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9. So far as the second reason assigned by the learned Subordinate Judge is concerned, I feel that it is neceessary to clarify the legal position with regard to a prayer for injunction as amde in the present case. The learned Subordinate Judge appears to have taken the view that since recovery of possession is the principal relief claimed in the suit, the plaintiff cannot claim restoration of possession on an interlocutory application because that would mean in a manner decreeing the suit even before its trial. Reliance has been placed upon an earlier decision of this court in the case of Rameswar Lath (1936 (40) Cal WN 1201) (supra). But in my opinion the said decision is no authority for an absolute proposition that no relief on an interlocutory application can be granted under any circumstances which may amount to granting of the main relief prayed for in the suit. Mcnair, J: in the said decision merely pointed out that as a general rule such a relief is not granted in the absence of apparent urgency and injury to the applicant. When I refer to the decision I find that Mcnair, J. did take note of and approve of the principle as enunciated in English cases which acknowledged the existence of a power in a court to give such a relief on an interlocutory application as may also be the substantial prayer in the suit. The learned Judge took pains to consider whether on the facts of the particular case any such ground had been made out for grant of such a relief and observed ; "There is no statement for pleading as to the injury which would be suffered by the applicant if he does not set the injunction which he now prays for and I am not satisfied that there is any urgency in the matter". If the bar to the granting of such a relief had been considered to be absolute by the learned Judge, it would not have been necessary for him to go into the question of urgency or the injury to be suffered by the plaintiff. Granting of such a relief was upheld by the court of appeal in the case of Heywood v. B. D. C. Properties Ltd., (1963) 2 All ER 1063 (1067). Reviewing the earlier authority it was observed: "Those cases, I think, do show that it is only in unusual circumstances that the court ought to take the step of granting substantially the whole relief claimed in the action on an interlocutory application. But they equally show that that is a procedure which, in a proper case, is available. In my judgment, having regard to the admitted fact that the alleged contract registered, was not contract at all this is one of those cases in which it is proper and appropriate to grant by way of an interlocutory application the relief which the Judge has granted". "The same view was expressed by the court of appeal in the case of Acrow Limited v. Rex Chain Belt, (1971) 3 All ER 1175, when the appeal court allowed the appeal and granted an interim relief though it took note of the fact that granting such an injunction meant virtually deciding the action and it was observed that: "that often happens". Mr. Kapoor has rightly drawn out attention to an unreported Bench decision of this court in the case of Lachmandas Daswani v. Messrs. Philis Berry D Cruz (A. F. O. O. No. 243/72, O. S. decided on May 17, 1974). In this decision, the Division Bench distinguished the decision in (1936) 40 Cal WN 1201 by taking the same view as I have taken in the present case. In my opinion, the principle on the point as it emerges on review of the authorities thereon is that if a court is called upon to grant any relief on any interlocutory application which when granted would mean granting substantially the relief claimed in the suit, the court will be very slow and circumspect in the matter of granting any such prayer. It is indeed true that such a relief should be granted only in exceptional cases. Though exercise of such a discretion should be limited to rare and exceptional cases, still at the same time no court should think, as has been the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge, that in law there is any absolute bar to the court granting such a relief. In deserving cases, the court should not hesitate to come in aid of a litigant and uphold the cause of justice by granting such a relief. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge went wrong in reading the decision in (1936) 40 Cal WN 1201 as an authority for a proposition that in law there is an absolute bar to the granting of an interlocutory relief as claimed in the present case and, therefore, not deciding on the merits whether the plaintiff had made out any exceptional case in support of his claim.

10. The learned Subordinate Judge has also relied on an earlier decision of this court in the case of Nandan Pictures Ltd. v. Art Pictures Ltd., in holding that when in the suit the plaintiff has acknowledged dispossession, the plaintiff is not entitled to a mandatory injunction for restoration of possession since dispossession was prior to the suit. Though an observation in the said decision if read not in its context is often cited as an authority for such a proposition, we do not think that the learned Judges really intended to lay down any such absolute proposition in the said decision. Since that observation was made having regard to the earlier authorities on the point, it would be just and proper for me to review these authorities. No doubt the observations of Beaman J. of the Bombay High Court in the Bench decision in the case of Rasul Karim v. Pirbhai Ameerbhai, AIR 1914 Bom 42 appear to support such a view when he observed; "Entertaining the doubt I had, whether in any case the mofussil courts have the power to issue mandatory injunctions on interlocutory applications it appears to me that upon grounds of general expediency the proper course where applications of the kind are made would be rather to expedite the proceedings than to grant an injunction". But in the Division Bench Shah, J did not agree to such a principle when he in his turn observed : "I am not sure that the Indian Court have not similar powers under Rule 2, Order 39". But the facts remains that the observations of Beamen, J did not find approval in subsequent decisions of different High Courts including the Bombay High Court itself. In a subsequent Bench decision in the case of Champsey Bhimji & Co. v. Jamna Flour , Mills, AIR 1914 Bom 195, it was observed by Davan, Acting C. J. as follows: "Having regard to the very clear wrding of Order 39, Rule 2 and to-- the fact that this court has always exercised the power of remedying an injury or wrong by a mandatory injunction on an interlocutory application, I have no doubt whatever that this court has the power to make a mandatory order on an interlocutory application. If the court had no such power, it would be in the power of a party to cause insufferable inconvenience and grave injury to another during the whole time that would elapse between the commission of the wrongful act and the hearing of the suit filed to remedy the wrong and redress the injury". The other learned Judge fully endorsed the view of the learned Acting Chief Justice and this latter view has been approved by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of M. Kandaswami Chetti v. P. Subramania Chetti, AIR 1918 Mad 588. Persuasive reasons given by a learned single Judge in support of the view in the case of Mdlla Surana v. Somulu, needs careful consideration.

