Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

In spite of the ostensible finality contained in this 'Firman', a further 'Firman' was issued on 7-9-1949, which revoked the earlier 'Firman' of 24-2-1949, and the whole case was referred for opinion and report to Sir George Spence, the Legal Adviser to the Military Governor, who was directed to hear the parties and take such further evidence as he considered necessary. The text of this 'Firman' is as follows :

"In my 'Firman' of 24-2-1949, which as stated therein was issued on the advice of the Military Governor, I directed that effect be given to the findings of the Legal Adviser Justice Qumar Hussain and Justice Abu Sayeed Mirza on the case of the succession to the late Wali-ud-Dowlah. The Military Governor for certain further reasons has now rendered further advice in accordance with which I revoke the direction given in the said 'Firman' and direct the case to be referred for opinion and report to Sir George Spence, the Legal Adviser to the Military Governor, who will hear the parties and have discretion to take further evidence if he thinks fit."

14. The second point urged is that even if there was an effective decree at any time that was completely destroyed by the two 'Firmans' of the Nizam dated 24-2-1949, and 7-9-1949. Lastly it is argued that assuming that a valid and operative decree is still in existence, the City Civil Court of Hyderabad has no. jurisdiction to execute the decree.

15. The determination of all these questions depends primarily upon the meaning and effect to be given to the various 'Firmans' of the Nizam which we have set out already. It cannot be disputed that prior to the integration of Hyderabad State with the Indian Union and the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed uncontrolled sovereign powers. He was the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive, and there were no. constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities. The 'Firmans' were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam and they were binding in the same way as any other law; - nay, they would override all other laws which were in conflict with them. So long as a particular 'Firman' held the field, that alone would govern or regulate the rights of the parties concerned, though it could be annulled or modified by a later 'Firman' at any time that the Nizam willed.

It is on the correct interpretation to be put upon the 'Firmans' of the 24th February and 7-9-1949, that a proper answer could be given to the question raised in the case, namely, whether the decision of the Special Commission which was made operative by the 'Firman' of 26-6-1947, was by reason of these two later 'Firmans' annulled or made incapable of execution. Paragraph 1 of the 'Firman' of 24-2-1949 runs as follows :

"

As advised by the Military Governor, I direct that the findings of the Legal Advisers, Qamar Hasan and Abu Sayeed Mirza JJ. in the late Wali-ud- Dowlah's case be given effect to. The result of these findings is that the claims of Mahboob Begum and Quadiran Bi on the 'matrooka' of the late Nawab Wali-ud-Dowlah are hereby dismissed and Ameer-un-nissa Begum should pay a sum of rupees one lac to Fatima Begum out of the 'matrooka' of the late Nawab."

24. The result will be the same even it we proceed on the footing that the various 'Firmans' issued by the Nizam were in the nature of legislative enactments determining private rights somewhat on the analogy of private Acts of Parliament. We may assume that the 'Firman' of 26-6-1947 was repealed by the 'Firman' of 24-2-1949, and the latter 'Firman' in its turn was repealed by that of 7-9-1949. Under the English Common Law when a repealing enactment was repealed by another statute, the repeal of the second Act revived the former Act 'ab initio'. But this rule does not apply to repealing Acts passed since 1850 and now if an Act repealing a former Act is itself repealed, the last repeal does not review the Act before repealed unless words are added reviving it : vide Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, p. 402 (10th Edition).