission [1957 13 ELR 112], held that while ordinarily the election process must not be interfered with by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, an exception can be carved out where the decision of the Returning Officer is manifestly erroneous, patently illegal, or suffers from jurisdictional error. In such circumstances, it would be wholly unjust to require the aggrieved person to wait until the culmination of the election process and thereafter initiate an election dispute under Section 91 of the MCS Act, which is a time- consuming and cumbersome remedy. It was observed that the High Court cannot abdicate its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 in appropriate cases where grave illegality or violation of fundamental principles of election law is demonstrated.

27. It was submitted that unless there exists cogent and conclusive proof of default, such as a certificate under Section 101 or an award under Section 91 of the MCS Act, a candidate cannot be disqualified merely on the basis of newspaper publication. In this regard, the learned Senior Advocate placed reliance on the wp4072-2025-J-FF.doc following decisions to assert that this Court has consistently held that interference in the election process must be exercised sparingly and only in cases of exceptional illegality:

64. A useful reference in this regard can be made to the instructive observations of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pandurang Hindurao Patil (Supra), wherein the Court delineated the contours of judicial intervention in election matters. The Division Bench held that when a petitioner invokes the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 challenging the electoral process, including acceptance or rejection of nomination papers, two distinct considerations arise. The first is whether the writ petition is maintainable and the second is whether, in the facts of the case, the Court ought to exercise its discretion. The Division Bench observed that the general principle remains that judicial wp4072-2025-J-FF.doc interference in election matters is not warranted once the election process has commenced. However, to this rule, the Court carved out certain exceptions. It held that in cases where the order of the Returning Officer is patently erroneous or passed without jurisdiction, it would be improper to compel the petitioner to await the conclusion of the entire electoral process and thereafter invoke the remedy of election petition under Section 91 of the MCS Act, which is a time-consuming and protracted remedy. In support of its view, the Division Bench relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) and Dr. Narayan Bhaskar Khare (supra), wherein the principle has been reiterated that the bar on judicial intervention is not absolute and that in cases involving jurisdictional error or violation of fundamental legal norms, the High Court may exercise its constitutional powers.

70. In the present case, if the Appellate Authority has accepted the nomination paper of respondent no. 5 despite the existence of an apparent disqualification under the MCS Act or the relevant Rules or Bye-laws--say, for instance, arrears of dues to the society, or violation of specific eligibility conditions--the petitioner cannot be relegated to a post-election remedy under Section 91 of the MCS Act, particularly when the said acceptance is shown to be without application of mind or contrary to statutory provisions. In Pundlik (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that where the process is vitiated due to fundamental illegality--such as reliance on invalid bye-laws or non-existent eligibility criteria-- the error cannot be allowed to survive merely on the ground that the electoral process is ongoing. Similarly, in Ashok Kumar (supra), the Court observed that judicial intervention is justified where the Court is called upon not to stall the election process, but rather to rectify a grave illegality before it culminates into an irreversible wrong. Thus, if the petitioner has approached this Court promptly and the issue raised pertains to an error apparent on the face of the record in the acceptance of a nomination paper which, if not corrected, would render the entire election process vulnerable to wp4072-2025-J-FF.doc challenge and result in avoidable expense, hardship, and multiplicity of proceedings, the Court would be justified in entertaining the writ petition and granting appropriate relief. However, such intervention must be exercised with circumspection and only when the facts clearly demonstrate that the error is not one which can be resolved through disputed questions of fact or extensive evidence but is apparent from the record, and the relief sought can be granted without disturbing the larger electoral timeline or causing prejudice to the democratic process.