11. English authorities on the point do not support an absolute proposition that the court cannot under any circumstance by an order passed on an interlocutory application, restore any state of things prevailing anterior to the suit. In the case of Thompson v. Park. (1944) 2 All ER 477, the court of appeal granted such an interim order setting aside the decision of Asquith J, in Chambers. There, the plaintiff was the owner of a house into which the defendant whose licence had earlier been withdrawn made forcible entry and the question that was raised was whether in the suit brought subsequent to such wrongful trespass an interim order could be passed for removing the defendant and restoring possession to the plaintiff. In allowing such a prayer it was observed by Goddard C. J. "The status quo that could be preserved was the status that existed before these illegal and criminal acts on the part of the defendant. It is a strange argument to address to a court of law that we ought to help me defendant who has trespassed and got himself into these premises in the way in which he has done and say that that would be preserving the status quo and that it would be a good reason for not granting an injunction." In a case much too similar to the case now under consideration by us, namely Luganda v. Service Hotels Ltd. (1969) 2 All ER 692, Lord Denning upheld an interim order directing restoration of possession in the court of appeal. There, the plaintiff was a contractual licencee who enjoyed the protections under the Rent Act of 1965. He was wrongfully dispossessed from the room in a building by the licensor when the licensor in the absence of the plaintiff took over possession of room by changing the lock. On an interlocutory application filed by the plaintiff in the suit brought by him Cross, J, granted him an injunction restoring him to possession of the room. That order being challenged was upheld by the court of appeal. It was observed by Denning, J. "counsel for the defendants submitted, as the plaintiff was not now in occupation, no mandatory order could be made to put him back. He suggested that such an order would require the constant superintendence of the court which the court would not do. He cited Ryan v. Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association (1893 (1) Ch. 116). I look on the case quite differently. The plaintiff is prima facie entitled by the statute to security of tenure of this room. It was unlawful for the defendant to look him out of it; see Section 30 of the Rent Act, 1965. They were wrong to take the law into their own hands. If the defendants had not changed the lock-- and the plaintiff was still in occupation -- I am sure that the court would have granted an injunction to prevent the defendants from locking him out. They should not be in a better position by wrongfully locking him out. As Lord Uthwatt said in Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd. v. Millenium Products Ltd. (1947 (2) All ER 331) "In a court of equity wrongful acts are no passport to favour", we must see that the law is observed. To do this, we should I think, order that the plaintiff should be restored to his room". The same principle was reaffirmed under similar circumstances in the case of Warder v. Cooper (1970)1 All ER 1112, and also in the case of Esso Petroleum Ltd. v. King Wood Motors Ltd. (1973) 3 All ER 1057. Recognising the court's power to grant such interim orders in exceptional cases, it was held that the case in which the court might be expected properly to grant a mandatory injunction on an interlocutory application is where the defendant is found to be "stealing a march" on the plaintiff.

25. The genuinely aggrieved party rushes to the court for a quick remedy in the form of mandatory injunction at the interlocutory stage, but only to be shown a passage from the decision in Nandan Picture's case (supra) which still holds the field: "If a mandatory injunction is granted on an interlocutory application it is done only to restore the status quo and not to establish a new state of things, different from that which existed at the date when the suit was instituted.

26. The status quo on the date of the institution of the suit being obviously the possession of the trespasser, the person unlawfully dispossessed is left to his destiny to wait till the final disposal of the suit which may last till eternity. Coming to the decision itself it may be difficult to appreciate what "restoration of status quo which existed at the date of the filing of the suit" actually means. There is always a cause of action antecedent to the filing of a suit. But does it mean that the suit has to be filed on the very same day in order to get the relief.' This may not very often be possible. But to file the suit even on the next day leaves the plaintiff without any remedy in the form of mandatory injunction on an interlocutory application, if a hypertechnical interpretation be put to the decision. 1 am not inclined to believe that this was actually intended. A person unlawfully dispossessed on a particular day may, if the decision is technically interpreted, be restored to possession even at the interlocutory stage if he can file the suit on that very day but not if it is filed even on the next day. Obviously, there cannot be any justification for this discrimination. Dispossession on the very day and dispossession a day or two earlier hardly makes any difference and to hold that this difference was actually intended would be putting a patently wrong interpretation to the decision.