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15. Thereafter, at page 379, it was held that even the mode of assessment of damages is not free from doubt. It is beset with certain difficulties. It depends on many imponderables. Their Lordships approved Davies' methods of assessing damages by capitalising the loss on the basis of appropriate years purchase factor. At page 380, their Lordships held that the number of years' purchase is left fluid, from twelve to fifteen, which was quite a common multiple in the case of a healthy man, and the number should not be materially reduced by reason of the harzadous nature of occupation of the deceased man. These principles, however, were only appropriate where the deceased was the bread-winner of the family. Following this settled legal position and after re-considering even the earlier decisions of this court in Bai Nanda v. Shivabhai [1966] 7 GLR 662 (Guj), where Nance's method was followed, it was held by this court in Hirji Virji Transport Co. v. Bashiran Bibi [1971] 12 GLR 783 (Guj), that although both Nance's method and Davies' method give the same result, experienced judges now follow only Davies' method which had now been finally approved by their Lordships as appropriate for dealing with such case in C. K. Subramonia Iyer's case, AIR 1970 SC 376. At page 787 ([1971] 12 GLR 783), it was pointed out following the settled legal position that the assessment was to be made of the loss suffered by tortious act by making an account of all gain and loss arising as a result of the death of the concerned victim (of course otherwise than as by way of fruits of insurance). A fair amount of damages has to be assessed not by way of giving any solatium but as a compensation, which is proportionate to the injury. For the loss caused under section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, the loss which resulted to the dependants is by way of losing the amount which would have been spent on them by the deceased during the period of his expected useful life Under section 2, however, the loss estimated is of the loss to the estate of the deceased. Under the first head the loss had an element of maintenance, while under the second head the loss has a saving element. That is why their Lordships added in Gobald Motor Service's case, AIR 1962 SC 1, that the loss under these two heads should not be assessed twice over. In other words, there should not be overlapping. If, therefore, from the income of the deceased the amount which had been spent on his is deducted, the remaining amount would either be spent on the dependants or would be saved. Loss to the dependants can be arrived at by capitalising the first amount which was the amount spent on the dependants, while the second amount can be arrived at by capitalising the saving made by the deceased from year to year. Of course, the estate could get additional amount by way of damage for the mental agony, suffering and loss of expectation of life. For this damage as per the settled legal position discussed in the earlier decision in Bai Nanda v. Shivabhai [1966] 7 GIR 662 (Guj). damages were to be awarded only as conventional amount which in this country should not be less than Rs. 3,000 because conventional damages on this head in England were initially pound 200 and were raised to pound 500 after devaluation of sterling currency. Thereafter, both these methods were considered in Davies' [1942] AC 601 (HL)) and Nance's [1951] AC 601 (PC) cases and it was pointed out that the same result was reached and how the preference of the experienced judges was now for the later Davies' method which was now finally settled even by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the country.

16. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, it is obvious that when the compensation was assessed in the present case for loss of life of such a bread-winner by applying Davies' method and the learned Tribunal was careful enough to exclude even the heirs and legal representatives like the earning eldest son, Rajnikant, or the two married daughters, it was obvious that the compensation of Rs. 59,904 had been assessed only by way of dependency benefit as the total loss suffered by the petitioner-dependants alone. As earlier pointed out, the cause of action to these dependants of the deceased for the first time in their own right on the death of the deceased due to the injuries inflicted to the deceased in this motor accident. As stated by Lord Wright in Davies' case [1942] Ac 601 (HL), in the aforesaid passage approved by their Lordships in C. K. Subramonia Iyer's case, AIR 1970 SC 376, this was a new cause of action and it was not a claim which the deceased could have pursued in his lifetime for the simple reason that it was for the damages suffered not by himself but by the family members after his death. If this settled ratio was appreciated by the Tax Recovery Officer, he could never hold that these petitioner-dependants were getting this dependency benefit not in their own right and that the cause of action for this dependency benefit had accrued to the deceased in his lifetime. That observation of the Tax Recovery Officer is based on a complete misconception of the settled legal position as per the law declared in our country by their Lordships and, therefore, the decision of the respondent-Tax Recovery Officer is wholly contrary to law as he has sought to attach not the property of the deceased, defaulter-assessee, but the property of the petitioner-claimants which they received in their own right and whose title was settled in their favour by the competent Motor Claims Tribunal in the aforesaid decision at annexure "A".